Editor's note: As protests in Hong Kong have moved beyond their original premise, Michael Tai in this opinion piece reminds us that Hong Kong still suffers from judicial loopholes that could allow fugitives to escape from the court's judgement. Tai is an analyst of international politics, a graduate of Cornell and Cambridge universities and former visiting fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. He taught development studies at Cambridge and is the author of "U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century: A Question of Trust." The article reflects the author's opinions, not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Recent protests in Hong Kong have been predicated on a misunderstanding of the fugitive bill. A survey conducted by a mainstream newspaper found that 90 percent of the people who turned out to protest thought that the bill was to enable the Hong Kong authority to send people back to the Chinese mainland for trial for criticizing the central government.

Extradition is defined as the handing over of a person accused or convicted of a crime to the jurisdiction in which the crime was committed. Police in the jurisdiction initiates the process by requesting for the fugitive to be extradited. The request is then reviewed by the courts of the jurisdiction where the fugitive is located. Safeguards are written into Hong Kong's existing statute, the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance, to ensure that the standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are upheld. The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the UN in 1966 providing a range of protections for civil and political rights. The Hong Kong courts must be satisfied that the fugitive will get a fair trial before handing him to another jurisdiction. The judiciary acts as gatekeepers and is the only institution that can order extradition. The task of scrutinizing any request for extradition lies with the judges, not with the chief executive. Hong Kong's chief executive has no power to order extradition. She only has the power to refuse extradition.

The existing law, however, only allows extradition to some twenty jurisdictions and needed to be amended to cover all jurisdictions. The fugitive bill follows what the UN has outlined each member state to do by bringing the existing statue in line with those of the U.S., Canada, Australia, and other countries. And it closes a loophole that allows criminals to take refuge in Hong Kong.

Contrary to popular belief, the bill was not requested by Beijing, but by the family of a young woman who was murdered by her boyfriend in Taiwan. The murderer, Chan Tong-kai, fled to Hong Kong where he confessed to the murder. But, because there is no legal mechanism in place, the police in Taiwan could not ask for him to be sent back to Taiwan for trial. Responding to the pleas of the victim's family, the Hong Kong authority proposed the extradition amendment in February 2019 to put in place legal mechanisms for the transfer of fugitives to jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, including the Chinese mainland.

The Hong Kong authority submitted the bill to the Legislative Council for consideration after 20 days of consultation with stakeholders and constituencies. The 20-day consultation period was criticized for being too short, but Chan is due to be set free in September and will leave Hong Kong if there is no law in place.

Nevertheless, bowing to the protests, Chief Executive Carrie Lam apologized and withdrew the bill (declared it "dead") and Senior Counsel Ronny Tong has confirmed that it will not come back. Yet the protests raged on with increasing virulence and sophistication and the claim that the movement is leaderless is simply not credible. Protesters demand the unconditional release of arrested protesters and charges against them dropped even as they charged police lines, threw bricks and Molotov cocktails at police officers, besieged police stations, and battered individuals who have taken a different view. It is up to the courts to decide whether those arrested have broken the law. An amnesty would be an erosion of the very rule of law which the protesters claim to champion.

They also demand an independent inquiry into police conduct. The Hong Kong police are doing as good a job as any police force could in dealing with a very challenging situation, as Richard Cullen, a visiting law professor at the University of Hong Kong observed. When he asked those who complain about the police to name any other police force anywhere that could have done a better job, his question is usually met with silence. The Hong Kong police discipline and restrain stand in stark contrast to the way the British dealt with demonstrators in Northern Ireland or the Israelis against Palestinian protesters. And Hong Kong-style protests would simply not be possible in the United States where heavily armed and militarized police and National Guard are deployed against demonstrators. U.S. politicians who express support for the Hong Kong Airport occupation would never allow the same in their own country.

It is worth noting that the Hong Kong Public Order Ordinance, which regulates public meetings and processions, was first enacted in 1967 to crack down on the leftist riots against British colonial rule. It outlawed any gatherings of three or more people without police permission and was relaxed only in 1995, bringing the law more in line with the aforementioned ICCPR which had been in place since 1966. In other words, Britain held back on granting the protections of the ICCPR to Hong Kong for almost 30 years until the eve of the handover.

Hong Kong residents today enjoy as much if not more liberties than at any time under British rule. And when they unfurl the Union Jack and bitterly decry the erosion of their civil and political rights, it is unclear which rights they mean.

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