Editor's note: Freddie Reidy is a freelance writer based in London. He studied history and history of art at the University of Kent, Canterbury, specializing in Russian history and international politics. The article reflects the author's opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

In 2014, Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's first president since the 2001 invasion led by the Unites States, said that "When I first took charge of office, we did not have a flag or a currency. We were the target of foreign agendas. We were homeless in our own country." Five years later and against the backdrop of another bloody election, we mark the beginning of the 18th anniversary of the invasion and ask what did the U.S.-led campaign bring and is Afghanistan once again on the brink of civil war?

The U.S. is by no means the only nation to have struggled and lost in Afghanistan. The British Empire was defeated in the 1840s and so too was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1988. The U.S. made the same mistake as their predecessors. All three nations entered Afghanistan with motives outside of Afghanistan itself. 

The British wanted to curb the territorial interests of the Russian Empire which threatened India. The USSR was afraid of American influence on its southern boarder as Afghanistan is geographically straddled by then U.S. allies Iran and Pakistan. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, American-led forces became the latest foreign power to set foot in Afghanistan in pursuit of al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden.

The Taliban had taken control of Afghanistan in the ensuing civil war after the Soviet Union's withdrawal. Taliban rule in Afghanistan was bloody and violent with the application of their strict fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, which among other things prohibited women from working outside the house, receiving an education or leaving the house unaccompanied by a male relative.

The emancipation of women in Afghanistan is certainly something which the U.S. is keen to point to when discussing the positive legacy of Afghanistan. The U.S. can also point to the relative stability of the Karzai government and its successor headed by Ashraf Ghani. The ratification of a constitution, improved press freedoms and establishment of a police force are other areas of moderate success. The aid-dependent economy has also shown signs of recovery with improvements to the nation's infrastructure. In context, the capture of Osama bin Laden appears an almost unrelated issue.

What is next for Afghanistan though? Many had thought that Barack Obama would be the president to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and bring to a close America's longest foreign campaign. However, like Gorbachev before him, additional troops were sent to Afghanistan in a surge to hasten withdrawal but instead led to a galvanized resistance. This too is an echo to the U.S. campaign in Vietnam. It is also what the British did in the 19th century after the Retreat of Kabul.

For the occupying nations of Afghanistan, leaving has proven to be the hardest thing. The sheer scale of the losses for British, Soviet Union or indeed American troops led to an undeliverable ambition to stay and justify the blood spilled as being part of something "bigger." This imperial hubris was met on the Afghan side by a sense of collective unity and national identity forged by enduring foreign occupation. This identity was closely bound to religion and ultimately led to jihad. 

For the U.S., the threat of a return to civil war is real. The Afghan government has also been placed in a difficult position. Bilateral talks between the U.S. and the Taliban have recently collapsed but had hitherto excluded the Afghan government. In an apparently seismic concession, the U.S. appeared willing to trade Taliban rule for security against more extremist elements gaining influence in the region such as offshoots of al-Qaeda or a resurgent ISIL.

The main crutch for the Afghan government has been the ability to call on U.S. military power and also be able to direct aid. If the government cannot rely on these two pillars then its authority is severely diminished. Furthermore, President Karzai and his successor Ghani are from the former Northern Alliance, a coalition of former foes who joined in opposition to the Taliban in 1996. There therefore exists a clear delineation of allegiances and an apparent likelihood of conflict after an American withdrawal.

The breakdown of talks between the U.S. and the Taliban has led to a wave of violence across the country during the presidential elections. There also appears to be a dispute over the outcome of the election with both candidates declaring victory. With this state of unrest, is the U.S. prepared to hand control back to the Taliban 18 years after toppling their brutal rule? Is the promise of Taliban resistance to more extremist elements believable or indeed deliverable?

When asked, what advice Soviet hero and Afghanistan veteran General Auschev had for the U.S. in Afghanistan, he simply replied, "take the quickest route home." It is a hard challenge to deliver "success" in a form that the U.S. recognizes without reshaping the country in their image. The tough lesson from history is that for Afghanistan to thrive it needs to reconcile a modern, progressive agenda with an Islamic identity and this undertaking must be led and taken by Afghans.

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