Editor's note: Freddie Reidy is a freelance writer based in London. He studied history and history of art at the University of Kent, Canterbury, specializing in Russian history and international politics. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on Sunday declared that the current cessation of fighting in northern Syria was not a ceasefire but a "pause" of hostilities which came about after a hasty and uneasy agreement with the U.S. The so-called "Syrian operational pause" is set to end on Wednesday though, if Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces do not vacate the 70-mile front the Turkish government has imposed between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain.

In something of a silent concession to White House and Pentagon advisers, U.S. troops have been redeployed to western Iraq rather than withdrawing entirely as U.S. President Trump had claimed when declaring he was "bringing soldiers home." This precautionary move is due to the growing likelihood of a resurgence of ISIL. The move is also a signal to Ankara and Moscow that the U.S., while keen to withdraw from the region, is not giving carte blanche to other regional powers.

While Turkey has justified the action on its southernmost boarder as securing the area from "terrorists," the incursion is nearly universally seen as an opportunity for Turkish President Erdogan to settle old scores and capitalize on a power vacuum in the region.

One of the curious outcomes of the Turkish invasion was an agreement reached between the Syrian government in Damascus and the Kurdish-led SDF forces, whereby the SDF would hand over territory to the Syrian government in exchange for protection from advancing Turkish lines. This unlikely deal underscores the universal sense of unease at Turkish actions and that the incursion is not the result of a coordinated policy between Damascus and Ankara to rid the Kurds from northern Syria but rather a fleeting confluence of interests and an uneasy acceptance of a marginal gain. From Damascus' position, it is preferable to have Turkish occupation, a cessation of violence, and a partner in the north, rather than a U.S.-backed SDF foothold.   

Added to this rather precarious arrangement, Russia will also be keen to retain its regional authority and will be a vital, if not entirely benign, force in holding together an alliance which at best will prevent the region from collapsing into chaos.

If there is a common theme or cause for the smallest sliver of hope, it is that no side wants to see the re-emergence of ISIL. Therefore, it will be essential for further agreements, such as the ones between the SDF and Damascus, to be struck. Without the U.S.' backing, it will be impossible for the Kurds to beat a retreat and shield civilians while also ensuring the incarceration of 12,000 ISIL fighters. Therefore, Turkey must be pressured into upholding the "pause" in its campaign and ensuring this transfer of power is as orderly as it can be.

The alternative to this transfer is of course regional fragmentation and a grave return to the days of ISIL insurgency. The Syria campaign is one the Russians have been paying a price for since 2015, with a loss of 117 soldiers and vast sums of money and equipment. Therefore, it is not a foregone conclusion that Russia will wish to remain in Syria. If Russia were to withdraw, it is unlikely that Turkey alone could contain the region. With the U.S.-Kurdish relations in tatters and relations between the U.S. and Ankara not much better either, the U.S. could find itself embedded in the region far longer than it anticipated or wished.

Despite the typically strong words from Turkey's foreign minister and president, it is likely that the "pause" will hold sufficiently long to ensure most Kurds withdraw. It is also noteworthy that U.S. Defence Secretary Mark Esper said that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would "take weeks not days," likely providing additional breathing space to Kurdish forces.

If Turkey is impatient and an orderly transfer of power is not achieved, then the situation will rapidly deteriorate. The fragile web of alliances will be tested to its limit over the coming weeks and, as has been the case since 2011, civilians will pay the price in the battle for regional influence in Syria.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com.)