Editor's note: Hannan Hussain is a security analyst at the London School of Economics-South Asia Center, and an author. The article reflects the author's opinions, not necessarily the views of CGTN.

In the Donald Trump administration's latest tilt towards provocation, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for China Chad Sbragia ramped up speculations of a "possible military confrontation" with Beijing. Testifying to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission this week, Sbragia rest his entire case on distorting the People's Liberation Army's mandate, and accusing it of furthering military expansionism – a policy exclusive to Washington's own foreign policy calculus.

For these hostilities to intensify at a time when Washington's own defense alliances appear in crisis is hardly a surprise. For instance, the Trump administration's desire to steer NATO towards an anti-China consensus may have landed a line or two in the London Declaration last December, but member states are beginning to protest this ominous transatlantic trajectory head-on. Absurd projections of Chinese 5G as a "U.S. national security threat" have also driven a wedge between the U.S. and its forward-thinking European allies.

To make up for all this void, the Trump administration feels naturally inclined to scar – instead of acknowledge – China's reputation as a global player, in hopes of legitimizing Washington's inherently "America first" doctrine.

But Sbragia's tirade does not stop there. His diatribe against China is aimed at strengthening Pentagon's case for greater U.S. military spending on hypersonic weapons and joint forces in the Pacific. "The first effort is to build and deploy a more lethal, resilient joint force," asserted Sbragia, adding that the U.S. Department of Defense should advance "directed energy, artificial intelligence, and autonomous platforms" to stay ahead of the innovation curve in future warfare concepts.

From Washington's viewpoint, a renewed case for military escalation sits well with its existing maritime transgressions in the South China Sea. For instance, 2019 saw the highest number of "freedom of navigation" operations (FONOPs) conducted by the U.S. Navy in the region, according to records released by the Department of Defense. FONOPs – a euphemism for consistent breach into territorial seas – is now succeeded by Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), announced publicly last month. These MDTFs have been mandated to conduct cyber, information and missile offensives against Beijing.

Washington's contentious profile in the South China Sea, and the refusal of key regional powers to give U.S. offensives another lifeline, lays bare the strategic and tactical weaknesses of Pentagon's Pacific policy. Born out of this dilemma is a dangerous military obsession with Beijing, which the U.S. has relied on extensively as a fallback option. The only problem is that U.S.-China escalations enjoy bipartisan support within the confines of Capitol Hill. They struggle to induce a single nod outside of Washington. 

Interestingly, a major shake-up of the U.S. Department of Defense's top-brass this week indicates a larger dynamic at play here: Pentagon's urgency to appear tough on Beijing. John Rood, Pentagon policy chief, was forced into resignation by Trump after resisting technology regulation proposals which aimed to double-down on Beijing. These technology regulation measures, floated by the Department of Commerce, are increasingly viewed as a national security prerogative by the Trump administration, as well as key federal agencies.

Thus, Rood's sudden fall from prominence redoubled Pentagon's resolve to place the National Defense Strategy on a pedestal. This time with Beijing at its center.

Evidently, a major selling-point for U.S. antagonism towards China is the alleged "challenge" Beijing poses to U.S. national interests. Sbragia, like many of his contemporaries, holds that the modernization of military and economic capabilities allows Beijing to "more effectively challenge U.S. national interests." What exact priorities constitute these national interests? And how does sovereign cooperation with Pacific states threaten them? Nothing within Washington's larger strategic discourse reveals an answer.

Much to the displeasure of anti-China belligerents, the political climate in South East Asia is also changing. This week, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte decided to terminate a long-standing Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between Manila and Washington. The agreement, pending a 180-day transition, could effectively deprive present and future U.S. military contingents of legal and operational standing. U.S. Defense chief Mark Esper considers the move as detrimental to the "joint interests" of Manila and Washington. He alleged that their bilateral aspirations were aimed at making Beijing "obey the international rules of order."

Not only is the statement wild conjecture, it is devoid of any factual basis or official endorsement from Manila. In fact, it serves as a classic example of Washington's deflection of strategic shortcomings on Beijing, whenever its provocations backfire in the Pacific. By becoming the self-appointed spokesperson for the Duterte leadership, and Asian allies at large, Esper's comments undermine the symbolism of the Manila-Beijing cooperation – one of the strongest comprehensive strategic partnerships of its kind in the region.

Ultimately, to contemplate military confrontation with Beijing is to threaten the very sovereignty of every Asian power that occupies China's immediate neighborhood. Sbragia stressed the need for Washington to "build a shared understanding of the nature of systemic rivalry with China." Current trendlines suggest that a strong U.S. military footprint would hardly ever serve the basis for convergence, let alone the kind that casts a cynical gaze on Beijing.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com.)