Editor's note: Guy Burton is an adjunct professor at Vesalius College, Brussels. The article reflects the author's opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Last weekend Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that he would be meeting with the leaders of Russia, Germany and France in early March to discuss the ongoing violence in Syria's Idlib province.

So is the Syrian war about to widen in terms of international involvement? Is it possible that not only will issues relating to that war be discussed, but also to other regional conflicts like Libya?

For now, it seems more likely that the focus will be on Syria.

With 900,000 people estimated to have fled their homes since the fighting in December 2019, it is likely that humanitarian assistance will be at the top of the agenda when the leaders meet next month.

The Europeans will want to discuss that access to aid is unfettered and free of any interference. They may find that they have a receptive audience from the Russians. As a key Syrian ally, Moscow has been keen to have its influence and role in the country and wider Middle East acknowledged. To that end Russia may therefore want to see greater EU involvement as well as funding.

At the same time, the Europeans will want to make sure that any fund is not a recognition of approval for the Bashar al-Assad government. They want to see a political transition, including wider political participation. They may therefore ask for more progress on the UN-sponsored constitutional committee for the country. 

That could prove a stumbling block for Russia though. Not only is it not certain that it is fully behind the process, it is not clear that its control over the Syrian government is complete. They may not be able to deliver the Syrian government even if they wanted to.

The Europeans will face difficulties with Turkey as well.

Both the Europeans and their Turkish counterparts are fearful of the new refugee crisis resulting from the fighting in Idlib. Already 3.7 million Syrians have crossed into Turkey during the course of the nine-year war. But Turkey has arguably reduced the pressure for Europe. 

After a spike in refugee numbers in 2015, in 2016 the EU signed an agreement with Ankara in which the latter would prevent any further refugees from passing through Turkey to Europe. As part of the deal the EU promised 6 billion euros to support Turkey's management of the refugee population.

Unfortunately for the EU, its relations have recently become more fraught with Turkey. Last autumn the EU criticized Turkey for intervening militarily in Syria's northeast, after the U.S. reduced its troop presence following the successful fight against the radical ISIL. The Turkish action was aimed at curbing the Syrian Kurds' autonomy in the region, which served as motivation for their cousins across the border in Turkey.

Erdogan did not appreciate the criticism. He also made clear his anger and frustration with the Europeans by claiming that they had failed to deliver the amount promised. Then, when the fighting in Idlib resumed in December last year, he pointed out that Turkey would not bear the brunt of the resulting refugee crisis alone.

But the differences between Turkey and Europe are not limited to Syria alone. There are also potential pitfalls between the two in Libya.

Last week the EU was reported to be deploying warships in the Mediterranean Sea to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya. That could prove awkward when Turkey steps up its assistance to the UN-backed government in Tripoli and supplies more in the future than the Syrian militias that have already been provided. It also raises questions about how willing fellow NATO members are to confront one another as well as the internal differences between EU member states.

Just as the Europeans will find it difficult to accommodate the Russians and Turks, so will Ankara and Moscow have their own difficulties at the meeting in March.

For most of the Syrian war, Turkey and Russia had been on opposite sides of the Syrian war, Russia supporting Assad and Turkey the opposition. In 2017 they buried those differences through the Astana process. Along with Iran, Syria's other main partner, they agreed to sponsor several "de-escalation zones," where fighting between the government and opposition was cooled down.

The de-escalation zones did not mean an end to the conflict though. The lull provided time and space for the government to rebuild its forces and retake those areas, with Idlib the last to be targeted. Turkey worries that if the government is successful in retaking Idlib, its military presence in the country will be diminished, weakening its leverage over Damascus as well as the Syrian Kurds.

Russia's subsequent accommodation for the government's actions has not gone well in Ankara. Erdogan has appealed for American support, including missile-defense batteries to counter the government's advance. Last week Turkey also denied Russian military aircraft the right to fly through its airspace to Syria.

Russia and Turkey also sit on opposite sides of the Libyan conflict as well. There, Turkey stands behind the Tripoli government while Russia is backing a rival, the Libyan National Army under the command of militia leader General Khaled Haftar. 

Since April last year, Haftar has been pressing a military offensive against Tripoli. Last month Turkey and Russia tried to put in place a ceasefire, which Tripoli agreed to but Haftar rejected.

In short, it is likely that the focus of next month's meeting will be on Idlib and what the different powers can do to tackle the violence and the crisis there. That means that if the issue of Libya is addressed, it will only be secondary and on the margins of the talks. 

Although the two conflicts may seem different, they share a number of common features and challenges in the form of weak states, unstable and fractious societies and stagnant economies, alongside the involvement of the same outside powers. While it would be understandable if all the attention were given over to Idlib rather than the broader question of what to do about Syria and Libya, it would be a missed opportunity.

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