Editor's Note: Hannan Hussain is a security analyst at the London School of Economics - South Asia Center and an author. He is also an international affairs commentator for The Diplomat, a leading foreign policy magazine based in Washington. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

About a month ago, Moscow and Riyadh parted ways in Vienna with a certain degree of confidence. Their departure, signaled by differences over an oil supply-limit agreement, led to the initiation of a price war by Riyadh, as Moscow stood its ground. 

Nearly a month later, one thing remains amply clear: none of that confidence ever delivered. An emergency meeting between OPEC, Russia and a range of other oil producers is expected later next week, in hopes of ending a calamitous price war.

The forthcoming meeting is significant for a number of reasons. First, Riyadh's self-initiated oil glut has sunk market prices to their lowest value in almost 20 years, hampering global revenue streams as nations struggle to grapple with the COVID-19 crisis.12 trillion U.S. dollars stood vanished from international stock markets by the beginning of April, ensuring that underperforming economies transitioned from bad to worse. 

The message from the international community is clear: widespread instability will not help the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It will only compound it.

Riyadh's reluctance to bow to U.S. pressure is likely to change next week. Washington's efforts represent a rare attempt at raising oil prices within the alliance, and its sustained pressure on Riyadh is exactly what changed the kingdom's aversion to prospective talks. 

The United States is also one of Saudi Arabia's most powerful allies, emerging as the largest producer of crude in the world. The latter makes it exceedingly difficult for Riyadh to justify meagre production cuts, at the expense of a highly influential – and deeply rattled – U.S. shale coalition.

Part of the reason why Washington did not intervene in the aftermath of the Russia-OPEC fallout, was because the impacts of COVID-19 did not weigh heavily on the U.S. "Good for the consumer, gasoline prices coming down!" tweeted President Trump during the price war.

Today, the COVID-19 pandemic is taking a toll on the United States: shuttered domestic growth, scores of drilling rigs gone dark, and about 50 percent of U.S. shale expected to shutdown. 

Thus, the Trump administration will be eager to block Riyadh's unilateralism, and acquire a semblance of stability in its COVID-19 induced revenue crisis.

Saudi aversion to a broader OPEC-deal is also now a matter of necessity, as opposed to choice. Consider the fact that long-standing regional allies, such as the United Arab Emirates, have ramped up production, in a show of solidarity with their Saudi counterparts. 

But underneath all this symbolism is a desperation to effect drastic production-cuts, as evidenced by UAE's Energy Minister Suhail al-Mazrouei last month: "I cannot see us not agreeing because that's very important for the market and everyone is keen.”

Even on the domestic front, there is nothing to suggest that Saudi Arabia has upped its domestic growth as a result of the price war. Market oversupplies have ensured that crude prices continue to fall below the accepted average, hampering the kingdom's primary goal of balancing its budget. 

To strike the balance, Saudi Arabia needs stability in oil demand, which is contingent on drastic production cuts. With about 80 percent of Riyadh's exports and 66 percent of its fiscal revenue tied to the energy sector, the costs of prolonging low-crude prices are well-known to the kingdom.

Interestingly, next week's meeting is also a litmus test for Riyadh's leadership during the COVID-19 emergency response. It was a key contributor to the G20's multi-trillion dollar fiscal stimulus package, aimed at limiting job and income losses from the COVID-19 pandemic around the world. 

Part of seeing those efforts through, is to create conducive market conditions that further – instead of hamper – the G20's coordinated COVID-19 measures. A consensus in the OPEC+ talks could lend vital impetus to G20's efforts – a forum chaired by Saudi Arabia this year.

Russia is likely to arrive at the talks with greater leverage than before. Since late March, it has been calling for a new "enlarged OPEC deal" to tackle oil demand collapse – a proposition categorically rejected by Riyadh. But pressure by non-OPEC members (such as United States, Canada, Brazil, Norway and the United Kingdom) to constitute a "new deal" that reflects their broader interests, is a win for Moscow.

Secondly, the Kremlin has pursued its rapprochement with Washington at a time when both parties find the current market situation undesirable. 

"Undoubtedly, there is an understanding [between Putin and Trump] that the current oil market situation is not in the interests of our countries," said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov last week. 

Hence, the onus of convincing Riyadh does not fall completely on Moscow's shoulders. The desperation for drastic oil-cuts is clearly evident.

As oil demand plunges by some 80 percent in countries as far as Spain and Italy, the effect of the pandemic on global markets is impossible to exaggerate. 

With anticipation to cut worldwide oil supplies by 10 percent gaining pace, anything short of the estimate would risk crippling the OPEC+ alliance for good.

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