Editor's note: Tom Fowdy is a British political and international relations analyst and a graduate of Durham and Oxford universities. He writes on topics pertaining to China, the DPRK, Britain, and the U.S. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

July 27 marks 67 years since the Korean War Armistice was signed in the village of Panmunjom, a treaty village which sits on the tense divide between the two Koreas. Despite the fact that fighting was formally frozen on such an agreement, the war itself is yet formally to end in the form of a peace treaty. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Republic of Korea (ROK), as well as the United States, technically remain in a legal state of war.

Two years ago there was hope that this finally might come to an end on the back of the denuclearization issue. First, ROK President Moon Jae-in met with his counterpart Kim Jong Un in this location for the historic Panmunjom summit, where they made a vow to work towards attaining this goal. This was then followed up by an equally unprecedented event in Singapore, whereby U.S. President Donald Trump met with Kim and agreed towards a similar set of principles, albeit not joint commitments.

Yet two years later, nothing has changed. The following year, talks between Washington and Pyongyang have broken down. The famous Hanoi summit where Trump met with Kim yet again ended abruptly without a deal, having been sabotaged by the influence of national security advisor John Bolton. The United States were not interested in compromising on the DPRK's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, but insisted upon a unilateralist approach to total denuclearization, something Pyongyang found unacceptable. A year of complete stalemate followed.

It is ultimately the prevailing interests of both countries which are propelling this status quo, and thus the sustaining of the Korean War. Pyongyang sees its nuclear weapons program as essential to its state survival. Placing maximum emphasis upon national sovereignty and amplifying its own leverage in order to control its national environment, the country's nuclear weapons program is regarded as the ultimate form of insurance. To completely surrender this in exchange for American sanctions relief would be to place its security on the goodwill of what is effectively its archenemy, and allow it to be dominated. This goes against the entire ethos and ideology of the state.

On the other hand, the United States perceives that legitimizing the DPRK's nuclear program is in effect a form of strategic capitulation which will undermine its influence on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, thus it demands nothing less than complete denuclearization. Washington notes that a legitimate nuclear DPRK, even if its capabilities are capped by agreement, will continue to make demands and have greater economic power. Such would be orientated towards weakening the U.S. position in the region as a whole.

In turn, this is closely linked to the sentiment as to why Washington resists the idea of ending the Korean War altogether. For many U.S. policymakers, a resolution to the conflict which is not on completely favorable U.S. terms subsequently reduces the country's justification for a troop presence in ROK and thus weakens the relevance of the alliance structure with Seoul. Like Pyongyang's sustaining of the nuclear program, some believe the status quo and thus the constant "state of war" is inherently better for Washington. Peace should thus only be acceptable on the premise that Pyongyang can be fundamentally "changed" to suit U.S. preferences and thus drawn into the American sphere of influence.

What now? There has been some speculation and gossip that Kim Jong Un could opt for a last minute summit with Trump and secure a deal before the election. With the President being seemingly likely to lose, and still more likely to strike an agreement than other administrations, this could be Pyongyang's only chance at gaining something, even if incremental. Joe Biden has signaled a potential return to the "strategic patience" policy of the Obama organization, and has made it clear he has no interest in meeting Kim.

Either way, it is quite obvious that any last minute agreement would be small in scope, and would be merely a "breakthrough" paving the way to future potential talks, the underlying policy of both countries will not change and nor will they offer enough space to meet in the middle. For example, an agreement to end the Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor in terms of lifted sanctions relief.

However, as a whole, in no circumstances would any potential meeting yield strong enough results to formally end the Korean War. The nuclear issue is not the cause of such a development, but it is a symptom of it. Whilst both countries pay lip service to the idea of peace, in practice both Washington and Pyongyang vest their respective strategic interests in an upholding of the status quo, and will only tolerate the shifting of that status quo save that it is entirely in their direction, which in turn becomes intolerable to the other. Thus, 67 years later, there's no end in sight just yet.

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