Editor's note: Li Yun is a researcher at the Institute of Foreign Military Research of the Department of War Research, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

At the end of July, a source from the Republic of Korea (ROK) government revealed that the ROK and the U.S. planned to hold a joint military exercise in mid-to-late August. The scale of this military exercise will be smaller than the ones in previous years, and computer simulation will be the main form.

As the first joint exercise between the two states after the disruption of contact between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the ROK, the exercise has attracted a lot of attention. On June 16, DPRK bombed the inter-Korean liaison office in the Kaesong Industrial Zone in DPRK.

Moreover, the exercise comes at a time when COVID-19 continues to wreak havoc in the U.S. and its military bases in ROK. In the past three weeks, the U.S. military in ROK has reported nearly 50 confirmed cases.

The U.S. has reduced the scale of the exercise over concerns surrounding the pandemic but insists on holding it, mainly for ends that serve the interests of U.S. President Donald Trump in the upcoming elections. During Trump's presidency, diplomacy has been completely reduced to a tool for his personal gains.

In fact, Trump has repeatedly taken actions contrary to international consensus, which has exacerbated tensions in many regions. However, as far as this joint military exercise is concerned, it could show Trump's tough image. At the same time, this exercise could also be Trump's bargaining chip to promote the improvement of relations between the DPRK and the U.S. After all, the exercise is dominated by computer simulations and Trump can cancel the exercise at any time in exchange for "improvement" in its relationship with DPRK, and label it as his own diplomatic achievement.

For the ROK, this military exercise is imperative for the smooth implementation of its plan to take back the wartime military command before 2022. Starting early 1950s, the U.S. troops stationed in ROK held the command of the ROK army for a long time. In 1994, the ROK took back its peacetime military command.

ROK President Moon Jae-in has promised to take back the wartime military command during his tenure. The plan for the transfer of wartime military command consists of three phases of assessment. In 2019, the first phase of the assessment was completed. This military exercise is an important step in the second phase of assessment.

It will assess whether the ROK army has "full operational capability (FOC)" in order to take back the wartime military command. If the second phase of assessment is completed as scheduled, the third phase will begin next year. As a result, the ROK is expected to take back its wartime military command by 2022.

If Seoul takes back its wartime military command, it will have a significant impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It means that the country's national defense autonomy and its autonomy in the alliance with the U.S. will be enhanced, giving it a greater say in the peninsula and paving way for the easing of tensions and the final settlement of the conflict.

At the same time, the transfer of wartime military command is also conducive to the normalization of the U.S.-ROK military alliance, changing the bilateral military relations from "master-servitor relationship" to "partnership relationship" and promoting the long-term development of the military relations between the two countries.

However, the bilateral joint exercises have always been one of the barometers of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK regards the joint exercise as preparations for launching a war, and it strongly opposes it every time. Therefore, the DPRK will definitely respond to this military exercise.

After the DPRK publicly reports COVID-19 cases in the country, it will have to make a corresponding military display to show that the overall domestic political and security situation has not been significantly affected by the epidemic. Moreover, for DPRK, "showing weakness" at this time is equivalent to "assisting in election" for Trump.

Nevertheless, the DPRK's response will be modest. In addition to making a strong statement, it may hold a certain scale of military exercises or live fire from long-range artillery or launch short-range missiles. But it will not actively provoke military frictions near the land and sea military demarcation lines with the ROK, let alone conduct nuclear tests. This is true because if COVID-19 has indeed hit the DPRK and the world is working together to deal with the pandemic, its overreaction will incur tremendous international criticism, thereby hampering epidemic prevention and economic recovery.

For all these reasons, this military exercise will not have a substantive impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. First, the DPRK's moderate restraint will not provide the U.S. with an excuse for further provocation. More importantly, with the ROK's ruling party winning a big victory in this year's parliamentary elections, candidates from Moon's party have a high chance of winning the 2022 presidential election. Moon's successor will likely continue to implement the current policy toward the DPRK.

In regard to the U.S., the DPRK has recognized the true face of Trump's peninsula diplomacy and no longer hopes that he has enough sincerity to improve ties. It remains to be seen whether the situation on the peninsula is relaxed or made more tense after the end of the U.S. presidential election.

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