Editor's note: Guy Burton is an adjunct professor at Vesalius College, Brussels. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

On September 19, the U.S. demanded the reimposition of UN sanctions against Iran for failing to comply with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA had been agreed between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany whereby Iran would freeze its nuclear program in exchange for having sanctions lifted so that it could trade and receive investment more freely.

However, a day after the U.S. made its demand the three European signatories – Britain, France and Germany – responded by saying they did not recognize the American request. They pointed out that the U.S. had withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018 and so was not in a position to make such a demand.

Along with the other signatories – Russia and China – also stating their commitment to the JCPOA as well, does that mean that the American challenge can be completely disregarded? Is the crowing by Iranian leaders justified?

In short, no. Although the JCPOA has survived for now, it is in a precarious state. Despite the apparent divide between the Americans and the Europeans, there are some common points of concern. Like the U.S., the Europeans have not given Iran a clean bill of health.

The so-called E3 point to the fact that after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of  its "maximum strategy" campaign to squeeze the administration, Iran's leaders announced they would increase the processing and stockpiling of nuclear material.

At first the Iranian threat and action was not a problem: its processing and storage remained under the levels allowed by the JCPOA. But by the end of the year they had gone over. Rather than reimpose sanctions through the "snapback" mechanism – which is what the U.S. has been demanding – the Europeans initiated the Dispute Resolution Mechanism last January.

The Europeans reiterated their concern over Iranian processing and stockpiling this month. They also complained that Iran was installing new and more advanced centrifuges at the nuclear facility at Natanz and was carrying out research on centrifuges which are not allowed under the JCPOA.

In addition to these breaches, Iran was also pushing against the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) right to visit and monitor activity at its nuclear sites. However, those differences appeared to have been resolved last month with Iran granting the IAEA access to two sites.

Iran is therefore on thin ice with the Europeans. But what unites the two is the wish to keep the JCPOA alive. While the other signatories are not happy with Iran's behavior, they share a common interest in stretching the dispute mechanism out, until American presidential election in November. Since he was vice president when the JCPOA was signed, the signatories may expect that Democratic candidate Joe Biden will bring the U.S. back into the fold as a party to the agreement.

However, if Donald Trump is reelected, that could make for a more uncertain, even dangerous outcome. Buoyed by a strong domestic mandate, he would be unlikely to step back from the strategy he has already embarked upon. If that happens, then it could well happen that the more hardline elements in the Iranian leadership may push to build a nuclear weapon as quickly as possible.

The repercussions of doing this would be significant. On one hand, it would be hard for the other JCPOA parties to maintain their support for the deal, given the likelihood that it would involve substantial scaling up by the Iranians. It would also make them look foolish for having backed the agreement for so long even as Iran was increasing its nuclear material. For Iran, the diplomatic consequences would be severe, as it quickly acquires pariah status.

On the other hand, the Iranians may calculate that a breakout for a nuclear missile may be worth the pain, especially in the short term. It will not have escaped their notice that after several presidents' containment and pressure against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), that strategy was effectively abandoned by Trump.

At first Trump used strong language and threats against the DPRK's leader, Kim Jong Un. But he then reversed course and met with him three times. The two sides were unable to reach an agreement. The DPRK was unable to leverage its nuclear status into a more profitable economic situation.

Despite the absence of an agreement, Kim may presumably be confident that his acquisition of nuclear weapons and capacity to produce more ensures his administration's survival. Not only may the U.S. fear who or what would replace Kim, but they may also worry that a breakdown of order would make it easier for some of those nuclear weapons to fall into other people's hands, including non-state actors like terrorists.

Given the DPRK experience and possible American fears, Iran's leaders may therefore see some merit in pressing ahead with their nuclear program. Perhaps for that reason, it began to increase its ability to produce and store more nuclear material. 

If that is the case then, it is therefore not enough for the other JCPOA signatories to adopt what seems to be a wait-and-see approach to the current dispute. Instead, they should be more proactive and work with Iran to find a lasting solution that can satisfy all parties and does not rely on the outcome of the upcoming American election.

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