Editor's note: Zhou Wenxing is a research fellow at Huazhi Institute for Global Governance, Nanjing University and former Asia Fellow at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

In their joint statement titled "U.S.-Japan global partnership for a new era" last week, the leaders of the two allies opposed "any unilateral attempts [by China] to change the status quo in the East China Sea," reiterating their objections to the alleged "unlawful maritime claims and activities in the South China Sea" by China, and shared "serious concerns" on issues pertaining to Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

Most importantly, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joe Biden mentioned the Taiwan issue, claiming that they "underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues." This is the second time that the two allies have referred to the issue in their joint statement since 1969 when they had not established diplomatic relations with China.

The U.S.-Japan joint statement indicated that Suga's cabinet has devoted itself to a confrontational policy with China. In fact, Suga began confronting China starting from the inception of the Biden administration in January. For example, the Japanese government interfered in China's domestic affairs in the so-called "2+2" security dialogues in March, when U.S. secretary of state and secretary of defense visited Tokyo. It also encouraged more European nations to help contain China in a high-level security dialogue with Germany on the eve of Suga's U.S. visit.

One of the main motivations driving Suga's cabinet to counter China lies in the longstanding yet growing strategic anxiety about a rising China shared by some Japanese political elites. Their anxiety became much more acute particularly when China overtook Japan as the world's second largest economy at the end of 2010.

Another one is Suga's desire to secure a second term in coming September when general elections are to be held. Given the limited time left, and, what's worse, his low approval ratings, Suga has to showcase tangible results immediately to woo voters and lawmakers alike. For the prime minister, standing up against China could shift the focus of the Japanese people on domestic issues, like the raging pandemic, and help make some breakthrough in foreign affairs.

Two important factors also contributed to the reorientation of Suga's anti-China policy. 

The internal one is the negative view of China held by many Japanese people. The external one is the Biden administration's calling for reviving the U.S. alliance to counter China, which fits exactly with Suga's wishes. As a key ally praised by the joint statement as "a cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world," Japan has already been placed at the forefront to counter China.

Undoubtedly, Suga's cabinet's anti-China policy is expected to bring extensive damage to China-Japan relations, triggering multiple political and economic risks to Japan and the region and beyond.

The Chinese government has rebuked the Japanese government for its efforts to contain China. Calling Japan-U.S. cooperation to counter China a "despicable collusion," Zhao Lijian, the spokesperson of China's Foreign Ministry, lashed out at Japan at a daily briefing that it had downgraded itself as the U.S.'s "strategic appendage."

A deteriorating diplomatic relationship with China might also hurt Japan's economic interests, given its increasingly deepening economic interdependence on the Chinese market. As its largest export market and trading partner, China represents more than 20 percent of Japan's total trade, according to Japanese trade statistics. 

Japan's meddling in the China's internal affairs particularly on the Taiwan issue would further complicate the sensitive issue, intensifying the political stalemate across the Taiwan Straits and causing instability to the region. This is not in line with any party's interests in the region.

Viewing U.S. confrontational policy to China as an "opportunity window," Suga's cabinet's following of U.S. footprint to contain China is too risky nevertheless. As warned by Taketsugu Sato, a senior national security correspondent of Japan's Asahi Shimbun, that while being an important ally to Japan, U.S. national interests "do not always dovetail with Japan's." "Stability in the Japan-China ties also offers huge gains in the national security field," he added.

In a word, Suga's decision to counter China is doomed to be counterproductive. It would neither live up to his expectations of drawing more votes in the short term nor serve the purpose of fulfilling Japan's great power status in the long term. Suga's cabinet should strike a balance, when making its China policy, between its domestic demands and foreign realities as well as between its ties with the U.S. and China.

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