Editor's note: Guy Burton is an adjunct professor at Vesalius College, Brussels. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Iran's new president, Ebrahim Raisi, will have a lot on his plate to deal with as he takes office this week. He will have to manage any potential blowback following a drone attack on an Israeli-linked oil tanker last week, which the U.S. and Israel believe Iran was behind. He will also have to decide whether or not to continue talks to get the U.S. back into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement in which the U.S. lifts sanctions in exchange for Iran freezing its nuclear program.

While getting the JCPOA back on track will likely take up much attention during Raisi's first weeks, it is important not to see Iranian foreign policy as solely a confrontation between Tehran and Washington. He will have several other issues to deal with, including Iran's wider relations in the Middle East and how it deals with other world powers, like Russia and China.

Undoubtedly, the start of Raisi's presidency will be dominated by the JCPOA and the attacked oil tanker. Although Iran has denied responsibility for the attack that killed two crew members, including a Briton, there have been reports that the U.S., Israel and Britain may be planning a response. If so, this could not come at a more awkward time. Since the start of the year, the new American administration under President Joe Biden had been talking indirectly to the Iranians about restarting the JCPOA. But the optimism of June has given way to a less optimistic prognosis today.

The Americans worry that Raisi will replace the current negotiating team with a new one that will make new and difficult demands. Already, Washington has been disappointed by Tehran's unwillingness to allow talks to go beyond the current nuclear deal to include other points of contention like Iran's ballistic missile technology or regional activities. At the same time, the U.S. is worried that the lack of international inspections means that Iran has been speeding up its research and production for its nuclear program.

Meanwhile, the Iranians have been greatly frustrated by the American unwillingness to guarantee that sanctions will not be reimposed if they go back to the nuclear accord. While Washington justifies this on the grounds that a democracy cannot be bound from one administration to the next, the Iranians see this as a problem, as few foreign firms will be willing to trade or make long term investments in the country if they fear getting caught out by American sanctions again.

Beyond the JCPOA and the attacked tanker, Raisi will be concerned with Iran's wider position in the Middle East. It is likely that he will continue his predecessor's dialogue with Saudi Arabia, which began earlier this year. While both countries have long been rivals, relations deteriorated significantly after 2016, when the Saudis executed prominent Saudi Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, and the two countries withdrew their ambassadors.

The talks arguably suit Iran more than Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are in a weaker position. Although they are important American allies, they do not have as close a relationship with the Biden administration as they did with his predecessor, Donald Trump. They are also at risk from the supposed American "pivot" away from the Middle East, which would mean less American involvement in regional security.

Even if he wanted to, Raisi would be unable to give the Saudis much. In Yemen, for instance, there is little that Iran can do to diminish the challenge of the anti-government Houthis toward the Saudis in their military intervention in that country. Although the Houthis are beneficiaries of Iranian assistance, it is not as all-encompassing as some observers have suggested. Unlike other militias, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, where Iranian finance and assistance are essential, that for the Houthis is more modest. Consequently, the Houthis are less dependent on Iran and can exercise greater autonomy in their military and political strategy against Riyadh.

Beyond Saudi Arabia, Raisi will face both opportunities and challenges in the Gulf. If the Americans are serious about withdrawing from the region, this will only enhance Iran's current position in Iraq. It already provides assistance to several political and militia groups there. Under Raisi, this will likely continue, especially because the alternative – a volatile Iraq in which tensions between the political class and society escalates and without any Iranian input – is not one that Tehran would consider on its doorstep.

Elsewhere, Raisi will need to navigate the apparent rapprochement between the Arab Gulf monarchies. In 2017 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain led an Arab Gulf dispute with Qatar. Among their reasons was criticism of Qatar's supposed support for Islamists and Iran. Ironically, the blockade actually enhanced Iran's relationship with Qatar, as the boycott forced it to look toward Tehran for trade in vital foodstuffs and other essential imports.

The dispute ended just before Biden's inauguration and without Qatar yielding to Saudi and Emirati demands. However, now that normalization is the order of the day, this raises questions over whether Iran's influence in Qatar and the Gulf can be sustained or will now diminish.

Further afield, Raisi will need to grapple with the coming end to the Syrian civil war. Iran was an early supporter of the Bashar al-Assad regime as the 2011 uprising transmogrified into an armed conflict between the government and its various opponents. Iran provided both financial and military assistance to Damascus, which was later backed up by Russia after 2015.

Iran, Russia and Turkey – the latter on the other side and backing key opposition groups in the north of the country – have played an important role in managing the conflict through the Astana Process. But as the war looks to be winding down, cracks are starting to show. Tensions have been bubbling up between Russians and Iranians in the Assad-controlled parts of the country as they seek to position themselves to take advance of the commercial openings presented by Syria's postwar reconstruction. Managing these will be challenging for Raisi, as he will want to make sure that pursuing them does not lead to problems with Russia elsewhere and on different files, such as security cooperation and economic opportunities at home.

Cultivating a security and economic partnership with the Russians is only one prospect. Raisi will also want to do the same with other global powers, especially China. Already Iran and China have been enhancing their relationship and reached an agreement in a range of areas in March of this year. Raisi will want to build on those by putting more substance to them. If he can do that then he will be able to insulate his country from the challenges presented by his current difficulties with the U.S., especially over the JCPOA and whether it will remove its sanctions.

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