On the eve of the renewed sanctions by Washington, Iranian protesters demonstrate outside the former U.S. embassy in the Iranian capital Tehran, November 4, 2018. /Getty
Editor's note: Guy Burton is an adjunct professor at Vesalius College, Brussels. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily those of CGTN.
On Monday, November 29, talks restarted between Iran and the signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But while Iran, Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany and the European Union meet in the same room, messages would shuttle back and forth within another room where the American delegation is based.
The talks are the latest in a bid to get the U.S. to return to the JCPOA, having pulled out of it under former President Donald Trump in 2018, and to get Iran to return to its commitments in the deal to stop the production and stockpiling of nuclear material.
The JCPOA was designed to prevent all of this threat of nuclear weapons. In exchange for freezing its nuclear program, Iran would benefit from the lifting of international sanctions against it. However, that arrangement came to an end with the withdrawal of America, which not only re-imposed sanctions, but added new ones. In retaliation, Iran began enriching uranium.
Despite the restart of talks, though, their prospects are not positive. Having started earlier in the year, expectations of a breakthrough have fallen over time. And the current round of talks – after a nearly five-month pause since the first round – could not be happening at a less auspicious time for the Americans. At the same time, the prospect of no deal will not be ideal for the Iranians either.
The indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran and mediated between the other signatories began earlier this year when the new American President Joe Biden indicated his willingness to return to the JCPOA. Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign was judged to have failed.
President Donald Trump signs a National Security Presidential Memorandum as he announces the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal during a "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" event in the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., May 8, 2018. /Getty
At the same time, Biden could not simply return to the JCPOA as it was acknowledging that the current format of the JCPOA was insufficient. He therefore proposed to seek a new JCPOA which would include Iran's ballistic missile program and its wider regional behavior in negotiations. Adopting such a position was judged to be good for Biden domestically, since it would prevent the Republican opposition from claiming he was a soft touch.
Unfortunately for Biden, his ambitions were greater than reality offered. The Iranians were unprepared to reopen or expand the scope of the JCPOA. As far as they were concerned, the responsibility for the JCPOA's collapse lay squarely with the Americans. If it was to be resurrected, then the Americans needed to return to what they had previously agreed to.
In addition, Biden was negotiating with a lame duck and discredited administration. As a moderate, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had been elected in 2013 with the expectation that his approach would improve Iran's prospects with the outside world. But the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and return of sanctions undermined him and his faction. Then in June the more hardline Ebrahim Raisi was elected – the same month that the last round of the nuclear deal talks took place.
In the five months since, the Iranians have made their further demands on the U.S. Not only do they want to see sanctions removed, but they also want assurances that the U.S. will not collapse the deal again. Although the Americans did express willingness to remove some sanctions several months ago, this has proved insufficient to Raisi's team, which took office in August. Given their hardline status, if they are seen to accept anything less than their maximalist stance, they will risk looking weak at home.
In addition, the demand by the Iranians that the U.S. promise to remain in the deal is undeliverable. There is no way that Biden can promise them that. Since many of the sanctions that exist require renewal, even if Biden agrees to waive them, he cannot bind his successors from not doing so.
In sum then, the impression that is given by the talks is that of a window rapidly closing. Indeed, every month that passes makes it less likely for Biden to achieve a positive outcome. Already he has had to lower his ambitions from renegotiating a new JCPOA to offering to remove some sanctions.
Now he will find it even harder to make concessions. His public approval ratings have fallen, especially in the wake of the Americans' botched evacuation from Afghanistan over the summer. He also faces mid-term elections in 2022. His record will be savaged by the Republicans. As the incumbent, his Democratic Party is likely to lose seats in Congress and then the control of the House and Senate.
With Biden running out of room, his options are few. One is to give up on the talks and continue with the current position outside the JCPOA. But as Trump before him discovered, while it undermines any charges of appeasement from the opposition, it does nothing to prevent the Iranians from advancing their nuclear know-how and material.
Another would be for Biden to cut his losses and agree to return to the JCPOA as it is currently constituted. However, it will make him look weak at home and will not address his initial criticisms of the current JCPOA.
A third option that has been mooted is to reach an interim deal called "less for less." In this scenario, Iran would stop its current enrichment of nuclear material and the U.S. would allow access to some of Iran's blocked funds to provide sanctions exemptions so that Iran can acquire humanitarian goods and services. This approach would not resolve the differences between the two sides, but would keep the talks ongoing and offer something for both while avoiding collapse.
None of these options are optimal for Washington. However, at this point it seems that it is now a question of choosing the least worst option.
At the same time, it is important to realize that Biden is not the only one facing tough and unattractive choices. Although the Iranians have been portrayed in some parts of the media as currently in a stronger position than the Americans, the fact remains that they have a hard choice to make as well.
Like Biden, Raisi and his team will not achieve the maximalist goals that they set for themselves. Any deal that is eventually agreed will likely require them to make some concessions to the Americans. If they do that, that will undermine Raisi's hardline status. However, if he decides against, then the status quo prevails. And that status quo is not one that is positive for Iran. It is a status quo in which Iran is on the receiving end of thousands of sanctions, which constrain its economy and the prospects of more trade and investment, which can be used to improve the prosperity of its people.
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