Editor's note: Henry Gao is an associate professor of law at Singapore Management University. He was the first Chinese lawyer at the WTO Secretariat and the academic coordinator of the first Asia-Pacific Regional Trade Policy Course officially sponsored by the WTO. He is an advisory board member of the WTO Chairs Program. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN. 

On December 11, 2001, China officially became a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A few months later, I started working in the Secretariat of the WTO Appellate Body, followed by another stint as a consultant in the Trade in Services Division. As a staff member of the WTO Secretariat, I was able to observe how the WTO operated from an insider's perspective. At the same time, I also witnessed first-hand how China, as a new Member, started its baby steps in the WTO. Since then, I have been following China's participation in the WTO with great interest, including how it rose from the periphery to the "inner circle."  

In 2011, in an article reviewing China's first decade in the WTO, I suggested that China would grow from rule-taker to rule-shaker, and maybe even a rule-maker. My prediction was largely confirmed by the developments in the next 10 years, with China emerging as a major player in key WTO negotiations such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement, an active participant in all of the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) negotiations currently under negotiation, and even the driving force behind the JSI on investment facilitation. 

However, just as China is about to start its third decade, some WTO members have begun to question the value of the multilateral trading system. According to them, the existing rules of the WTO are insufficient to deal with the "challenges" presented by China's unique economic system. Therefore, they argue that new rules are needed, either in the WTO or in other forums such as various free trade agreements and plurilateral initiatives, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) or the "Trilateral Initiative" launched by the U.S. along with the EU and Japan at the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2017. 

Unfortunately, however, such a view fails in both the diagnosis and the prescription.  

First, as I have long argued, to the extent that the other members have problems with specific aspects of China's trade and economic policies, existing WTO rules and China's WTO accession commitments already provide ways to address these problems. It is the prerogative of these members to choose not to make full use of these rules, but their own failure to enforce existing rules does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the existing rules are insufficient and therefore new rules are needed.   

Second, even if there might be gaps in existing rules, the best way to address the problem would not be through the regional trade agreements, or worse yet, unilateral trade measures. As we can see from the aftermath of the disastrous trade war by the Donald Trump Administration, unilateral trade restrictions by the U.S. not only failed to provide a meaningful recalibration of the bilateral trade relationship, but also backfired and hurt its own economy. Regional trade agreements are also of rather dubious value, as we can see from the failed attempt of the U.S. to co-opt the TPP.  

Instead, the only proper forum is through discussions in the WTO, which, so far, remains the only trade agreement that involves all the major players like the U.S., EU and China. It also has the added advantage of having a binding dispute settlement system, or should I say "had," before the U.S. killed its Appellate Body and rendered the system inoperative. 

So why has the U.S. not chosen this route and instead preferred to address the issue through either regional initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or plurilateral ones such as the trilateral initiative? The answer is that they want to make the rules within a small group first, and then force them on China as a fait accompli. However, such an approach is highly problematic as it would cause more problems than it solves.  

To start with, China is now a fully-qualified member of the WTO, just like any of its other 163 members. Thus, it does not have to accept any "tailor-made straightjacket of trade rules" that reduce its rights or add to its obligations, as it did when it joined the WTO 20 years ago. But this is not a problem as perceived by some people. Instead, if anything, it is actually more of a promise as it ensures that any discussion on WTO reform must constructively engage China, which is the only proper approach going forward as it makes sure that the largest trader and the second largest economy in the world is on board.  

Moreover, contrary to those who suggest that China's participation in the reform discussion would make things more difficult, China has been playing a constructive role on most issues in the WTO, judging from its record as a WTO member of 20 years. But this does not necessarily mean that China will agree with the U.S. and EU on all aspects of the reform, including what to reform and how to reform. Instead, to have a more fruitful reform discussion, as I argued before, efforts should be made to understand China's own priorities and sensitivities, align the discussions with China's own reform goals and policy movements, and find room for a mutually beneficial agreement with China.  

In particular, in response to claims that there are wide gaps between China's positions and those of the West, it is worth noting that China is always receptive to new ideas and willing to adjust its positions based on new developments. One recent example is that, as Chinese President Xi Jinping said in the opening ceremony of the fourth China International Import Expo, China will take part in negotiations over issues including industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an active and open manner. 

It is only when everyone realizes that China is not the problem, but part of the solution, that WTO reform discussions can be carried forward in a more promising direction.  

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com.)