A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. That's the latest commitment announced by the world's five Nuclear Weapons States. 

In a joint statement released on January 3, 2021, leaders of China, France, Russia, the UK and the U.S. reiterate that "the avoidance of war between nuclear-weapons states and the reduction of strategic risks are their foremost responsibilities". 

What's the significance of this statement? How does align with the ultimate goal of world free of nuclear weapons? And what's China been doing in promoting nuclear disarmament? 

CGTN's Liu Xin had an exclusive interview with Fu Cong, Director General of the Department of Arms Control of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Here is the full transcript of the interview: 

China: P5 Statement a "confidence-building measure"

LIU XIN: In the joint statement, the five permanent members of the UN security council who are also five nuclear weapons state known as the P5, reiterated their commitment to the principle of non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The statement says the five countries reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and their nuclear weapons, for as long as they continue to exist, should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. How significant is this joint statement?

FU CONG: First, let me say that this is indeed a very important document. I would say it is a document of historic importance. This is the first joint statement ever by the leaders of the five Nuclear-Weapon States on issues related to nuclear weapons. The leaders of the P5 happen to be the five Nuclear-Weapon States as well. And the leaders of these countries do not issue join statement very often.

Last time they issued a joint statement was more than 20 years ago. That was in the year 2000 after the Millennium Summit. This by itself shows the significance of this document. In terms of the content, just now you mentioned, this is one of the most important principles that have been reaffirmed in this document, that is a nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought. This actually gives us the understanding of the true nature of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrence and are not for war fighting. The recognition by the five Nuclear-Weapon States of this basic fact will go a long way towards maintaining global strategic stability and reducing the danger of a nuclear war.

And I think this is quite pertinent. I would say it is even very timely given the high tension that is building both in Europe, and to a less extent, in Asia-Pacific.  So this commitment is very important indeed. And, actually in addition to this important principle, there are other elements or points that need to be highlighted in this document. For instance, the leaders emphasized that none of their nuclear weapons will be targeting against each other or indeed against anybody else. This is also important. This will help reduce the danger of unauthorized or unintentional launch of nuclear weapons. This is by itself a confidence building measure and is very important.

LIU XIN: We'll talk about that in just a moment, but I want to highlight this part which caught my attention because the statement also says the five countries each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons.

We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, which is what you were talking about, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other state. How do you assess, however, the level of mutual trust at this moment between major countries, especially between China and the United States for obvious reasons? And does the statement alleviate the concern that there could be a potential nuclear conflict between the two sides?

FU CONG: We have to recognize the fact that, as I said, there are tensions mounting between the major powers. But this is the fact we need to recognize. At the same time, the leaders of all these countries have realized the danger that is inherent in the basic fact that all these countries possess nuclear weapons. That is the reason why the leaders have committed themselves to this basic principle that nuclear war cannot be fought.

In terms of the de-targeting, this is actually a concrete measure of not allowing unauthorized or unintentional launch of nuclear weapons. Because during the peak of the cold war era, the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States would maintain at extremely high level of alert.

So there was a high and the genuine danger of unintentional or accidental launch. In order to prevent that, the leaders in the past, since the late 1990s, China and the Russian Federation, China and the U.S., have issued joint declarations on de-targeting. That is by itself, as I said, confidence building measure and it will actually be conducive to reduce tension and also to drastically reduce the danger of an accidental war, nuclear war.

China played a leading role behind the scene

LIU XIN: As you mentioned, they have been mounting tensions between major countries, but on the other hand, this is an unprecedented, extremely rare statement, extremely rare consensus among the P5 countries at this critical time. So I can imagine there must have been a lot of work right behind the scenes by leaders and senior administration officials among the P5. So what kind of work has been put in by P5, especially in your case by China in drafting, reaching the consensus and releasing such a joint statement?

FU CONG: This is a very good question. Actually, yes, this document was the result of hard work for the last 2 years at least. China actually played a very positive, and I would say a leading role in this effort. This basic reiteration of the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought was first pronounced in the 1985 by President Reagan and Gorbachev between the Soviet Union and the United States. That was at the height of the cold war. The two leaders' announcement of this basic principle actually did a lot in reducing tension between the two nuclear superpowers.

Now that more than 30 years or 40 years later, we are now faced with the situation whereby the tension among the big powers regrettably is quite high. The non-Nuclear-Weapon States quite reasonably expected the P5 or the Nuclear-Weapon States to reiterate this basic principle. China was the first to respond to this appeal from the non-Nuclear-Weapon States. And in our national report to the NPT review conference, we have put that into our report, and in our bilateral declaration with Russia, we have put that into our bilateral declaration.

And within the P5, China has been the one that advocated that we, the P5 should collectively reaffirm this basic principle. And originally it was not responded very positively. We know that during the Trump administration, the U.S. was not interested in anything that is remotely related to arms control issues. And it was not responded very positively. And China was the only country among the P5 that reiterated it publicly and it was widely welcomed by the non-Nuclear-Weapon States. China has continued to push this, and then Russia was very positive, and then the U.S., with the change of government, President Biden's administration agreed to this and later on, UK and France came on board. So this whole document, even though if you look at it, it is not long.

LIU XIN:  Less than 2 pages.

FU CONG：Exactly. But it was the result of 2 years' hard work.

China, U.S. worked professionally for statement

LIU XIN: I want to ask a little bit more details between the interaction you had with the U.S. administration, right? The relationship has been fraught with trouble. Let's say. How have you been able to work towards the same goal? And what does that signify?

FU CONG: Within the P5, there is a P5 process whereby the nuclear issues were discussed very thoroughly, and within the P5 consultation process, China and the U.S. interacted quite professionally. A lot of discussion has been had. On the bilateral basis, we know the saga of the Trump's administration when they talked about this trilateral negotiation and so on so forth. Let me say that, we have been saying all this for a long time, that was only a ruse or hoax that the U.S. side put out to provide cover for their own inaction in terms of the nuclear arms control and efforts. So we resisted that.

China: U.S.-led "trilateral arms control negotiation" a hoax

LIU XIN: Basically, you were talking about the U.S. were seeking a trilateral nuclear arms reduction negotiation involving China, whereas it was originally between Russia and the United States.

FU CONG: That's true. Our basic point is that in the past few decades, China has been exercising a great restraint in our development of nuclear forces and China has adopted the no-first-use policy. China's nuclear arsenal is not at the same level as U.S. or the Russian Federation.

So it is unreasonable to expect China to join in a nuclear arms reduction negotiation. Firstly China is not at the same level.  And actually, we will ask one simple question, by inviting China into this trilateral negotiation, do you want China to raise our level of nuclear armaments to the U.S. level, or do you plan to reduce your nuclear armaments to our level? Then the U.S. was unable to answer that basic question. So, when there was no point for China to participate in this trilateral negotiation. But on the bilateral basis, there has been actually existing channels of consultation between the two countries. Actually, before Trump came to power, China and the U.S. had maintained regular arms control dialogue. And then Trump suspended that. With Biden administration coming into power, our view has always been that we are open to arms control dialogue with all countries, including the U.S. We hope that the U.S. can create favorable conditions that can materialize this dialogue.

Statement provides guidance for China-U.S. cooperation

LIU XIN: So basically, the release of this joint statement also gave a positive signal that China and the United States can work on such important strategic matters professionally. Can we say that?

FU CONG: Yes, of course. Our understanding is that now we have this P5 declaration at the highest level. So, this document should provide the guiding principles for any bilateral efforts that the two sides may have in terms of arms control dialogue and strategic security dialogue.

In our view, with China and the U.S. being the nuclear weapons countries and the two largest economies in the world, there is a lot of things that we can cooperate on. We have the shared responsibility towards the world, not only to our two countries. We have always believed that the bilateral relationship between China and the U.S. goes beyond the scope of our two countries. It affects the entire world. There are so many things that we can cooperate on, for instance, on the issue of nonproliferation, that is in my area, on issues of bio-security, etc. The thing is, we need to have the right environment in our bilateral relationship in order to jump start all these dialogues.
 

China keeps nuke capabilities at minimum level for defense

LIU XIN: Some U.S. officials, however, allege that China is engaged in a remarkable expansion of nuclear capabilities, hyping up a so-called China nuclear threat theory. Could you help us understand exactly on what level is China developing its nuclear capability? Why should the world not be concerned?

FU CONG: First, let me say that the assertion that China is expanding remarkably its nuclear capabilities is not true. As I said, China adopts this no-first-use policy and we have always maintained our nuclear forces at the minimum level that is required for a national defense. That is interpreted by the west as a minimum deterrence policy. And I would say that these things have not changed and will not change. This is point number one. Secondly, that does not mean that China should not modernize our nuclear capabilities, if, for nothing else, for the safety and reliability issues because nuclear weapons also get aged. Sometimes we need to modernize so that they remain reliable, and they remain safe by themselves.

The third point I want to emphasize is that no-first-use and minimum deterrence doesn't mean that the Chinese nuclear forces will remain static, because our security environment changes. We have seen that in the past few years, even today, the U.S. regards China as the biggest competitor. The U.S. is putting trillions of dollars upgrading their nuclear arsenals, which is already the most sophisticated and the largest nuclear arsenal. They have also taken such steps as withdrawing from the INF which is the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. They have also publicly announced that they are going to station intermediate range, ground based missiles in Asia Pacific, which actually may affect China's strategic capability, the survivability of China's nuclear capabilities.

And also, they are actually developing the missile defense capabilities and they are deploying all these capabilities around China and on what we call on the doorstep of China. All these have gravely aggravated China's security environment. So that necessitates China developing its nuclear deterrence capability. This is very important, but it doesn't mean that China, by expanding a little bit its nuclear capabilities, will change its no-first-use policy or will change its minimum deterrence policy. China has no intention to compete with any country in terms of the number and size of its nuclear capabilities.

China the only one within P5 to pursue no-first-use policy

LIU XIN: China is the only P5 country to remain committed to the principle of no-first use of nuclear weapons at any time, and under any circumstances. China is the only P5 country to declare that among the P5. What's the significance of that? Can other countries follow suit?

FU CONG: Actually, as we always say that China is the only Nuclear-Weapon State that declares no-first-use, unconditional no-first use. That has been China's policy since day one of China's entering into its possession of nuclear weapons since 1964. That is very important. The no-first-use policy is not only a declaratory policy. It has practical implications, both in terms of the size of the arsenal and also in terms of the mode of deployment, for instance, the level of alert.

All these will flow from this no-first-use policy. Because China takes the no-first-use policy, China's nuclear forces have remained at a very low level. For us, nuclear weapons are not for war fighting purposes. We will only retaliate after we are attacked by nuclear weapons. We hope that other countries can follow suit.

China: AUKUS sets bad precedent, exposes U.S. double standard

LIU XIN: Time is very limited. I still have three questions. I want to get your answers. First about AUKUS. Right? It's a very important matter. China says it poses serious nuclear nonproliferation risks and violates the spirit of the nonproliferation treaty, but some people say by acquiring nuclear power submarine does not mean acquiring nuclear weapons. What exactly is China stance?

FU CONG: The crux of the matter is that because of the AUKUS, UK, and the U.S., mainly the U.S. most probably will transfer weapon-grade highly enriched uranium to a non-nuclear state, which is Australia.

And the existing IEA safeguards cannot provide sufficient guarantee that Australia will not divert these materials to develop nuclear weapons. So that is the crux of the matter. There are also very bad implications. For instance, this creates a bad precedent that other countries may follow. We know that there are countries even in our neighborhood, in the Northeast Asia, that are contemplating to follow the example of Australia. We are following the situation very closely. It also exposed the double standard of these countries. When we talk about the Iranian nuclear issue, the JCPOA says that Iran cannot possess nuclear materials that is enriched to a level higher than 3.67%. You know the purity of the nuclear material that the U.S. may transfer to Australia, it is 97%. So, these materials can be very easily diverted to nuclear weapons.

China remains committed to ultimate goal of nuke-free world

LIU XIN: China has not, like the other P5 countries, signed up to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon which came in effect a year ago. What is China's stance towards a nuclear free world?

FU CONG: Yes, we always say that we stand for a nuclear free world. We have always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that is a long-term goal that we will not abandon.

At the same time, we believe that such a goal can only be achieved in a step-by-step manner. When it comes to nuclear disarmament, we should take into consideration the security considerations. That is the reason why on the one hand, we share the goal of the member states of this treaty. At the same time, we do not believe that this goal can be achieved with one kick. But at the same time, we are actually engaged in frequent dialogue with non-nuclear states. We share the goal. At the same time, we can help promote the process. At this moment, we are not in the position to join because of the security environment we are faced with.

China: Japan's view on no-first-use policy "perplexing"

LIU XIN: Finally, the only time that a nuclear bomb has ever been used was over Japan in 1945 by the United States. What lessons must mankind remember, keep in mind so that the mushroom cloud never happens again?

FU CONG: The nuclear bombings of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki are tragedies in the human history. There is no doubt about that. But at the same time these events need to be put into a proper historical context and lessons need to be drawn from both sides, both from the countries that used the nuclear weapons and from the side that nuclear weapons were used upon.

At least one big lesson is that aggression will not pay. Aggression would beget annihilation. Standing here, 70 years later, we need to try our utmost to prevent the nuclear weapons from being used again. And that again, coming back to the joint statement, that is the importance of this joint statement. So nuclear weapon (states) need to realize that we should not use nuclear weapons. And in our view, one way to do that, given the current international security environment, given the policies of the Nuclear-Weapon States, one concrete step would be the no-first use. That's why we have been advocating this. One thing we would like to call upon Japan to rethink is that the funny thing is, what is perplexing about the Japanese position is that, on the one hand, it is the only victim of a nuclear use. Also it advocates nuclear disarmament. But on the other hand, it is the most vocal opponent of no-first-use policy. They are actually working very hard, vigorously against the possible adoption by the U.S. of the no-first-use policy. That is, I don't think, a logical position for the Japanese to take.

LIU XIN: A lot of answers are still in the air. Hopefully let's take the step one at a time and this joint statement hopefully will keep us a little bit further away from a possible nuclear war.

FU CONG: That's our hope. Let's work together for that.