Editor's note: Michael. R. Powers is the Zurich Insurance Group chair professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Long before Russia's "military operation" of Ukraine on February 24, national leaders in Europe and North America frequently reiterated their unfaltering support for Ukraine, underscored by strong assurances of grave economic sanctions to be imposed in the event of Russian aggression.

However, when it became clear that the conflict escalated, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appealed to these leaders to do more, noting that threats of economic sanctions had failed as a deterrent.

Subsequently, as Russian forces began its "military operation" against Ukraine from multiple directions, the U.S., UK, and EU put into place a slate of sanctions that some Western leaders described as "massive" and "severe," but which obviously had no immediate impact on the active military conflict.

President Zelenskyy has maintained a persistent online presence, repeatedly asking for more substantial outside help. Specific requests have included both stronger sanctions and concrete military support through the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine.

However, with the exception of a very grudging and convoluted agreement by Western leaders to deny certain categories of SWIFT transactions involving certain Russian banks, Zelenskyy's pleas have gone largely unheeded.

Reading the statements of Western leaders regarding the ongoing crisis – including passionate assertions of their desire and willingness to "stand with Ukraine," to punish Russia, and to do all they can militarily – one is almost convinced of their sincerity. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the discrepancy between what Ukraine's professed friends have done, and what they are capable of doing, paints a very different picture.

On the military side, U.S. President Joe Biden's observation that American armed forces cannot enter the Russia-Ukraine conflict without potentially igniting a major world war is absolutely correct.

However, there are numerous non-nuclear European nations within NATO. There is possibility that, with logistical and financial support from the U.S. and others, they could intervene on Ukraine's behalf (either individually or collectively), providing at least some of the air support requested by President Zelenskyy.

NATO members sharing borders with Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. And certain of these countries, especially those with sizeable ethnic Russian populations, are currently wondering if they could be "next."

Many observers would dismiss this possibility by citing NATO's Article 5, which calls on all alliance members to come to the defense of any individual member attacked within the North Atlantic security zone.

According to this view, if an Eastern European NATO member were fired on while assisting Ukraine, then the U.S., UK, et al. would be compelled to insert their armed forces into the conflict as well.

However, this interpretation is far from the actual language of Article 5. In fact, the North Atlantic Treaty does not require the U.S., or any other alliance member, to assist an attacked member by deploying combat forces. Rather, the relevant language simply states that, if such an armed attack occurs, then each member "will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary…"

In short, one or more Eastern European NATO members could provide direct armed support to Ukraine without automatically compelling a nuclear power to enter the fray; and that presumably could be clarified by all parties a priori.

Of course, it is understandable that no relatively small Eastern European country would want to enter a military contest with Russia. What is much more difficult to fathom is why the U.S., UK, and EU have been unwilling to impose more damaging economic sanctions on that nation.

Western leaders frequently have stated that their current sanctions – freezing accounts of Russia's largest banks and certain prominent individuals, denying Russian access to Western capital markets, embargoing exports of sophisticated technology to Russia, placing the (largely completed) Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline on hold, and, most recently, imposing the partial SWIFT ban – are "unprecedented." By certain measures, this is probably true.

However, if one considers that the U.S. and EU imposed even greater restrictions on SWIFT transactions involving Iranian banks in 2012 (with far less handwringing), it is easy to see that that characterization is somewhat disingenuous. 

Furthermore, given the long run-up to Russia's operation and the broad public discussion of likely sanctions, it is obvious that major Russian corporations and powerful individuals have had ample opportunity to prepare for these economic restrictions, thereby minimizing their ultimate impact. 

During the recent negotiations among the U.S., UK, and EU over the SWIFT-based sanctions, the Achilles' heel of Western resolve came into full public view: Many EU nations routinely transfer huge amounts of money to Russia in exchange for the fossil fuels they use to run their factories and heat their homes. 

In fact, Russian exports account for about 41 percent of the natural gas and 27 percent of the crude oil consumed by the EU. This crucial source of revenue to Russia has been largely unaffected by the current slate of economic sanctions, which notably addresses only future Nord Stream 2 gas exports and exempts all energy-related SWIFT transactions involving Russian banks.

Reviewing the totality of European and North American responses to the Ukraine crisis, it is difficult to find much evidence of countries willing to make the sacrifices necessary to "stand with Ukraine" in a truly effective way. The reason for this is simple: When confronting an adversary, any individual assault, whether military or economic, tends to be costly for the nation delivering it as well as for the target. 

Although such costs can be spread fairly painlessly over the members of a large alliance when sanctioning a relatively small country, they become quite significant with an adversary as large and powerful as Russia. 

As Ukrainian fighters continue to hold out, day by day, against a superior military operation, one wonders whether Russia's energy customers in the West ever will accept the pain of imposing truly painful sanctions.

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