Editor's note: Keith Lamb is a University of Oxford graduate with a Master of Science in Contemporary Chinese Studies. His primary research interests are China's international relations and "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently stated that strategic mistrust is at the core of China-U.S. tensions. Consequently, if this cause of discontent can be ameliorated then other tensions will ease. 

Strategic mistrust describes a mutual breakdown in China-U.S. trust regarding each other's long-term aims. For example, the U.S. accuses China's heightened naval presence in the South China Sea as having ambiguous intentions that threaten the U.S. naval presence. For China, U.S. strategic ambiguity towards China's Taiwan region is regarded as sovereign interference. 

Strategy works on many levels. On a micro level, one can question the strategic calculations of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to China's Taiwan region, where some ponder whether the U.S. is pushing for geopolitical gain by not respecting China's sovereignty.

For the U.S., China's increasing military prowess ignites fears that  Beijing will challenge Washington's hard power. Here, China is viewed as a rival that seeks global hegemony. This fosters a win-lose mentality where overwhelming U.S. military and economic power, at the expense of others, is justified because hegemonic loss ignites existential fear. 

One solution for strategic mistrust is for the two sides to have more ministerial contacts and install frameworks to alert each other when red lines are being encroached. Indeed, this was the conclusion of the China-U.S. G20 meeting. 

Managing great power competition is laudable as it works to avoid war. However, one must also understand China-U.S. strategic mistrust from a macro theoretical level, which is the primary strategic contradiction at the core of China-U.S. tensions. This concept is well understood by China but less so by the U.S. side. 

Theory as understood by Marxists is also strategy. Marxists consciously choose a "player" namely the workers, they seek to understand its position on the chessboard of contradictions and plan for long-term success. As circumstances change, so does the plan and those unfamiliar with the strategic nature of theory may mistakenly denounce changing strategy as a betrayal of theoretical foundations. 

Transnational capital and its antecedents, whose prime state is the U.S., also use theory as a strategy. However, because their "player" is a minority their strategy is disguised as objective doctrine. Here, neoliberalism isn't a strategy for globalization in the interests of transnational capital but practically a law of nature. 

Now that this strategy is less favorable, economic decoupling is increasingly justified as being in Western states’ national interests, rather than certain elites. Should this move be solidified then undoubtedly theory will follow to justify the strategy. Conversely, China remains committed to globalization and open markets. These changes demonstrate the interplay between theory as strategy in relation to material interests of states and social classes.

Major political-economic theories backed by concrete interests also interact. Socialism with Chinese characteristics (SCC), backed by Beijing, made a turn to a Socialist Market Economy with the rise of neoliberalism, backed by Washington. 

Strategic interests converged and they were clear. Neoliberals wished for the restoration of a China in sync with the interests of transnational capital. China positioned its labor force in exchange for global markets and the technology needed to build socialism.

With market relations in full swing and the privatization of large parts of the Chinese economy, the U.S. believed a soft neoliberal coup would take place. China's strategic change was mistaken as a drift towards Western capitalism. However, China has remained independent and capable of setting its own future, which contributes to U.S. strategic mistrust. 

However, the strategic aims of SCC have always been well-publicized. With clear intentions, there should be no mistrust. However, many Western analysts disregard SCC because they mistakenly view the open strategic nature of SCC as propaganda, not theory. Peculiarly, they regard theory that disguises its material interests under universal tenants as true theory. 

We have a state where China is conscious of macro strategy inherent within theory but the U.S. is not. This can lead to strategic mistrust on the Chinese side and strategic error on the U.S. side. China's strategic mistrust arises because theory that justifies U.S. actions is cloaked within a universal framework which disguises its material basis and class biases.  

Conversely, U.S. actors who mistake the particular for the universal are compelled to act irresponsibly. For example, when only liberal democracies are theorized as true democracies, all other systems must be countered. This thinking is another source of hegemony and a reason why there is so much misguided and unreflective indignation from U.S. officials reacting to what they perceive as Chinese wrongs.  

To overcome macro strategic mistrust, the U.S. must have greater respect for SCC which has proved successful. It must recognize that theory that openly displays its material interests is democratic while theory that disguises them is undemocratic. 

If one recognizes the aims of SCC then firstly one understands that China does not seek hegemony but equality. Hegemony must be avoided because it breeds war which negates the conditions for development. Secondly, SCC sees capital as important, but markets must be governed for all. Thirdly, as a theory conscious of its geographical scope, SCC rejects all outside sovereign interference on Chinese territory. 

If anything, it is these aims of peace, development, and national sovereignty that are universally good for mankind. With this in mind, macro China-U.S. strategic interests, which have long cooperated, must adjust to the changing reality and avoid decoupling.

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