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Copyright © 2024 CGTN. 京ICP备20000184号
Disinformation report hotline: 010-85061466
SITEMAP
Copyright © 2024 CGTN. 京ICP备20000184号
Disinformation report hotline: 010-85061466
Ronen Bar, the new chief of the Israel Security Agency, also known as "Shabak" or "Shin Bet", enters a vehicle at an undisclosed location in central Israel on October 11, 2021. /CFP
Israel's military leadership faced heightened public scrutiny this week after recent damaging reports by The New York Times and Israeli media suggested that senior intelligence officials were aware of an incursion by Hamas at least a year before it happened.
According to the reports, the Israeli military acquired a copy of an attack plan that Hamas carried out on October 7, but officers miscalculated Hamas' capability to carry it out. Additionally, in July, a commander disregarded a subordinate's warning about the group's training activities and its increasing capacity to implement the plan.
The revelation sparked anticipation among political analysts that, following the conclusion of the war, high-ranking military and security officials might voluntarily step down or face dismissals due to intelligence lapses.
Advocates of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu capitalized on the news, leveraging the claims of military shortcomings to divert attention from allegations that Mr. Netanyahu bore partial responsibility for what numerous Israelis perceive as the nation's most significant security lapse in the last half-century.
Dr. Azmi Hassan, a geo-strategist and senior fellow at Nusantara Academy for Strategic Research, told CGTN that this is a colossal failure of Israeli intelligence, especially of Shin Bet.
Netanyahu's heavy focus on domestic protests at the time might also have led to the intelligence failure, he said.
(With input from agencies)