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Japanese PM's U.S. visit for peace or war?

Han Zhili

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrives at the White House in Washington, D.C., April 9, 2024. /CFP
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrives at the White House in Washington, D.C., April 9, 2024. /CFP

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrives at the White House in Washington, D.C., April 9, 2024. /CFP

Editor's note: Han Zhili, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is a Professor of the Institute of Asian Studies, China Foreign Affairs University. The article reflects the author's views and not necessarily those of CGTN.

Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is paying an official visit to the United States, during which he'll hold a summit with U.S. President Joe Biden to reinforce their alliance, and attend the first trilateral U.S.-Japan-Philippines leaders' summit with Biden and Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. to advance a trilateral partnership.

The leaders of the United States, Japan and the Philippines will reaffirm the alliance and partnership commitments during the summit. Topics likely to be discussed include boosting deterrence and response capabilities of the U.S.-Japan alliance, improving the command-and-control operations of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and U.S. troops based in that country, and enhancing trilateral cooperation "to further peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and around the world."

The U.S. military stationed in Japan has 88 dedicated bases, in addition to dozens of bases shared with the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Japan is preparing to set up a permanent joint command overseeing the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces by the end of March next year. Meanwhile, U.S. government officials are considering giving the command of U.S. forces based in Japan more authority to improve interoperability and readiness.

The United States legitimates its stationing military personnel and assets in Japan by hyping up the "China threat" theory. In recent years, the United States and Japan have been strengthening their military cooperation and publicly stating that this move is targeted at China. The United States affirms that the Diaoyu Islands fall within the scope of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Japan hosts approximately 55,000 U.S. service members – the largest contingent of U.S. forces outside the United States.

Many of the United States' most capable and advanced military assets are hosted in Japan, including the USS Ronald Reagan and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. The government of Japan shares the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan through the U.S.-Japan Host Nation Support framework, which was extended through March 31, 2022. Negotiations for a new and expanded multi-year agreement are ongoing.

The USS Mobile, JS Akebono, HMAS Warramunga, BRP Antonio Luna and BRP Valentine Diaz sailing in formation during a multilateral maritime cooperative activity between Australia, the United States, Japan and the Philippines, off the coast within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone, April 7, 2024. /CFP
The USS Mobile, JS Akebono, HMAS Warramunga, BRP Antonio Luna and BRP Valentine Diaz sailing in formation during a multilateral maritime cooperative activity between Australia, the United States, Japan and the Philippines, off the coast within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone, April 7, 2024. /CFP

The USS Mobile, JS Akebono, HMAS Warramunga, BRP Antonio Luna and BRP Valentine Diaz sailing in formation during a multilateral maritime cooperative activity between Australia, the United States, Japan and the Philippines, off the coast within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone, April 7, 2024. /CFP

The "China threat" narratives also give Japan an excuse to shift its post-war security policy. Japan decided to increase the level of its defense budget to 2 percent of its current GDP from no more than 1 percent during 2022-2027, possess counterstrike capabilities, improve response capabilities in the field of cybersecurity and step up its defense posture in its southwest region.

These moves represent a historically critical transformation of Japan's security policy after World War II. Although proclaiming a defensive intent, Japan still needs to smooth U.S. suspicions on its increasing military capacity by reiterating its acceptance of the U.S. leadership, its unchanged post-war status as a peace-loving nation, and its unchanged foreign policy and continued will to be a "model citizen" of the world.

Besides strengthening their alliance partnership, the U.S. and Japan are also reinforcing some multilateral coalitions, such as the QUAD and the U.S.-Australia-Japan trilateral strategic dialogue. These groupings to realize a vision of the Indo-Pacific region have an intention to form coteries against China.

The most recent example of such endeavors will be the U.S.-Japan-Philippines leaders' summit to be held on April 11 in Washington against the backdrop of heightened tensions between China and the Philippines, and a more provocative plan of joint naval patrols in the South China Sea, expected to be launched by the end of the year.

Not only do the Philippines have ulterior motives, but also Japan and the United States. By intervening in the situation in the South China Sea, the U.S. and Japan will continuously strengthen security cooperation, and weave a military and security network that threatens and counteracts China's sovereignty in the South China Sea and stability in the Taiwan Straits. This will be a long-term military and security challenge facing China in the region.

Even so, the U.S. and its allies in the Asia Pacific are most unlikely to form a bloc to contain China. The U.S. alliance system in the Asia Pacific is structured differently from NATO in Europe. NATO is an organization built on a multilateral alliance treaty, according to which the members bear common obligations for collective security. 

In comparison, the U.S. alliance system in the Asia Pacific is a number of bilateral alliance treaties between the U.S. and individual allies including Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, all of whom have different nationally-oriented interests and considerations in security cooperation with the U.S., and don't bear security obligations toward each other. 

Moreover, the U.S. allies in the Asia Pacific seek autonomy on diplomatic and economic policies, so as to realize their own interests, and to enhance their voice and leverage in the region. Their accession to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an example of such autonomy.

The U.S. had a negative perception of the RCEP, maintaining that China would lead this trade arrangement. In this context, the U.S. allies insisted on joining the RCEP instead of following the U.S. in boycotting it. The U.S. allies in the Asia Pacific cannot afford to leave the value chains with China in it. Remaining outside the RCEP, the U.S. influence in the economy of the region is likely to be further reduced.

The U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-Philippines alliances cannot provide security to the region. Instead, they breed mistrust and instability. Alliances are private commitments between allies, rooted in the idea of a balance of power. However, as European history shows, war is often an essential mechanism for preserving a balance of power.

It is gravely disturbing that the U.S. and its allies and partners cobble together exclusive groupings and stoke bloc confrontation to the detriment of peace and stability in the region. To ensure long-term peace and stability, the region needs to establish new principles of international relations, championing consultation over confrontation, partnership over alliance.

Openness and inclusiveness is the defining feature of Asia-Pacific cooperation, development for all is the overarching goal, and seeking common ground while shelving differences is the best practice. The region cannot and should not be an arena for geopolitical rivalry; still less should it be plunged into a new Cold War or camp-based confrontation.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on Twitter to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

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