Editor's note: Wang Jin, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is a research fellow of the Charhar Institute. The article reflects the author's opinion and not necessarily the views of CGTN or the Charhar Institute.

The recent pager and walkie-talkie explosions in Lebanon have led to concerns around the world about the safety of communication tools, with the "backdoor" becoming a major focus. The "backdoor" refers to gaining access to a program or system by bypassing security controls. The pagers and walkie-talkies that exploded in Lebanon were programmed to detonate by remote control through "backdoor" channels.

In a survey conducted globally by the CGTN recently, 93.84 percent of the respondents were worried about the "backdoor" security hazards in electronic devices that might be used for terrorist attacks; 96.76 percent believed that "backdoor" hazards in electronic devices were increasing the risk to information security and even to life.

However, the United States, though a major consumer of wireless communication products and a major target of terrorist attacks in the world, has been indifferent to such a huge security loophole as if it is not worried about similar attacks inside the U.S. and on its citizens abroad.

During the past decades, the United States was repeatedly found involved in different large-scale wiretapping scandals and forcing high-tech companies to provide access to their back-end data. In 2013, Edward Snowden leaked classified information revealing extensive surveillance programs by the National Security Agency (NSA), including the interception of phone calls and emails. According to Snowden, the U.S. organized the PRISM project, which enabled the NSA to collect data from major tech companies like Google, Facebook, and Apple. This program allegedly exploited the vulnerabilities or the "backdoor" in these platforms to access user information.

The United States not only steals information and intelligence from its own citizens, but also uses the "backdoor" to collect information from other countries like Russia. These efforts have often involved compromising hardware and software systems. Even the allies of the U.S. are targets of Washington's espionage. In 2013, the U.S. was exposed as monitoring the cellphone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, something it was doing since 2002.

At the same time, the U.S. has been crying "Stop thief," alleging that Huawei and TikTok might have a "backdoor" that allows Chinese intelligence access to Americans using Huawei's devices and TikTok. Using the allegation as a pretext, it has been trying to limit Huawei's participation in telecom infrastructure globally, and has tried to block TikTok at home.

Therefore, its indifference to the explosions in Lebanon is unnatural, especially for a country that often criticizes the communications policies of others. Against this backdrop, more than three quarters (76.26 percent) of the respondents in the CGTN survey were concerned that their electronic devices posed similar security risks as these pagers.

The attacks in Lebanon remind us of the threat to the safety of communication chains globally. The misuse of the "backdoor" by the United States in intelligence gathering and military attacks on other countries shows the continuation of American hegemonic thinking.

Communication facilities, as an important tool for social progress and economic development, should not become a tool for political struggle. The international community should forge a new consensus and norms to avoid hegemonic interference and sabotage of communications security.

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