Our Privacy Statement & Cookie Policy

By continuing to browse our site you agree to our use of cookies, revised Privacy Policy and Terms of Use. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.

I agree

Nasrallah's death: A turning point in Israeli-Hezbollah conflict?

Bobby Naderi

Supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah carry his pictures, following his killing in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut's southern suburbs, in Saida, southern Lebanon on September 28, 2024. /CFP
Supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah carry his pictures, following his killing in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut's southern suburbs, in Saida, southern Lebanon on September 28, 2024. /CFP

Supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah carry his pictures, following his killing in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut's southern suburbs, in Saida, southern Lebanon on September 28, 2024. /CFP

Editor's note: Bobby Naderi, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is a London-based journalist, guest contributor in print, radio and television, and documentary filmmaker. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

On 28 September, Lebanon's Hezbollah confirmed to the media that the Israeli army had killed its leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in an attack on Beirut. The most important question is whether his assassination will stoke further escalation by Hezbollah, or whether there's now a strategic window of opportunity to realign and de-escalate.

Since his assumption of leadership in 1992, Nasrallah has represented Hezbollah, having succeeded the late Abbas al-Musawi. Although charismatically led by Nasrallah, Hezbollah is not a one-man operation. The organization has a strong command structure that enables it to replace lost leaders and reorganize for continuous operations.

Even though Nasrallah's death is significant symbolically, Hezbollah would continue to exist as a political and military organization in Lebanon. A new leader would take over and possibly carry out an even more extreme program against Israel, much like Nasrallah took over following al-Musawi's death, and made the group into a more formidable force.

Hezbollah is more than just a militant organization. It's also a political movement, with representation in the Lebanese parliament, immense social services and thousands of fervent supporters from whom it can freely draw into the militant fold. These factors, combined with the fact that its close relations with Iran, mean it's guaranteed to remain supremely well-resourced, despite changes in command.

Iran's strategic reaction

Iran has significant influence over how the organization might react to Nasrallah's killing. Some Western countries consider Hezbollah as an Iranian proxy, believing that Tehran supplies Hezbollah with the arms and financial assistance necessary for being a key player in the "axis of resistance" against Israeli and American hegemony.

Iran is hardly likely to demand an abrupt escalation. It has demonstrated a tendency for more measured reactions, particularly when Lebanon suffers high losses. Tehran may urge Hezbollah's new leadership to refrain from launching a full-scale conflict with Israel due to its larger geopolitical concerns, which include negotiations with the West about its nuclear program, economic sanctions and domestic problems, along with the relations it maintains with its neighbors in the Middle East.

Case in point: Iran has a long history of letting its proxies recover from setbacks. Iranian-backed proxy forces have demonstrated exceeding levels of resistance in the face of losing key figures in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and Hezbollah is no exception. Instead of pressuring the organization to take quick revenge, the political class in Tehran might urge Hezbollah to continue its current stance of resistance while safeguarding its capabilities for future conflicts.

Smokes rise following Israeli airstrikes in Beirut's southern suburb, Lebanon, September 28, 2024. /Xinhua
Smokes rise following Israeli airstrikes in Beirut's southern suburb, Lebanon, September 28, 2024. /Xinhua

Smokes rise following Israeli airstrikes in Beirut's southern suburb, Lebanon, September 28, 2024. /Xinhua

A de-escalation window?

From Israel's perspective, Nasrallah's death is a major tactical success. For more than two decades, he guided the militant group through a series of conflicts, including the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006. His assassination is one of the most important successes Israel has had since tensions reignited last May in light of the Israeli-Hamas war in Gaza.

The military leadership of Israel has stated unequivocally that its operations will continue even after Nasrallah's death. Israel wants Hezbollah's military power to be so diminished that it can no longer be a threat to its northern border by any means.

Tel Aviv has also underlined how crucial it is to put a stop to Hezbollah's rocket firings in its northern border as a way to facilitate the return of the tens of thousands of Israelis who have been displaced by the conflict.

However, history suggests that the situation will be quite different, notwithstanding Israel's hopes that Hezbollah's resolve will be weakened as a result of Nasrallah's death. In past conflicts, Hezbollah has demonstrated a remarkable resilience, frequently coming out stronger after suffering huge losses. Israel's problem is to maintain its tactical advantage without inciting Hezbollah to launch an increasingly severe and desperate counterattack, a temptation too great to resist.

It's strange when you think about it. Long-term de-escalation cannot be ruled out, notwithstanding the possibility of immediate reprisals. The temporary debilitation of Hezbollah's leadership could present a prospect for the Lebanese government and other entities to intervene and diminish Hezbollah's sway in the region. For this to succeed, major political will and international assistance are needed, and these haven't materialized in recent years.

Count on one thing. Israel and Hezbollah can, and might, arrive at a functional stalemate. Iran and Hezbollah believe that a war with Israel would be catastrophic, especially given the current instability at home and abroad. With more than half a million people displaced internally in Lebanon, an escalation would similarly threaten Israel with censure in the global community and exacerbate instability along its northern border.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on Twitter to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

Search Trends