Philippine domestic maritime 'acts' violate international law

Editor's note: Ding Duo, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is the deputy director and an associate research fellow at the Research Center for Ocean Law and Policy, the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Philippine President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos signed the "Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act" and the "Philippine Maritime Zones Act" on Friday in the name of implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, in essence, this practice strengthens the implementation of the so-called South China Sea arbitration, with the aim of giving a veneer of legitimacy to the Philippines' illegal acts in the South China Sea, violating the spirit of the UN Charter and the provisions of international law, including the UNCLOS.

The sea lanes and air routes designated by the "Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act" do not include all commonly used international waterways in the waters of the Philippine archipelago. It's inconsistent with Article 53 of the UNCLOS, which stipulates that "such sea lanes and air routes shall include all normal passages used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters," undermining the legitimate rights of navigation and overflight of other countries and interfering with the convenience of passage established by other countries in the waters of the Philippine archipelago through long international practice.

The "Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act" stipulates that foreign ships and aircraft that violate the UNCLOS and infringe upon the sovereignty and rights of the Philippines shall not exercise the right of passage through the Philippine archipelagic sea lanes. It links the right of passage through the sea lanes with the South China Sea dispute and restricts the legitimate right of passage of ships and aircraft of other countries, which is obviously contrary to the provisions of the UNCLOS.

In addition, the sea lanes and air routes designated by the "law" are adjacent to the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the Philippines and the U.S. will collude with each other to monitor passing ships and threaten the navigation safety of various countries.

The "Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act" exceeds the scope of international law, illegally restricts the legitimate rights of other countries, and has no binding force on other countries, including China. It can be foreseen that all types of Chinese ships and aircraft, including merchant ships, warships and marine research vessels, will continue to pass through all normal channels as needed and in accordance with international law.

The "Philippine Maritime Zones Act" illegally includes China's Huangyan Dao and some islands and reefs and waters of the Nansha Qundao into the Philippines' maritime zones, infringing on China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea. The "law" deliberately packages or replaces the Philippines' illegal territorial claims with "maritime jurisdiction claims" to cover up the legal and political fact that the Philippines has illegally occupied some islands and reefs of China's Nansha Qundao.

The Philippine Senate claimed in a publicly released legislative announcement that the exclusive economic zone, continental shelf and extended continental shelf constitute part of Philippine territory. Obviously, this statement violates the UNCLOS, customary international law on territorial issues, and the international law principle that "land dominates the sea."

The "Philippine Maritime Zones Act" mentions the low-tide elevations and the artificial islands located in the Philippines' "exclusive" economic zone. Although it does not specify the names of the features, this article is mainly aimed at some islands, reefs and shoals in China's Nansha Qundao. This once again exposes the Philippines' attempt to illegally occupy islands and reefs in the Nansha Qundao.

The Philippines has a long practice of attempting to legitimize unlawful territorial claims through domestic legislation, a strategy it uses to push beyond the established boundaries of its own territory. For example, the Presidential Decree No. 1596 signed in 1978 called some islands and reefs of China's Nansha Qundao and a large area of ​​surrounding waters the "Kalayaan Island Group" and claimed them. The "Republic Act No. 9522" passed by the Philippine Congress in 2009 illegally included into Philippines territory China's Huangyan Dao and some islands and reefs of Nansha Qundao. The "Philippine Maritime Zones Act" takes a similar path and is also an inheritance and development of previous legislative infringements.

The "Philippine Maritime Zones Act" uses the South China Sea arbitration ruling as a basis for clarifying maritime boundaries, attempting to formalize it through domestic legislation. In the Philippines' view, further "domesticating" the arbitration ruling is the only way to maximum its effect, thereby consolidating the "political and legal foundation" for maritime confrontation with China. This move provides so-called domestic legal support for actions such as advancing maritime delimitation negotiations with other countries while sidelining China, and potentially filing new international arbitration cases in the South China Sea.

However, the arbitration ruling is illegal and invalid, as the tribunal overstepped its jurisdiction, applied the law improperly and made serious errors in legal interpretation, evidence assessment and fact-finding. The Philippines' use of an invalid ruling as a basis for its "rights" is not legitimate.

Marcos' decision to sign the two "acts" at this time is not isolated, but a specific projection of the provocative policies currently pursued by the Philippine government, which will further squeeze the political space for the Philippines and China to control crises and properly handle disputes.

The Philippines has been constantly creating incidents in Ren'ai Jiao, Xianbin Jiao, Huangyan Dao and other places recently, exaggerating the so-called China threat theory, strengthening the "urgency" and "necessity" of domestic legislation, and consolidating the political, legal and even social basis of its provocation at sea.

The two pieces of so-called legislation are part of the Philippines' struggle with China on the South China Sea issue in the form of so-called cognitive warfare, echoing Manila's reckless infringement and hyping up the issue.

It can be predicted that the Philippines will use these legislative "achievements" to create new hype points in the public opinion field, and some senior officials of the Philippine Coast Guard, National Security Council, Ministry of National Defense and other departments will also take the opportunity to make inflammatory remarks to gain personal benefits by smearing China's image and rousing confrontational emotions.

Also, some Philippine senators, congressmen and civil groups have repeatedly asked the Marcos government to take more diverse measures against China on the South China Sea issue, in addition to diplomatic means. After the two "acts" come into effect, their impact on Philippine legislation, judiciary, public opinion and other aspects will inevitably be used by the Marcos government to serve its domestic political purposes.

China has said it will not stand idly by in the face of the Philippines' political and legal provocations over maritime issues. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated on November 8 that the two "acts" seriously violate the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and will complicate the situation in the South China Sea.

Any infringement or provocative action taken by the Philippines in the South China Sea under these two "acts" will severely violate China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the region. China will respond firmly to such actions.

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