How Lai Ching-te's 17 strategies will harm cross-Straits integration

Editor's note: Wang Shushen, a special commentator for CGTN, is the Deputy Director of Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's views and not necessarily those of CGTN.

On March 13, Lai Ching-te, leader of China's Taiwan region, put forward the 17 strategies of "seeking independence and rejecting reunification" at a press conference, defining the Chinese mainland as a "hostile force outside the country," smearing the mainland's Taiwan policy, and exaggerating the mainland's "threat" to Taiwan. This practice proves Lai's self-positioning as a "pragmatic Taiwan independence worker," and once again makes the media focus on Lai's various actions to promote separatist policies since he entered politics.

Obviously, the 17 strategies, which have proposed to "implement various registration systems" for Taiwan's people to travel to the mainland, will become a weapon of the authority to suppress normal cross-Straits civil exchanges and create a chilling effect on the island. It is foreseeable that the exchanges between Taiwan's people of all walks of life – including the young generation and religious figures – and the mainland will be monitored by the Lai authority.

Lai's 17 strategies, which cover a wide range of areas, have also proposed to use security issues as an excuse to control cross-Straits economic and trade exchanges with political power. Taiwan is a typical export-oriented economy, and its sustainable economic development depends on globalization as well as a free and open market environment. After more than 30 years of deepening trade cooperation with the mainland, Taiwan's economy has been deeply integrated with the mainland market.

According to statistics released by the Chinese mainland, the cross-Straits trade volume in 2024 was $292.971 billion, a year-on-year increase of 9.4 percent. Among them, the mainland exported $75.189 billion to Taiwan and imported $217.782 billion from the island; Taiwan had have a trade surplus of $142.593 billion. Electronic components, which have an advantage in Taiwan's industrial structure, are key technological products exported by Taiwan to the mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The mainland has always been the largest source of trade surplus for Taiwan. Therefore, losing the mainland market will have a major consequence for Taiwan's overall trade.

Since taking office again, Donald Trump has adopted a coercive policy towards Taiwan's economy and technology. TSMC was forced to expand its investment in the U.S., causing some analysts to worry that Taiwan's semiconductor industry would be hollowed out by the U.S. Relying on Washington, Lai Ching-te issued the 17 strategies, proposing "necessary and orderly adjustments to the flow of people, logistics, capital and technology involved in cross-Straits economic and trade relations." In essence, it is to speed up the "decoupling from China and integrating with the U.S." in the economic and trade field, which will harm the long-term development of Taiwan's economy, technology and small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Lai Ching-te's 17 strategies is an important upgrade of the "Five National Security Laws" and "Anti-infiltration Law" implemented during the Tsai Ing-wen authority, injecting greater risks into the already fragile and severe cross-Straits relations.

Taiwan is a part of China; Taiwan people are Chinese, and Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to the Chinese nation. Whether from the perspective of history, or the current international order, these are ironclad facts that cannot be changed, and certainly not something that Lai Ching-te's "Taiwan independence" policy can tamper with.

In addition to provoking cross-Straits confrontation, Lai's 17 strategies actually has another political purpose within the island. This year, Lai is faced with the task of promoting the "mass recall" campaign against Kuomintang legislators in an attempt to reverse the passive situation in which the current authorities led by Lai is constrained by the blue and white factions in the Legislative Yuan. The Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) long-standing tactic is to intensify the confrontation with the mainland, escalate the threat from the mainland, and create a pessimistic mood in society in order to mobilize people who support "Taiwan independence" to follow Lai's political actions. The 17 strategies will first be used by the DPP to assist in the "mass recall" movement to achieve its party interests and Lai Ching-te's political interests.

Based on previous experience, the more cross-Straits exchanges and integration there are, the more afraid the DPP becomes. During Tsai Ing-wen's authority, despite the DPP's obstruction, the mainland has been working to promote the peaceful and integrated development of cross-Straits relations, encouraging exchanges between cross-Straits civil societies, to reduce mutual misunderstandings. As a result, some people from Taiwan have walked out of the "information cocoon" set up by the DPP and got to know a quickly developing mainland. This has put the DPP in a difficult position in spreading false information about the mainland's image on the island, which has affected the party's interests.

At present, cross-Straits relations are generally complex and severe. The public opinion in Taiwan hopes to maintain the status quo of peace and avoid conflicts. Although the mainland is committed to the peaceful integration, their policy of curbing the provocation of "Taiwan independence" will not be relaxed. Using the "Taiwan independence" ideology, Lai Ching-te may lead Taiwan to the brink of crisis. The people on the island are expected to be vigilant against the "Lai-style Taiwan independence" that may harm Taiwan itself.

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