Iran's calculated response: A strategic lever to compel U.S., West

Editor's note: Mohammad Reza Manafi is a former editor-in-chief at IRNA News Agency and a senior editor and political commentator at CRI Persian Service. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

On June 25, 2025, just four days after the U.S. airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, the Iranian Parliament overwhelmingly approved a bill to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The bill was immediately sent to the Guardian Council for approval and was officially enacted as a law by Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian on July 2, 2025.

Iran believes that the IAEA "committed betrayal" against the nuclear non-proliferation regime by submitting a "misleading report" on the country's peaceful nuclear program to the IAEA Board of Governors. Iran argues this report effectively paved the way for the latest anti-Iran resolution by the Board and provided Israel with the pretext to launch military aggression against Iran.

On June 13, just one day after the IAEA Board of Governors passed its anti-Iran resolution, Israel launched heavy strikes on Iran's civilian, military and nuclear targets under the pretext of Iran's nuclear program being a threat to Tel Aviv.

However, several days after Israel began its war against Iran, IAEA's Director General Rafael Grossi made a delayed admission, stating that the IAEA had no proof of systematic efforts (by Iran) to develop nuclear weapons – a crucial point that, had it been included in Grossi's original report to the Board, could have potentially prevented Israel's war against Iran.

This belated admission by Grossi prompted a response from Esmail Baghaei, spokesperson of Iran's Foreign Ministry. On platform X, Baghaei addressed Grossi directly: "Your admission comes far too late, Mr. Grossi! You deliberately concealed this truth in your completely biased report – a report that was abused by three European states and the United States to pass a resolution with baseless claims of 'non-compliance' against Iran…"

Why did Iran decide to suspend cooperation with IAEA?

The U.S. airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan caused significant damage, though the full extent – including the fate of over 400 kilograms of enriched uranium – remains unclear. While Donald Trump claimed the attacks "completely destroyed" these sites, U.S. media have refuted this, reporting minimal damage and noting Iran's capacity for rapid reconstruction.

Iranian officials have acknowledged significant damage to nuclear facilities, but due to the absence of IAEA inspectors, the international nuclear watchdog has stated it cannot provide an accurate assessment of the extent of damage to Iran's nuclear sites. The IAEA has requested Iran grant access to inspectors but under the new law, Iran will likely advance its nuclear programs without IAEA oversight or operational monitoring cameras for a significant period.

In fact, the IAEA's unrealistic and incomplete report to the Board of Governors – which ultimately led to Israel's attack on Iran – provided Iran with an opportunity to at least temporarily suspend its "voluntary cooperation" with the agency. This is an opportunity for Iran to use the absence of IAEA inspectors both as a chance to quickly rebuild the damages incurred and also to exert pressure on its adversaries.

Therefore, the critical law can perhaps be seen as a political tool for Iran to resist external pressures, particularly to push back against European parties and compel them to retreat from triggering the snapback mechanism.

Additionally, the U.S. attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities occurred while nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S. were ongoing. Thus, if Iran decides not to return to the nuclear negotiation table or to delay the talks until an unforeseeable future, no one can blame or hold Iran responsible. It is entirely clear that the U.S., by carrying out an illegal attack on nuclear sites, has closed the path to diplomacy.

Regarding the "Law on Suspension of Iran's Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," several key points should be noted:

1. The law does not use the term "termination of inspections" but rather "suspension of inspections," implying its temporary nature.

2. The parliamentarians, in passing the law, made its implementation conditional. According to the law, IAEA inspectors may resume their monitoring activities in Iran's nuclear facilities only if the following two conditions are met:

a) Ensuring the full observance of Iran's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the security of nuclear facilities and nuclear scientists, based on the framework of the UN Charter and as determined by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

b) Ensuring the full recognition of Iran's inherent rights to enjoy all privileges stipulated in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), particularly uranium enrichment inside the country, as determined by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

The decision on when Iran's nuclear facilities and activities are deemed secure enough for the return of IAEA inspectors will be made by Iran's Supreme National Security Council.

Therefore, it does not appear that Iran intends to permanently cut off IAEA inspectors' access to its nuclear facilities (as part of its voluntary cooperation with the Agency). Rather, the Iranian parliament's move primarily serves as a political lever for Iran. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a country with the right to uranium enrichment, Iran has no intention of retreating from nuclear enrichment and will use every possible political tool to counter external pressure.

Notably, this legislation – as a calculated response from the Iranian side – does not compromise the country's continued commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as the country remains fully bound by its non-proliferation obligations. Rather, it serves as a strategic instrument to compel Western powers, particularly the U.S., to formally acknowledge Iran's legitimate nuclear rights under the NPT framework – specifically, its entitlement to peaceful nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment for civilian purposes. The measure effectively strengthens Iran's negotiating position while maintaining its technical compliance with international non-proliferation standards.