When the world moves on from American influence

Editor's note: The article was written by Warwick Powell, adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology. It reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

As BRICS nations convened in Rio de Janeiro and issued a comprehensive joint statement, US President Donald Trump took to Truth Social on July 7 and threatened that, "Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an additional 10 percent tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy. Thank you for your attention to this matter!"

On the same day, Trump began sending out letters to various national leaders notifying them of Trump's decision concerning the imposition of unilateral tariffs. These letters came as the 90-day post "Liberation Day" hiatus comes to an end. On the pretext that bilateral relationships have been "far from reciprocal", Trump advised counterparties of additional tariff measures to be imposed above and beyond the base tariffs announced as part of the 2 April 2025 regime.

Since April 2, the Trump administration has sought bilateral trade agreements (the so-called "deals"), at times bragging that over 70 countries were readying themselves to accede to US demands. As the 90-day period comes to an end, it looks increasingly unlikely that the US will achieve its ambitions.

What are we to make of this situation? In part, we can understand this situation in terms of poorly conceived negotiation strategies. Having announced the tariffs then, within 2 days, suspending them for 90 days for all countries other than China, and for China to respond by way of retaliation rather than concession, the US had boxed itself into a position where countries were incentivised to: 

(1) indicate a willingness to engage with the US (no downside); 

(2) meanwhile, coordinate with each other to strengthen their respective and collective positions, not just in terms of negotiations with the US but also in terms of mitigation measures related to preserving the institutions of open trade; 

(3) delay reaching a resolution with the US on bilateral terms. With China not yielding to US bullying, there was little reason for any country else to come to the table on America's terms.

Aside from tactical miscalculations, this episode may also portend the realisation that US influence has diminished. In the past, the United States didn't need to beg for attention on the world stage. Its economic dominance, military reach and institutional centrality made it impossible to ignore. But in 2025, something more consequential than overt resistance is unfolding: the rest of the world is beginning to stop reacting to Washington's latest fancies and missives.

This indifference could well mark a turning point not just in geopolitics but in global psychology. Countries that once reacted with urgency to US threats now delay, deflect, or quietly coordinate around them. The BRICS group is expanding. Bilateral trade settlements in yuan, rupees and rubles are growing. The Global South economies are pursuing industrialisation and digital sovereignty on their own terms. None of this is hostile in the traditional sense. But it reflects a strategic fading of unilateral dominance.

In the latest round of tariff brinkmanship, the US administration has sent out letters threatening sweeping punitive actions if partners don't comply with trade demands. President Trump has returned to the rhetoric of unilateral dominance. In effect, Trump's mantra is that "they're cheating us and we'll make them pay." But this time, there's a hollowness to it.

The threats are familiar. So are the delays, the ultimatums, and the walk-backs. But unlike previous cycles, other players aren't biting. They're not panicking. They're not rushing to the table. Many are simply waiting it out. This isn't because the tariffs are costless. It's because the global economic system has evolved around the United States. What was once coercive leverage is now just noise.

The US continues to approach international economic relations through the lens of pressure: Tariffs, secondary sanctions and export controls. But coercive power decays with overuse and diminished material capability. When every negotiation is a threat, and every demand is framed as non-negotiable, credibility erodes. Eventually, the game changes.

Other countries begin to coordinate among themselves, reducing exposure to unilateral pressure. We've seen this happen. We also see that new institutions get built, such as national currency-based payments, bilateral currency swaps and the like. More and more nations are investing in resilience, from regional trade routes to domestic substitution strategies, buttressed by multilateral agreements that do not include the US. In fact, nations are increasingly ignoring the bluff, recognising that US follow-through imposes more pain on itself than others.

What happens next isn't defiance. It's disengagement.

The US finds itself more vulnerable to its own tactics than its targets. This is the irony of financialised power. Tariffs run the risk of raising prices in a country where inflation is politically toxic. Supply chain disruptions hurt American importers and consumers more than producers elsewhere in the world. Currency sanctions erode trust in the dollar and accelerate de-dollarisation. Export bans on key technologies only drive R&D localisation abroad.

And perhaps most importantly, the US has no mitigation strategy for its own declining centrality. It cannot replace global interdependence with domestic production overnight. It cannot fund industrial renewal when its fiscal system is skewed toward speculative capital and tax avoidance. And it cannot compel loyalty through institutions that it has undermined over the past decade.

The group of counterparties no longer view the US as a necessary interlocutor. For decades, even the most powerful emerging economies have been calculating their moves relative to Washington. Now, they are charting courses with reference to each other.

China and Brazil settle commodities in yuan. India buys Russian energy with rupees. Africa negotiates connectivity and infrastructure investment with BRICS and GCC partners. ASEAN countries are deepening regional supply chains rather than depending on trans-Pacific integration. Even Europe is exploring de-risking from the US financial system while seeking to promote the global relevance of the Euro.

This is a profound shift. It's not just a reaction to Trump. It's a structural recalibration of what matters - and who matters - in the global system.

When others stop reacting, you've lost power. Not military power, not economic scale, but strategic centrality. Put plainly, the gravitational pull that makes others care about your decisions as far as the US is concerned, is dissipating.

This is the indifference threshold, and the US has crossed it with many players. Its threats still make headlines. But they no longer shape agendas. Instead of "What will Washington say?", the new logic revolves around a different set of questions. "Can we coordinate without them?", "Can we withstand the noise?" and worse, "Do we even need to reply?"

This is far more dangerous than open rivalry. Rivals engage. Indifferent actors disengage.

The problem isn't that the US has lost all leverage. The problem is that it keeps playing the same game, expecting old rules to work. But the game has changed. In a multipolar world, credibility decays with every empty threat and leverage erodes with every overreach. Former partners become exiters, while erstwhile adversaries become network builders. The rest of the world stops listening to Washington's bloviating, and simply moves on building the relationships and institutions needed to sustain their own development ambitions.

There is a path back, but it requires the US to fundamentally change its approach. That means rebuilding credibility through consistent policy, which aims at mutual benefits, not performative threats. It demands an America that is able to engage multilaterally, not just transactionally. The US itself needs to think hard about how it can overcome the dominance of finance capital so that its financial resources can be committed to the development of real production rather than catalyse more rounds of asset bubbles and share buybacks. For all of this to happen, the US would need to accept interdependence, and recognise others' autonomy as legitimate. Simply put, the US needs to think about how it becomes a partner, rather than a hegemon in denial.

None of this is about retreat. It's about evolution. Great powers that endure are those that adapt to new realities, not those that cling to old myths.

The post-US-centric world won't necessarily be chaotic. It will be polycentric, layered and negotiated. It will be messier, but also more stable in the long run, because no single player will dominate. Others are building it already, not as an anti-American project, but as a practical alternative - a post-western project for shared global prosperity.