Interdependence and Strategic Symmetry: The New Phase of US-China Competition

Editor's Note: Sun Taiyi is an associate professor of political science at Christopher Newport University in the United States. He is also the executive editor of the Global Forum of Chinese Political Scientists' main publication, Global China. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily those of CGTN.

Consider the following statement:

"The Department of Commerce of China is implementing a series of targeted updates to its export controls as part of China's ongoing efforts to protect Chinese national security and foreign policy interests. These updates will restrict the US' ability to both purchase and manufacture certain rare earth minerals and magnets used in military applications…"

Many China hawks in Washington would find this alarming. Yet this text is not from Beijing – it's adapted from a US Commerce Department release, with "China" swapped for "US" and "high-end chips" replaced by "rare earth minerals and magnets." The irony is clear: China's recent export restrictions mirror what Washington has done for years. To denounce one and justify the other is not principle – it's hypocrisy.

This mirroring, though, signals more than double standards. It marks a new stage in US-China competition, one defined by strategic symmetry rather than unilateral dominance. The United States remains the strongest pole in an increasingly multipolar world, but it is no longer the unchallenged hegemon. China has grown confident enough to respond directly and often imitatively to US measures when dealing with the US, turning Washington's own playbook back on itself.

When the US raises tariffs, China answers in kind. When the US restricts Chinese ships or technology, China mirrors the move. And now, America's semiconductor curbs have met their counterpart in Beijing's rare-earth export controls. Both sides possess roughly equal leverage, each holding tools that can disrupt the other's industries and supply chains.

Parity, however, does not have to mean hostility. Since early 2025, both governments have found that escalation brings diminishing returns. After several rounds of tariff battles, neither side gained much, and both suffered. That realization led Washington and Beijing to retract some retaliatory steps and explore steadier ways to manage friction.

Crucially, instruments such as tariffs, chips, and rare earth restrictions serve a dual purpose in the evolution of great-power competition. At first, they are tools of probing, testing each other's resolve and red lines. But once equilibrium is reached, they begin to define behavioral boundaries. Each side learns what the other can tolerate, how far it will go, and when restraint is possible. Through repeated actions and reactions, tacit understandings take shape. Both powers start to read one another's intentions more accurately, reducing the risk of miscalculation and strategic surprise.

When tariffs lost potency, competition spread to subtler fronts such as industrial policy, technology standards, and supply-chain dominance. Yet amid these clashes, a delicate balance emerged between semiconductors and rare earths, two sectors now almost perfectly paired. Neither country can fully detach from the other in the short term. Analysts estimate that both countries will need at least a few years to achieve meaningful self-reliance.

This reluctant technological interdependence is not what either side wanted. For Washington, it signals waning control over key technologies; for Beijing, it imposes limits on industrial speed. Yet it also functions as a stabilizer. Just as tariffs once created a crude, but workable symmetry, the new equilibrium between chips and rare earths adds another layer of balance.

When Beijing announced rare-earth restrictions, US President Donald Trump considered new tariffs on China. But realizing that tariff power was already in equilibrium – and that chips and rare earths had become countervailing tools – he instead chose to de-escalate, saying he's waiting for the meeting with the Chinese president in South Korea to discuss the next steps. The decision reflected an emerging recognition: in high technology, mutual dependence can restrain conflict as effectively as it provokes it.

Some worry that if both nations eventually achieve fully independent supply chains, their relationship will lose stability. But history suggests otherwise. Interdependence has always existed among major powers, whether through royal marriages in earlier centuries or nuclear deterrence in the Cold War. Such links create costs for aggression and incentives for restraint.

Today's interdependence takes new forms – shared data systems, climate cooperation, and globalized manufacturing networks. Economic coercion, once purely a weapon, can evolve into a guardrail. Under President Trump's current administration, Washington continues to use measures such as tariffs and export controls, while Beijing wields its own tools in rare earths and strategic minerals. What began as tit-for-tat retaliation is gradually transforming into an unspoken framework that both tests and constrains behavior.

The future of US-China competition will hinge less on who dominates and more on how both manage this dense web of interdependence. As new arenas of symmetry emerge – from AI governance to advanced materials – each shared vulnerability adds both complexity and stability to the international system. The contest between Washington and Beijing will remain intense, but if governed by the logic of balance rather than destruction, mutual dependence may yet become the foundation of a steadier world order.

(Cover via VCG)