Japan's historical fallacies have become a serious obstacle to Sino-Japanese relations

Editor's note: Lyu Yaodong, a special commentator for CGTN, is the deputy director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Ma Ziyao, a special commentator for CGTN, is a student at the School of International Politics and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's recent claim that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" is an absurd one that tries to challenge China's sovereignty and cross the red line of China's core interests. While appeasing Japan's right-wing politicians, it has cast a sinister shadow over Sino-Japanese relations that are already complex and in dire need of moderation.

Looking back at history, the fascist regime of Japan launched a war of aggression in the 20th century that inflicted immense suffering on people around the world, particularly the Chinese, and committed appalling war crimes.

According to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, two pivotal documents that established the fundamental framework for the post-war international order, Japan was explicitly required not to covet territories beyond its defined sovereignty, to reflect on its historical culpability, and to purge militarist forces.

The current Constitution of Japan enshrines the principle of pacifism, stating that Japan renounces war as a sovereign right and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes, and will never maintain land, sea, and air forces.

Thus, the core objective of the "post-war settlement" was to demilitarize and democratize a defeated Japan and ensure it fulfilled the state responsibilities clearly stipulated in international legal documents.

As the nation that suffered most from Japanese militarist aggression, China, in the post-war period, waived its right to the war reparations that Japan was obligated to pay, a point reiterated in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement.

This decision was by no means a concession towards Japan, but a significant political and legal act by a sovereign state based on the international situation and long-term interests of the time. Its implicit precondition and reasonable expectation was that the Japanese government and society would reflect on Japan's history of aggression and adhere to the pacifist constitution, thereby achieving genuine reconciliation between the two nations and laying a solid foundation for the development of Sino-Japanese relations.

However, Japan has since deviated significantly from the path set by the post-war international order.

Its militarist elements were not thoroughly purged and remained active in Japanese politics. For instance, Kishi Nobusuke, who was jailed as a suspected war criminal for his role in Japan's atrocities, returned to politics after being sheltered by U.S. anti-communist forces and escaping trial.

In 1955, as secretary-general of the Japan Democratic Party (1954-1955), he played a key role in merging it with the Liberal Party (1950-1955), and became the 56th prime minister of Japan in 1957. His relatives, Eisaku Sato and Shinzo Abe, typical right-wing conservative politicians, also became prime ministers later.

Japan's security policies have continuously breached the limits of the pacifist Constitution. Through measures like "reinterpretation" of the constitution, the enactment of new security legislation, and significant increases in defense spending, Japan has substantively altered the nature of its security posture.

Furthermore, right-wing prime ministers like Shinzo Abe repeatedly made statements attempting to justify military interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, especially China. Now Takaichi is continuing that tradition.

Under the guise of "proactive pacifism," Japan is pursuing "re-militarization" in reality. Its ambition to fully lift the ban on the right of collective self-defense and expand the scope of the use of force is all too apparent.

Additionally, historical revisionist rhetoric holds considerable sway in Japan. Numerous Japanese officials have publicly visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which honors war criminals, despite strong opposition from China, South Korea, and others. Right-wing forces promote history textbooks that downplay, deny, or distort Japan's history of aggression. Politicians stoke extreme nationalist sentiments among voters to win elections ...

These phenomena collectively indicate that neither the Japanese government nor mainstream public opinion in Japanese society has sincerely reflected on Japan's historical crimes, and continue to injure the feelings of the nations that were victimized by Japanese aggression, particularly the Chinese.

The Japanese government and society over the past decades have, overall, failed to respond positively to China's goodwill and expectations. On the contrary, they have persistently undermined the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations.

But China will not make the slightest concession on issues concerning its core national interests, and will take substantive countermeasures to thwart Japan's neo-militarist elements.

At the same time, as a major nation committed to peace, China still hopes Japan will awaken from its militarist delusions, return to the spirit of its pacifist constitution, and, on that basis, reflect on its historical culpability and fulfill the unfinished task of historical reckoning. Only then can Sino-Japanese relations potentially return to the right track and develop soundly.

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