Greenland and the Arctic extension of 'Donroeism'

Editor's Note: Huang Bin is an assistant professor at the School of Peace and Development at Renmin University of China and an associated researcher at the Global Research Center for Polar & Deep Sea Strategy. Zhang Boxiao is an assistant professor at the School of Peace and Development at Renmin University of China and an associated researcher at the Center for Research on Global Energy Strategy at Renmin University of China. This article reflects the authors' views and not necessarily those of CGTN.

In January, US President Donald Trump insisted that the United States must acquire Greenland for national security reasons and explicitly refused to rule out the use of military force. Framed within what has come to be known as "Donroeism" – Donald Trump's contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine – this stance signaled a qualitative shift in US strategic thinking. What had once been a hemispheric doctrine focused on consolidating influence in the Americas has now been projected outward, marking the extension of the Donroeist agenda into the Arctic.

The United States' interest in acquiring Greenland is not new. As early as 1946, Washington proposed purchasing the island for $100 million, a move firmly rejected by Denmark. In 2019, during his first presidential term, Trump revived the idea of buying Greenland, triggering immediate opposition from Copenhagen and broader controversy across Europe. What distinguishes the current episode is not novelty, but insistence. More recently, Trump has articulated his position in far more explicit and confrontational terms, stating that US control of Greenland would be pursued through either "the easy way" or "the hard way," elevating the issue from speculative discussion to a declared national security objective.

Following this rhetorical escalation, the Trump administration and its political allies have moved to translate words into action. Efforts to advance the Greenland agenda are now unfolding simultaneously on both international and domestic fronts, combining legislative initiatives, military signaling, and economic pressure into a more coordinated strategy.

On the military front, the escalation has taken the form of an explicit threat of force, with significant political consequences. Trump and senior US officials have explicitly refused to rule out the use of force in discussions over Greenland, underscoring the coercive dimension of Washington's security posture. Against this backdrop, the United States' existing military footprint on the island, anchored by the Pituffik Space Base, a US Space Force installation supporting missile early warning and space surveillance, has acquired a new political meaning. A security arrangement once treated as technical now functions as a source of implicit leverage.

Economic pressure has been applied even more overtly. On January 17, Trump announced that beginning February 1, the United States would impose an additional 10 percent tariff on imports from eight European countries – Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland. He further declared that the tariff rate would rise to 25 percent starting June 1 and remain in effect until an agreement was reached on the "complete and total purchase of Greenland." By directly linking trade penalties to a territorial transaction, the move has effectively transformed tariffs on US allies into leverage aimed at forcing concessions on a core issue of sovereignty. Allies are no longer partners in security, but variables in a bargaining equation. 

Domestically, parallel efforts have emerged to provide political and legal reinforcement for this agenda. In January, Republican Congressman Randy Fine introduced the Greenland Annexation and Statehood Act, a legislative proposal calling for Greenland to be incorporated into the United States and eventually granted statehood once control is obtained. Although the bill remains at an early stage and faces substantial obstacles to securing majority support in Congress, its significance lies elsewhere. It represents the first explicit legislative attempt to normalize the idea of annexing Greenland, signaling that territorial expansion under the banner of national security has moved beyond campaign rhetoric and into the formal legislative arena. Legislation need not pass to shape expectations; sometimes its function is to make the unthinkable discussable.

Under Donroeism, Greenland is treated less as a political entity than as strategic real estate, valued for its location, resources, and controllability. Its importance lies not only in its Arctic geography but in its potential to be integrated into a US-centered system of resource and route control. Two pillars underpin this logic. One important pillar of this approach is resource control. Greenland's potential rare earth reserves are viewed not as commercial commodities, but as strategic inputs for future energy and high-technology industries. By restricting non-US participation in mining projects and related infrastructure, Washington seeks to bind resource development to a US-aligned framework, converting ownership into managerial control and limiting Greenland's scope for diversified economic cooperation.

A second pillar is control over Arctic routes. As polar ice retreats, Arctic shipping lanes are becoming increasingly viable, placing Greenland at a strategic junction of maritime, military, and energy corridors. Through its existing military presence and security framing, the United States seeks to shape governance over Arctic access and transit, including pricing power. By coupling route control with security dominance, Washington aims to extend its logistical and energy influence into the polar region, narrowing the space for multilateral management and reinforcing a US-centered Arctic order.

Taken together, these drivers point to a coherent operating logic rather than a series of ad hoc decisions. Under Donroeism, Greenland functions as a testing ground for a power-projection model that integrates territorial control, resource management, and security dominance – one whose effects extend well beyond the island itself.

The broader implications reach beyond Greenland. By acting on an ally's territorial sovereignty, Washington has eroded strategic trust within the transatlantic alliance. Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and other European states have openly opposed the US approach, while the European Union has issued unusually straightforward criticism. This episode has reinforced political momentum in Europe for greater defense autonomy and "strategic autonomy," potentially weakening the cohesion of transatlantic security cooperation.

In the Arctic, US control over Greenland would not immediately alter existing shipping routes, given limited geographic and technical overlap. Over the medium to long term, however, Greenland's position near the Arctic center gives it relevance for the future Central Arctic shipping route. Control over the island would allow Washington to shape regulatory frameworks, transit oversight, and infrastructure planning at an early stage, securing institutional advantages and narrowing the rule-making space available to other actors.

By contrast, Greenland's resource potential is unlikely to yield rapid material returns. While the island is estimated to hold significant rare earth reserves alongside lithium, uranium, and zinc, development faces severe constraints. Ice coverage, harsh climate, short navigation seasons, weak infrastructure, and high upfront investment costs all limit near-term feasibility. Environmental restrictions and domestic political opposition, particularly around uranium-linked projects, add further uncertainty. As a result, Greenland is better understood as a long-term strategic reserve than as a source of immediate disruption to global resource markets.

Ultimately, the Greenland episode illustrates how Donroeism operates not as a momentary deviation but as a governing logic. By redefining territory as an asset, sovereignty as a variable, and alliances as instruments rather than commitments, this approach blurs the boundary between national security and economic domination. Greenland may be the immediate focus, but it is unlikely to be the last. As power replaces rules and control supplants consent, the precedent set in the Arctic risks normalizing a more transactional, exclusionary, and unstable international order – one in which strategic advantage is pursued not through shared governance, but through calibrated coercion.