Takaichi's dissolution of the lower house: Power anxiety and political speculation

Editor's note: Cao Cong, a special commentator for CGTN, is a doctoral candidate at the School of International Politics and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

On the afternoon of January 23, Japan's House of Representatives was formally dissolved. The election notice for the new House of Representatives was issued on January 27, with voting and ballot counting commencing on February 8.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's sudden dissolution of the House of Representatives and decision to call an early election have been framed as a democratic move to "respond to the will of the people." However, from the perspective of real political logic, this appears more like a carefully orchestrated maneuver to serve her personal political interests, far removed from considerations of governance responsibility or the nation's long-term interests.

At the level of domestic governance, Japan is facing multiple structural challenges. Sluggish economic growth, rising inflation, an aging population, expanding fiscal deficits and the heavy burden on the social security system have made many Japanese citizens anxious about the future. The Takaichi administration has failed to present a convincing plan to stimulate economic vitality, improve public welfare, or promote industrial transformation. Against this backdrop, dissolving the parliament early and resetting the political agenda essentially constitutes a political tactic aimed at evading accountability and postponing the mounting governance pressures.

At the level of party politics, Takaichi's decision reflects ongoing tensions within the Liberal Democratic Party's power structure. Internal divisions continue to surface between hawkish and relatively cautious factions on key issues such as national security policy, the scale of fiscal expansion and overall foreign strategy.

The nationalist conservatism and security hardline stance embodied by Takaichi do not represent a solid consensus within the party. An early election provides her with an opportunity to use electoral legitimacy to suppress dissenting voices, consolidate personal authority and reshape the internal balance of power. This practice of aligning the national political calendar with personal power consolidation carries clear elements of opportunism and underscores the increasingly short-term, personalized nature of Japan's political power dynamics.

Of particular concern is the likelihood that Takaichi and some conservative candidates will continue to intensify their hardline rhetoric against China during the election cycle, deliberately leveraging China-related issues as a tool for political mobilization. Reviewing Takaichi's past statements reveals a recurring tendency to frame China in terms of crisis, confrontation and ideological opposition, even portraying the Taiwan question as a matter related to Japan's "national survival."

As part of electoral strategy, manipulating foreign policy issues has become a familiar tactic among certain political elites in Japan. Redirecting public attention toward external challenges can effectively divert scrutiny away from domestic economic and social problems. At the same time, it caters to emotional appeals among certain voter groups and helps reinforce the support base of right-wing conservative factions.

Using relations with China as a domestic political instrument is steadily accumulating negative long-term consequences for China-Japan relations. The stability of bilateral ties should rest on mutual respect, strategic restraint and pragmatic cooperation. Japan's continued promotion of the so-called China threat theory not only erodes mutual trust but also entrenches the prejudice against China within Japanese society, thereby further narrowing the space for rational dialogue and policy adjustment.

More seriously, such short-term political maneuvering may amplify regional strategic risks. At a time when the Asia-Pacific security landscape is undergoing profound adjustment, any foreign policy posture driven primarily by domestic electoral considerations may lead to misjudgments, misinterpretations, or cascading geopolitical reactions. Once foreign policy becomes subordinated to election cycles, its consistency and predictability inevitably decline. This not only undermines Japan's own diplomatic credibility but may also exacerbate strategic unease among neighboring countries.

Historical experience has repeatedly shown that treating foreign relations as a domestic political bargaining chip often results in long-term repercussions. While a hardline stance may temporarily stir national sentiment and win electoral support, it risks undermining a nation's strategic autonomy in the long run. Such an approach forces countries to become more reliant on external powers in great power rivalries and weakens their capacity for independent mediation in regional affairs.

For Japan, if it continues to intensify confrontation with China driven by electoral politics, it will not only fail to secure genuine security but may accelerate its strategic passivity within the regional landscape.

At a deeper level, Takaichi's political trajectory also reflects that some Japanese political elites have yet to truly shed cold-war thinking and zero-sum logic. By manufacturing confrontation and reinforcing antagonistic narratives to secure domestic political advantage, such approaches not only hinder long-term improvement in China–Japan relations but also constrain Japan's own strategic rationality and policy maturity. A country that repeatedly turns foreign policy into a campaign tool will struggle to build a stable, credible and sustainable international image.

Stable, rational and predictable diplomacy remains a core asset for any responsible nation. Reducing complex international relations to election slogans and turning diplomacy into a domestic political instrument ultimately damages not only bilateral ties but also a nation's own strategic credibility and historical reputation.

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