Japan's drive to enshrine the SDF betrays history and peace

Editor's note: Cao Cong, a special commentator for CGTN, is a doctoral candidate at the School of International Politics and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

On February 2, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivered a campaign speech in Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture, to support candidates for the House of Representatives election. In this speech, she explicitly stated her intention to push for constitutional revision to enshrine the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the constitution.

Her remarks quickly drew intense attention from domestic and international public opinion, once again sounding the alarm for the international community regarding the direction of Japan's security policy. It must be clearly recognized that enshrining the SDF is by no means a simple legal technical adjustment. It represents a fundamental challenge to the post-war foundations of Japan's peaceful constitutional governance, an open evasion of historical responsibility, and a serious threat to regional peace and stability.

Article 9 of Japan's Constitution explicitly renounces war, prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, and prohibits the maintenance of military forces or other war potential. This provision emerged from profound reflection on Japan's history of militarist aggression. It served as a crucial political prerequisite for Japan's postwar reintegration into the international community and remains a vital institutional safeguard that allows Asian nations and the international community to maintain vigilance toward Japan while extending trust.

It was precisely because of the pacifist constitution that Japan was able to concentrate on economic development in the postwar period and avoid once again descending into the abyss of military adventurism. However, Takaichi's proposal to enshrine the SDF essentially seeks to overturn this principle of peace, opening the institutional floodgates for military expansion. The danger of this move should not be underestimated.

Since the second Shinzo Abe administration, Japan has continuously stretched the limits of the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy through constitutional reinterpretation, legal revisions, and policy adjustments. The equipment level, operational scope, and combat capabilities of the SDF have long surpassed what is required for purely defensive purposes. Takaichi's attempt to provide the SDF with constitutional endorsement through formal revision signifies a transition from de facto breakthroughs to institutional consolidation, shifting from policy deviations toward a constitutional-level transformation.

What is particularly alarming is that strong conservative and revisionist tendencies have long characterized Takaichi's political stance. She has repeatedly made controversial statements on historical issues, security policy, and foreign strategy. Her high-profile promotion of constitutional revision amid the election context carries clear overtones of political mobilization and ideological manipulation. The underlying objective is to cater to domestic right-wing forces and push for a fundamental redefinition of Japan's national identity.

More troubling still is Japan's long-contested attitude toward historical issues. Incomplete reflection on its history of aggression and the persistent reemergence of historical revisionist rhetoric have already severely undermined Japan's political credibility among its Asian neighbors. Against this backdrop, advancing constitutional revision and strengthening the legal status of military forces will not foster understanding from surrounding countries, but will inevitably deepen unease and resentment.

It must be emphasized that Japan's constitutional revision agenda is by no means a purely domestic matter. As a former aggressor nation, any major shift in Japan's security policy will inevitably have spillover effects on the regional security landscape. Enshrining the SDF in the constitution would provide a legal basis for expanding overseas military operations, deepening military alliances, and intervening in regional hotspot issues, thereby intensifying bloc confrontation and security dilemmas and undermining the hard-won stability of East Asia. Repeated experience has shown that any attempt to pursue security through military means ultimately results in greater insecurity.

China has consistently maintained that security should be built on principles that are common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable. If Japan genuinely cares about its own security, it should face history squarely, respect its neighbors' legitimate concerns, and remain committed to a path of peaceful development, rather than repeatedly testing red lines through constitutional revision and by manufacturing tension.

Within Japan, many rational voices uphold the pacifist constitution and oppose militarization. This precisely demonstrates that peace is not imposed from the outside, but represents an important societal consensus. Ignoring this public foundation and pushing for a forced constitutional revision will only exacerbate domestic divisions and further damage Japan's international image.

History has repeatedly warned that militarism brought not glory, but disaster to Japan itself and to the peoples of Asia. The postwar order has endured precisely because it imposed sober and rigorous institutional constraints rooted in historical memory. Any attempt to weaken these constraints is a betrayal of history and a reckless disregard for present-day risks.

At this critical juncture, Japan must make the right choice. The international community is watching closely to see whether Japan will continue to build regional stability with its pacifist constitution as its cornerstone, or whether it will use constitutional revision as a breakthrough to slide down the dangerous path of military expansion. What is certain is that any regressive actions that deviate from peaceful development will neither be accepted by Asia's neighbors nor forgiven by history.

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