As indirect U.S.–Iran talks resume amid heightened military tensions, questions abound over what distinguishes this round of negotiations, how far they can go and what they reveal about Washington's broader Middle East strategy. Li Shaoxian, president of the Chinese Academy of Arab Studies at Ningxia University, offers his assessment of the talks, Iran's internal resilience and the strategic calculations shaping both sides.

Q: How does this round of indirect talks, mediated by Oman, compare with previous U.S.–Iran negotiations? What is its significance?

A: In terms of format, there is nothing fundamentally new. Iran has long insisted on avoiding face-to-face negotiations with the United States, and this round continues that practice. Earlier there was speculation that if talks went well, the two sides might eventually meet directly, but that clearly did not happen.

The biggest difference lies in the context. These talks are taking place against the backdrop of intense military confrontation and brinkmanship. That is why they have drawn such extraordinary international attention, with widespread concern that a breakdown could quickly escalate into conflict.

I had anticipated three possible outcomes. The worst would have been an immediate collapse of talks, which would have sharply raised the risk of war. A second, middle-ground outcome is what we have now: no concrete results, but agreement to continue talking. A third, more optimistic scenario would have involved easing tensions first and then negotiating toward a deal, but that was always unlikely. So this current outcome is neither pessimistic nor optimistic; it sits squarely in the middle and was largely predictable.

Q: What was achieved in this first round, and what comes next?

A: The first round was never about details. It focused on procedures, agendas and the overall framework for negotiations. Iran presented its broad proposal, and the U.S. responded in kind. Both sides then returned to their capitals for consultations—Tehran internally, and Washington to brief President Donald Trump. That process itself shows that both sides genuinely want to keep talking. Given the momentum, another round could happen as soon as early next week.

Q: Where are future rounds of talks most likely to be held?

A: Oman remains the most likely venue. Iran trusts Oman more than other regional players, many of whom have higher profiles or stronger regional ambitions. From Tehran's perspective, this is fundamentally a bilateral issue with the United States. Involving other influential regional states would only increase pressure on Iran. Iran's core objective is clear: easing U.S. sanctions.

Q: Will Iran's ballistic missile program remain a major sticking point?

A: Absolutely. This has always been a red line for Iran. The U.S. has long argued that ballistic missiles can serve as delivery systems for nuclear weapons and therefore should be included in negotiations. Iran resisted this for over a decade, and ultimately succeeded in keeping missiles out of the 2015 nuclear deal. Israel, for its part, sees Iran's missile capability as an existential threat and is even more adamant on this issue. This divergence will remain extremely difficult to bridge.

Q: How should we interpret Washington's continued military buildup in the region alongside diplomacy?

A: This approach is entirely consistent with Trump's style: negotiate under maximum pressure. Military deployments and new sanctions are meant to intimidate and coerce Iran into concessions. But historically, Iran has seen far greater U.S. military pressure and has not been cowed. The current posture is not unprecedented, nor is it at its peak.

Q: Some argue Iran's clerical leadership is more fragile than ever. Do you agree?

A: No. Iran is not at its weakest point since 1979. The clerical leadership is internally cohesive, has strong control capabilities and benefits from nationalist backlash against external pressure. While economic hardship has hit the middle class hardest, there is no organized opposition capable of toppling the system. External pressure, if anything, tends to reinforce the leadership's legitimacy rather than undermine it.

Q: From Trump's perspective, what is ultimately at stake in the Iran issue?

A: In my view, Trump's approach to Iran is driven less by short-term domestic political calculations than by a broader adjustment in U.S. national security and global strategy. The key words here are "retreat" and "recalibration."

By "retreat," I do not mean a complete withdrawal, but rather a strategic contraction. The United States no longer sees itself as able—or willing—to sustain the costs of acting as a global hegemon everywhere at once. This means scaling back commitments in regions such as Europe and the Middle East, where U.S. military and political investments have been extremely heavy for decades.

"Recalibration," meanwhile, refers to shifting strategic attention inward and toward areas Washington sees as more critical to its long-term competition. That includes prioritizing domestic issues, strengthening influence in Latin America and concentrating resources in the Asia-Pacific. From this perspective, the Middle East is no longer the central theater it once was.

This helps explain what may look like contradictory behavior in the region. On the one hand, the U.S. is clearly retrenching; on the other, it continues to apply pressure on Iran. In reality, this fits into what I would call Washington's three-step Middle East policy.

First, the U.S. does not want to invest more. There will be no major increase in military or political investment in the region. Second, it does not want to deploy ground troops. We have already seen withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, and further pullbacks from Iraq and Syria are likely. The overall trend is unmistakably one of military contraction. Third, the U.S. no longer wants to assume primary responsibility. Even when allies take the lead, Washington prefers to play a supporting rather than a directing role.

However, because the Middle East remains strategically vital, the U.S. cannot afford to leave a vacuum that could be filled by forces it views as hostile. That is why it seeks to contain Iran, firmly back Israel and promote rapprochement between Israel and Arab states. Only by locking in this regional balance can Washington feel secure enough to continue its strategic retreat.

From this standpoint, Trump has no intention of becoming bogged down in a prolonged confrontation with Iran in the Persian Gulf. His approach is more transactional. I would call it a "one-shot deal." That is why I believe there is still room for compromise.

Iran will never give up its missile program, which it sees as essential to national survival. But it may be willing to pause elements of its nuclear program, such as uranium enrichment or centrifuge production, if the U.S. offers meaningful sanctions relief in return.