Q&A: Where will Takaichi lead Japan's foreign policy after lower house election?

Japan's ruling coalition, comprised of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party, secured a more than two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives following Sunday's general election, public broadcaster NHK reported early on Monday.

The LDP, led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, won a total of 316 seats, effectively granting the party a two-thirds majority in the 465-seat House of Representatives on its own.

The victory removes the domestic brakes that have previously moderated the Takaichi administration's radical defense and diplomatic stances, a significant shift that could undermine regional peace and stability, Lyu Yaodong, deputy director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told CGTN.

Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University of China, said Tokyo's shifting security posture is driven by American changes of its priorities and can only be countered by a shift in the overall geopolitical balance of power.

Here are CGTN's conversations with the two experts on Monday, edited for clarity and conciseness.

CGTN: Some analyses suggest the result has disrupted the balance of power in the House of Representatives, potentially pushing Japan toward a more adventurous policy path. What is your view of this assessment?

Lyu: In this Japanese House of Representatives election, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has secured more than two-thirds of the seats on its own. As a result, all the diplomatic approaches previously proposed by Sanae Takaichi will be advanced, as, in terms of Japan's party structure, there is no opposition party capable of counterbalancing them.

Additionally, the Centrist Reform Alliance [formed in January by the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and the Komeito party] has seen its seats drop from 167, pre-election, to 49. This means the opposition cannot effectively challenge the Liberal Democratic Party.

Takaichi can proceed freely with her diplomatic policies, especially regarding constitutional revision and other related ideologies. The ability of [Japan's largest opposition] Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan to counter the Liberal Democratic Party has diminished.

Furthermore, within the ruling coalition, Takaichi no longer needs to consider the Japan Innovation Party's stance. She can fully adhere to the Liberal Democratic Party's unilateral ideology and translate it into government will, effectively making it the national will. From the perspective of power structure, this represents a significant change.

CGTN: Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reportedly called for initiating constitutional revision debates after her election victory. Could her past controversial statements and the government's push for military security policy expansion potentially exacerbate regional instability?

Lyu: Regarding the issue of constitutional revision, Takaichi has made it clear that she intends to include the Self-Defense Forces in the constitution. This aligns with the goals previously set by the Liberal Democratic Party.

Additionally, her stance on constitutional revision is almost identical to that of the Japan Innovation Party, although the latter is more radical, advocating for the direct establishment of a national defense force.

During [former Japanese Prime Minister] Shinzo Abe's tenure, the Self-Defense Forces route was proposed, and a consultative body on constitutional revision clauses was to be established within the ruling coalition. I believe Takaichi will soon advance this process.

Given that the Liberal Democratic Party government has secured more than two-thirds of the seats in the Diet, it is certain that they will adopt very radical measures in relation to foreign policies. This includes revising the three non-nuclear principles and the three principles on transfer of defense equipment and technology, and lifting restrictions on developing offensive military capability, along with other radical policies that could undermine peace and stability in East Asia.

CGTN: How should the region and the international community coordinate their response to Japan's potentially more aggressive diplomatic and security policies?

Wang: Japan's attempts to break its post-World War II constitutional constraints is primarily due to the United States' desire to reduce its burden, as well as American acquiescence. Additionally, there is what Tokyo has claimed is a "threat" from China.

Countries like South Korea or other nations invaded by Japan in WWII, unlike China, do not have the same momentum of rise and are either aligned with or allied with the United States. As a result, their reactions may not be as strong as China's. Therefore, China should not entirely rely on them to jointly restrain Japan.

While there may be some challenges in the short term, ultimately, it will depend on comprehensive national strength, technology and production capacity to shift the geopolitical landscape. In the end, the broader strategic competition between China and the United States will determine the future dynamics between China and Japan, as well as the overall landscape of East Asia.