Cracks in US-Israel alliance widen as Iran conflict drags on

As the conflict with Iran stretches into its third week, there is palpable discord in the air between the United States and Israel. Analysts suggest that what began as a coordinated campaign is now marked by diverging goals, disagreements over escalation, and contrasting domestic pressures.

At the outset of military strikes on February 28, both US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signaled that pressure on Tehran could lead to regime change. However, subsequent developments indicate a clear divergence.

Israel continues to pursue its so-called maximalist objectives. Netanyahu has repeatedly framed the campaign as an effort to "overthrow" the Iranian system, reflected in ongoing targeted killings of senior Iranian figures and strikes on core political and military assets.

US policy, meanwhile, has narrowed. Officials now emphasize degrading Iran's missile program, nuclear capabilities and proxy networks.

According to The Economist, Israeli officials have grown convinced that Trump is much less eager than they are to see full regime change in Iran, instead prioritizing control over escalation that risks unleashing unpredictable dynamics.

Former US ambassador to Israel Daniel B. Shapiro noted that Trump has recently "de-emphasized" regime change, indicating that the US is worried such an outcome could trigger regional instability, including civil conflict in Iran.

Differences in strategic intent have translated into open operational tensions.

Following strikes on the South Pars gas field and associated oil and petrochemical facilities in Bushehr Province on Wednesday, Washington publicly distanced itself from Israeli actions. Trump stated that the US had "no prior knowledge" of certain Israeli operations and insisted that any future strikes on energy targets would require American approval.

Signs of disagreement had already surfaced earlier. Israeli strikes on fuel depots and petroleum logistics sites in Tehran on March 7 were seen in Washington as exceeding expectations.

The Economist flagged Washington's unhappiness with hits on critical energy infrastructure, calling it "the first sign of discord" between the two countries. Axios also called it the first major diplomatic falling out between the two nations since the start of the conflict, with a Trump adviser quoted as saying, "The president doesn't like the attack."

These differences point to contrasting risk calculations. Israel appears more willing to accept escalation risks in pursuit of strategic disruption, while the United States is more focused on mitigating economic shocks and preventing a wider regional crisis.

Another bone of contention is how long the conflict is allowed to drag on for before it becomes a war of attrition, and who determines that timeline – Iran or the US and Israel.

Trump's messaging has been notably inconsistent. After initially appearing to favor a "short, sharp" campaign, similar to earlier US operations elsewhere, his subsequent statements have ranged from declaring the war "essentially over" to acknowledging that the mission remains incomplete.

By March 20, Trump suggested that the US was "very close" to achieving its objectives and was considering scaling down operations, including reducing responsibility for securing the Strait of Hormuz.

However, US military deployments continue to expand, with additional naval forces and contingency planning for ground operations. Analysts interpret this as a sign of strategic ambiguity rather than coherence.

The Economist noted that if economic costs – particularly high oil prices – begin to pose a threat to Trump's political standing, he may move quickly to end US involvement regardless of Israel's position.

Shapiro offered a similar assessment, arguing that once Washington decides to halt operations, Israel is unlikely to openly oppose it. He warned, however, that Iran may not follow suit, potentially evolving its battlefield strategy through asymmetric attacks. In such a scenario, Israel could revert to a "mowing the grass" approach – conducting periodic strikes rather than sustaining continuous warfare.

Internal political dynamics are driving a further wedge between the US and Israel, prying open existing cracks.

According to Foreign Affairs, Israeli society – long accustomed to viewing Iran as an existential threat – largely anticipated and supported military action, at least in its early stages. The conflict is primarily framed through a regional security lens.

In contrast, US domestic support remains limited. Polling in early 2026 showed little appetite for war with Iran, and opposition has grown as the conflict continues. Conservative commentator Tucker Carlson has publicly criticized the campaign, calling it "Israel's war."

Institutional dissent has also emerged. John Kent, director of the US National Counterterrorism Center, resigned on March 17, stating he could not "in good conscience" support the administration's war against Iran.

Shapiro observed that many Americans do not understand why the US is involved, suggesting the administration has failed to clearly articulate its strategic rationale.

Economic concerns are compounding political pressure. Rising oil prices and the risk of US casualties are key factors shaping public opinion. Niu Xinchun, director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued that opposition within the US is growing rapidly, with more than half the population viewing the war as unnecessary and calling for a swift end.

He warned that if oil prices refuse to climb down from the $100s or, worse still, surge further, it could have disastrous political consequences for Trump, particularly with midterm elections approaching.

Analysts also suggest that these disagreements are rooted in deeper structural differences. As Niu observed, "the longer the war drags on, the sharper and more public these contradictions will become."

Niu noted that Israel perceives Iran as a far more immediate threat due to geographic proximity. "The US can withdraw; Israel cannot," he said, highlighting the asymmetry in strategic exposure.

This distinction shapes risk tolerance. Israel is more willing to sustain a protracted campaign to inflict lasting damage, while the United States is actively seeking an exit strategy, the scholar said.

Moreover, Washington must balance global commitments. As Foreign Affairs pointed out, extended conflict risks diverting military resources, including air defense systems and naval assets, from other theaters such as the Indo-Pacific and Europe. These considerations are largely absent from Israel's strategic calculus.