Why Japan's bid to export arms deserves global vigilance

Editor's note: Xiang Haoyu, a special commentator for CGTN, is a specially appointed research fellow at the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

In February, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) adopted a draft proposal to revise the operational guidelines for the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," a critical document governing the export of military hardware.

On March 6, the LDP and its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, jointly submitted the proposal to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. If adopted, the revision would scrap the current rule limiting arms exports to five categories – rescue, transport, vigilance, surveillance, and mine clearance – and significantly loosen export controls, including allowing the export of lethal weapons.

These developments have not only come under close international scrutiny but also met with opposition within Japan. To defend the move, the current administration has once again resorted to the old trick of peddling the so-called "China threat."

In response to media inquiries, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi claimed that China's characterization of the policy shift as "militarization" is a "propaganda campaign." Citing data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, he also claimed that China is the world's fourth largest arms exporter while Japan does not even rank among the top 50.

The implied argument is clear: If China exports large quantities of weapons, why can't Japan?

This argument is not only logically flawed but also a malicious distortion of China's position.

To begin with, the nature and context of arms exports by China and Japan are entirely different.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China upholds the UN Charter and international law. Its participation in international arms trade has always complied with UN resolutions and norms of international law.

China strictly adheres to three principles in arms exports: they should be conducive to the legitimate self-defense capability of the recipient country; they should not impair regional and global peace, security and stability; and they should not interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient country.

China never uses arms exports as a tool for geopolitical rivalry, nor does it seek military presence or political privileges in exchange for weapons. It has always opposed weapons proliferation and promotes arms control and non-proliferation in UN bodies.

In contrast, Japan's relaxation of arms exports, framed as a response to the so-called "external threats" from China, Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is rooted in a Cold War mentality of zero-sum game and serves the strategic goals of containment and confrontation. Japan's arms export expansion is intended to fuel bloc confrontation and intensify camp-based rivalry in the region. This is fundamentally different from China's approach in logic, purpose and end results.

In addition, the two countries bear vastly different historical and moral responsibilities.

China suffered immensely from the brutal aggression of Japanese militarists. Today, China is a large country with complex surroundings. Necessary development of national defense capabilities and engagement in international military trade cooperation is China's legitimate right and contributes to regional security.

Japan, however, has yet to draw serious lessons from its history of aggression, and is now plagued by historical revisionism. Against this backdrop, any move to lift the ban on lethal weapon exports is bound to cause serious security concerns and warrants close scrutiny.

This is not a matter of double standard, but rather a reflection of differing moral responsibilities shaped by history and facts. Ignoring this distinction and judging an aggressor and its victim by the same moral yardstick is in itself a denial of historical justice – it is neither fair nor reasonable.

Koizumi has also portrayed China's rare earth export controls on certain Japanese entities as "pressuring behavior," and camouflaged the easing of arms exports as a self-defense measure aimed at reducing dependence on specific countries. This is exactly the same public relations tactic long used by Japanese right-wing forces to erode the constraints of the pacifist Constitution and push for military expansion.

Invoking the so-called "China threat" while pursuing military buildup in the name of "self-defense" reflects a deeply entrenched Cold War logic: Security is defined in zero-sum terms. Japan's attempt to address domestic skepticism by shifting attention outward amounts to untenable sophistry. Rather than resolving concerns, it only exposes the ulterior motives behind the decision to ease arms exports and highlights the increasingly dangerous trajectory of the security policy.

Japan's push to ease arms exports is a step toward "re-militarization" driven by clear strategic ambitions. Three objectives stand out.

First, revitalizing the domestic defense industry to break the constraints of the exclusive defense-only principle.

After World War II, Japan adopted the exclusively defense-oriented policy under its pacifist Constitution. In 1967, it introduced the "Three Principles on Arms Exports," which strictly restricted arms sales and became one of the landmark policies signifying Japan's post-war commitment to peaceful development. However, the Shinzo Abe cabinet replaced it with the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology" in 2014, significantly easing weapons exports.

Now the current government is seeking to remove the remaining restrictions, even opening the door to exports of lethal weapons. The real aim is to turn Japan into a major arms exporter, and sustain its domestic defense industry with overseas sales, thereby forming a closed industrial loop of "funding the military through arms sales."

This will not only stimulate the expansion of Japan's arms industry but also steer its broader economic and industrial structure toward militarization, thus reshaping the national trajectory.

Strengthening alliance integration is another objective.

Koizumi claimed at a press conference that Japan aims to reduce dependence on specific countries and build up independent defense capabilities – an apparent reference to the US. Yet this rhetoric is deceptive. In essence, it seeks to capitalize on Washington's expectations for "security burden sharing" by Asia-Pacific allies and elevate Japan's status in America's Indo-Pacific Strategy.

By supplying weapons and equipment to US allies and "like-minded" partners, Japan may help contain and counter strategic rivals like China and Russia, integrate itself more deeply into the lethal operational chain of the Western combat system, and boost its global military influence.

Finally, circumventing constitutional constraints to accelerate "re-militarization" is the third goal.

Article 9 of Japan's Constitution clearly stipulates that Japan shall not maintain land, sea and air forces, and renounces the right of war and the right of belligerency. Yet for a long time, the Japanese government has repeatedly broken constitutional restraints through reinterpretations of the Constitution, dramatic increases in the defense budget, and development of offensive military capabilities.

Faced with domestic resistance to constitutional revision, they have gradually eroded the pacifist provisions of the Constitution through supplementary legislation and policy adjustments. This "salami-slicing" approach risks steering Japan away from its peaceful development path to re-emerge as a "war-capable major power" with reckless strategic ambitions.

If Japan fully liberalizes lethal weapon exports, the consequences will be profound and far-reaching.

At the regional level, it will heighten the risk of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific. Japan is already an industrial power with a strong military technology basis, possessing sophisticated capabilities in naval vessels, fighter jets, tanks and missiles. More Japanese weapons flowing into sensitive regions are likely to fuel geopolitical tensions, create new flashpoints, and seriously damage regional peace and stability.

At the global level, the proliferation of Japanese weapons will further erode the international arms control system. Mechanisms such as the Arms Trade Treaty are already facing credibility challenges due to certain countries' withdrawal. Japan's full liberalization of arms sales and military aid would further hold back the global efforts to curb arms proliferation.

At the historical and moral level, arms exports by Japan, a major aggressor in World War II, carry particular sensitivity. For countries falling victim to Japanese militarism such as China and South Korea, Japan's return to the old path of military expansion is always highly alarming. Such moves would further undermine the security trust and reconciliation efforts in the region.

However, sober voices also exist in Japan. During a parliamentary debate, an opposition lawmaker posed a pointed question: "On the one hand, Japan teaches its children to cherish peace; on the other hand, it manufactures lethal weapons and exports them to gain profits. How can we explain such a contradiction to our children?”

Lessons from history remain fresh. No matter how Japanese politicians attempt to justify their actions, they cannot cover up the ulterior motives and potential dangers of easing arms exports and pursuing re-militarization. This development deserves the vigilance of regional countries and the international community.

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