Iran and the United States have agreed to a two-week ceasefire less than two hours before the deadline set by US President Donald Trump and will hold negotiations in Pakistan.

The ceasefire came shortly before Trump's deadline for Iran to agree to a deal and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, or the "whole civilization will die tonight."

Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi has said that Iran will cease "defensive operations" if attacks against it stop.

Araghchi also promised safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz during the two-week ceasefire under "coordination" with Iranian armed forces, saying that Iran will hold negotiations with the US side in Pakistan's capital of Islamabad.

In an interview with CGTN, Wang Jin, director of the Center for Strategic Studies at Northwest University in China, said ending the war is the real objective for both Iran and the US, and negotiations are merely a pretext. 

Sun Taiyi, associate professor of political science at Christopher Newport University in the United States, told CGTN that the most immediate trigger of this ceasefire is political rather than purely military, and more fundamental driver lies in domestic political constraints.

Factors behind ceasefire

Speaking of the background and opportunity of this ceasefire, Wang said for Iran, the negotiations are being led by its government, spearheaded by the Iranian president and foreign minister. "Within Iran's domestic political factions, both figures belong largely to the pragmatic camp, which has long favored seeking peaceful dialogue and engagement with the United States."

On the other hand, the United States has come to realize the protracted nature of the conflict and that it cannot change the current situation, he said. Public dissatisfaction at home has been rising, and continuing the war has also drawn criticism from US allies, said Wang, adding that sustained military investment in the conflict has pushed Washington to pursue talks.

Sun said the most immediate trigger is political rather than purely military. Trump had significantly escalated his rhetoric in the final days, including references to potentially "destroying an entire civilization." Once such maximalist threats are issued, failing to follow through creates a credibility gap that must be managed, Sun said.

The ceasefire, therefore, functions as a strategic off-ramp – a way to recalibrate without openly admitting failure, he said, adding that meanwhile, there was indeed some degree of international mediation in the background, with actors such as Pakistan and China facilitating indirect communication.

The more fundamental driver lies in domestic political constraints, Sun noted. Crucially, the timing coincides with the April 15 tax filing deadline in the United States – a moment when public attention shifts intensely toward personal finances and economic performance. 

Under these conditions, prolonging a costly and uncertain conflict risks overshadowing the administration's efforts to promote its tax policy achievements, he said. "A two-week ceasefire conveniently covers this politically sensitive window, allowing the administration to pivot the narrative from war-related uncertainty to domestic economic messaging."

True intentions of both sides

Trump said the reason for doing so is that the US has already met and exceeded all military objectives and is very far along with a definitive agreement concerning long-term peace with Iran and in the Middle East. Iran stressed that the temporary ceasefire does not mean an end to war, which depends on pending negotiations on details of its 10-point plan.

"What we are seeing is less a convergence on peace than a competition over narrative dominance," Sun noted, adding that almost immediately after the ceasefire was announced, domestic debates in the United States exposed sharp discrepancies over its actual terms.

CNN, citing Iranian official messaging – particularly from the Supreme National Security Council – reported a maximalist version in which Iran claimed sweeping gains: control over the Strait of Hormuz, continued uranium enrichment, sanctions relief, compensation and even a reduction of US regional presence. The Trump administration quickly rejected this framing and instead pointed to more moderate statements from Iran's foreign minister.

"This divergence is telling," he said, stressing that both sides are not simply negotiating outcomes; they are actively constructing "victory narratives" for domestic audiences. "In that sense, the ceasefire is as much about political communication as it is about conflict management."

Substantively, however, the arrangement bears the hallmarks of a tactical pause rather than a durable settlement, Sun said, adding that the ceasefire provides an off-ramp for Trump's prior escalation, allowing him to step back from extreme threats without openly conceding failure.

This asymmetry makes a permanent ceasefire unlikely in the near term, according to Sun. "Over the next two weeks, the risk of renewed escalation – particularly through Israeli action or a US attempt to reassert leverage – remains high," he said, adding that this is a temporary stabilization at best, but the conflict remains unresolved structurally.

Complete opening of Strait of Hormuz in the future?

Trump said the decision is "subject to" Iran agreeing to the complete, immediate and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking of whether Iran will fully open the strait in the future, Wang said the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz will never return to the pre-conflict status quo, adding that Iran is certain to retain dominance over the strait and that the US side may issue criticism or file complaints but will be unable to alter the reality.

Discussions over navigation in the strait are unlikely to become the central focus of US–Iran negotiations, Wang said, adding that the two sides will not reach any binding agreement on this issue in their core negotiations.

Sun said what we are likely to see is not a fully open strait, but a conditionally open and highly managed one. Despite the formal language of "full reopening," the post-ceasefire reality already suggests a different dynamic: vessels are expected to coordinate with Iranian forces, implying some form of tacit permission structure.

In other words, Iran does not need to physically block the strait to exert control. Instead, a credible threat of disruption is sufficient to shape behavior, Sun said.

While Washington may seek to make "freedom of navigation" a central negotiating objective, achieving it in absolute terms is structurally difficult at this point, he said, adding that the eventual equilibrium, if one emerges, is more likely to resemble a managed passage regime rather than a return to pre-war openness, with the rules of transit remaining a persistent source of friction.

Turning point or temporary buffer?

Speaking of whether this two-week window will become a turning point or a temporary buffer for regional order and US-Iran relations, Sun said this two-week window looks more like a temporary buffer than a true turning point.

The current arrangement pauses escalation, but it has not resolved the underlying dispute over Iran's nuclear program, regional influence or the rules governing Hormuz, he noted.

Reuters and other reporting also indicate that Iranian officials are treating the arrangement as provisional and maintaining military readiness, while strikes and alerts have not fully disappeared across the region.

"That makes the ceasefire less a settlement than a period in which both Washington and its partners – especially Israel – are likely reassessing whether they can create a more favorable strategic outcome, including action related to Iran's enriched uranium," he said.

Therefore, the larger risk is not simply higher oil prices; it is the emergence of a new regional pattern in which shipping lanes, energy flows and deterrence postures are all militarized on a more regular basis, said Sun.

Wang said the next two weeks will serve as a transitional period during which the conflict gradually winds down and hostilities ease.

After that, the United States and Iran are expected to hold sporadic negotiations, yet no substantive progress will be achieved, he said, adding that large-scale fighting is unlikely to resume.