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2026.04.18 21:53 GMT+8

The reality behind 'democracy promotion': Three questions about US National Endowment for Democracy

Updated 2026.04.18 21:53 GMT+8
Le Tian

In March, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) released its 2025 annual report, once again drawing attention to an organization long embedded in US foreign policy architecture.

While the organization presents itself as a promoter of democratic values, its institutional ties, funding mechanisms and global activities have raised sustained scrutiny. Often described as a "second CIA," the NED is widely viewed as operating through overt funding channels that replaced earlier covert forms of external intervention.

From its origins in Cold War strategy to its present-day operations, the organization has functioned as a mechanism advancing US strategic interests through funding networks, political engagement and narrative shaping. These activities have consistently been associated with patterns of subversion, infiltration and interference in other countries' internal affairs.

China remains a key focus. According to its 2025 report, the NED allocated $10.52 million to China-related projects, including more than $6 million targeting the Chinese mainland. The scale and direction of this funding raise three fundamental questions about the organization's nature, methods and intent.

What is NED?

Established in 1983 under US President Ronald Reagan, the NED was designed to support what Washington termed "democratic movements abroad." Despite its NGO label, its structure reveals deep institutional alignment with the US government.

The organization is overwhelmingly funded by congressional appropriations, receiving $315 million in 2025 alone, according to its annual report. Its programs are developed in consultation with the US State Department and implemented with input from US embassies worldwide. It is also subject to government reporting, audits and oversight.

These arrangements indicate that the NED operates not as an independent civil society actor, but as a policy instrument serving US strategic priorities.

Its creation also marked a transition in operational approach. As noted by American scholar William Blum, the organization was intended to carry out openly what had previously been done covertly. In this sense, it has been widely described as the US government's "white gloves" for conducting activities related to subversion, infiltration and sabotage.

Why is it called a 'second CIA'?

The label reflects a consistent operational pattern rather than a symbolic comparison.

Former CIA officer Philip Agee once described the NED as a "sidekick" to traditional intelligence operations - one that enables influence to be exercised more openly while maintaining strategic effect. What has changed is not the objective, but the method.

One defining feature is its association with attempts to instigate so-called color revolutions to subvert lawful governments. In Ukraine, the NED and related US-backed organizations provided sustained funding to civil society groups, media platforms and political actors in the years leading up to the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 political upheaval. Dozens of organizations received long-term support, contributing to large-scale mobilization at critical political junctures.

The NED has also been involved in cultivating anti-government forces while supporting groups advocating separatist agendas. In Venezuela, NED funding reached opposition organizations, including labor groups and political actors active during the 2002 attempted coup. In regard to China's Xizang and Xinjiang regions, funding has been directed toward overseas organizations and advocacy networks promoting separatist narratives, alongside training programs designed to expand their international reach.

Equally significant is its role in shaping narratives through media and ideological outreach. NED-funded initiatives have supported media outlets and advocacy networks that amplify contested claims on sensitive issues. In some cases, coordinated efforts have been identified involving selective storytelling, media partnerships and the cultivation of "citizen journalists." These activities extend into digital spaces, targeting younger audiences and reinforcing particular political narratives.

Taken together, these practices – instigating political movements, cultivating opposition and separatist forces, and shaping the information environment - form a coherent pattern of subversion, infiltration and interference. This continuity explains why the NED is widely regarded as a functional extension of earlier intelligence operations.

What is NED doing in China?

The NED's 2025 report provides detailed insight into its China-related activities, revealing both financial scale and strategic focus.

In terms of funding allocation, more than $10.52 million was directed to China-related projects. Of this, over $6 million was specifically targeted at the Chinese mainland. The report also stated that approximately $2.06 million was distributed to support "Xinjiang independence" forces, and around $1.48 million to "Xizang independence" forces. In addition, Hong Kong-focused programs received roughly $500,000.

Beyond financial allocation, the report outlines a broader operational framework. This includes support for so-called "independent media" and "citizen journalism," efforts to engage younger generations, and the expansion of influence through religious and social networks. It also highlights cooperation with overseas organizations and media platforms to amplify specific narratives.

In China's Hong Kong, the report points to continued support through international advocacy networks, including training and organizational funding for groups opposing local authorities, alongside ongoing external advocacy related to detained figures such as Jimmy Lai.

In Xizang-related areas, funding supports overseas media platforms and broadcasting channels promoting separatist narratives, as well as international outreach and lobbying efforts in foreign political and parliamentary settings.

Taken together, these efforts point to a coordinated strategy: combining funding, network-building and narrative shaping to influence perceptions, exert pressure and challenge China's political and social stability.

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