Japan's accelerated remilitarization is a fact and a reality

Editor's note: Cao Cong, a special commentator for CGTN, is a doctoral candidate at the School of International Politics and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Recently, Japan has made frequent moves in the military and security sphere, with its policy direction breaking away from the long-cultivated post-World War II (WWII) image of a peaceful nation. From sharply expanding defense spending, developing "counterstrike capability," and revising the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, to seeking to enshrine the Self-Defense Forces in the Constitution, and repeatedly hyping the Taiwan question, Japan is advancing a transformation of its national security strategy in a gradual and institutionalized manner, moving onto a dangerous path of remilitarization.

Transformation of military and security policy

For decades after WWII, Japan based its national security policy on the principle of "exclusively defense-oriented policy," meaning it would exercise only the minimum level of self-defense after being attacked, possess no offensive weapons, and refrain from military expansion abroad. This principle once served as an important political symbol distinguishing postwar Japan from its prewar militarism. However, recent policy changes have rendered this principle largely hollow.

When revising the three key security documents in 2022 – the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program – Japan explicitly stated its intention to acquire the capability to strike enemy bases, namely a "counterstrike capability." This concept is far from purely defensive. It represents a typical offensive deterrence posture. Its core logic is that once Japan determines an opponent is preparing an attack, it could launch long-range precision strikes before suffering damage. Once incorporated into operational planning, such a capability inevitably alters Japan's strategic posture, transforming it from a passive defender into a state possessing preemptive strike capabilities.

In March, Japan had already deployed long-range missiles in Kumamoto and Shizuoka prefectures. The upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile deployed in Kumamoto reportedly has a range of 1,000 kilometers, capable of reaching parts of the Asian mainland coast. A hypersonic missile deployed in Shizuoka is planned to reach a range of 2,000 kilometers eventually. In addition, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's Aegis destroyer Chokai has reportedly been equipped to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, which have a range of approximately 1,600 kilometers. These deployments mark the substantial implementation of Japan's "counterstrike capability."

More noteworthy is that Japan is building integrated capabilities for future warfare. For example, Japan has established two new offices within its Ground Self-Defense Force dedicated to unmanned warfare, and plans large-scale procurement of reconnaissance and attack drones. The Maritime Self-Defense Force is reorganizing the Fleet Escort Force and Mine Warfare Force into a unified Fleet Surface Force to strengthen island defense under centralized command.

Rising defense spending and expansion of the military industry

Another prominent feature of Japan's remilitarization is the sustained increase in military spending and the expansion of its defense industrial base.

In the 2022 revision of its three security documents, Japan proposed raising total defense spending to 43 trillion yen over five years. On that basis, Japan's initial defense budget for fiscal year 2026 reached 9 trillion yen, a record high. After Sanae Takaichi took office, the government moved to revise the three security documents ahead of schedule, suggesting defense spending will likely rise further.

At the same time, Japan has begun loosening restrictions on arms exports. On April 21, the Japanese government decided to revise the Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, allowing the export of lethal weapons to "like-minded countries." Under the new rules, Japan can export frigates, air defense missiles, and other weapons to countries such as the Philippines and Australia.

It is worth noting that under the new framework, such exports need only approval from Japan's National Security Council, composed of the prime minister and cabinet ministers, while the Diet is merely informed afterward. This means Japan is expanding military trade authority while maintaining weak oversight, increasing the risk of weapons proliferation, intensifying regional arms races, and drawing Japan into external conflicts.

For decades after WWII, Japan's strict limits on arms exports were presented as evidence of pacifism. The lifting of those restrictions formally brings Japan into the global arms trade market. Once military industry profits become tied to foreign orders, arms production ceases to be solely about national defense and instead creates incentives for commercial expansion. History shows that when military capital aligns with security policy, it often drives more hawkish diplomacy and higher military spending.

Using constitutional revision to pave the way for military expansion

Japan's remilitarization is reflected not only in policy and weapons procurement, but also at the institutional level. In recent years, right-wing forces in Japan have continuously called for revising the pacifist constitution and explicitly writing the Self-Defense Forces into the constitution, in an attempt to remove legal and political constraints on military expansion.

Article 9 of Japan's constitution clearly renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential. It has long been regarded internationally as a key symbol of Japan's postwar peace framework. Yet many conservative politicians have consistently viewed constitutional revision as a political objective, seeking to break free from postwar restraints and turn Japan into a so-called "normal country."

Enshrining the Self-Defense Forces is publicly packaged as a move to "remove controversy" and "clarify legal status." In essence, however, it would constitutionally legitimize permanent military forces and open the door to larger military buildups, expanded overseas operations, and looser restrictions on the use of force. Once achieved, Japan's postwar peace framework would be further hollowed out, giving remilitarization a fundamental institutional foundation.

More concerning is that some Japanese politicians have exploited changing regional circumstances to portray constitutional revision as urgent, using external security concerns to push domestic political agendas and manufacture public anxiety. This reveals that their true purpose is not to preserve peace but to escape the constraints of the postwar system.

Using the Taiwan question as a pretext for military expansion

The most alarming external manifestation of Japan's remilitarization is its repeated hype over the Taiwan question and growing involvement in regional affairs, aimed at manufacturing external threats to justify military expansion.

First, Japan has continuously strengthened military deployments in its southwestern region, incorporating Taiwan-related contingencies into its own military planning. Yonaguni, Ishigaki, and Miyako islands sit at key points along the first island chain. Japan's military buildup there serves both the US-Japan alliance maritime blockade concepts and Japan's ability to intervene in the event of a "Taiwan contingency."

Yonaguni Island lies only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. Japan views forces stationed there as the "eyes and ears" monitoring developments around the Taiwan Strait. Electronic warfare units have already been deployed, and surface-to-air missile units are planned by 2030, posing serious risks to regional peace and stability.

Second, some Japanese political figures continue to make irresponsible remarks on Taiwan-related matters, promoting a "China threat" narrative to justify military expansion. Since taking office, Sanae Takaichi has made erroneous comments on the Taiwan question, internationalizing and securitizing China's internal affairs. This not only violates the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan, but also undermines the political foundation of bilateral relations.

Threats are often politically constructed rather than naturally existing. By constantly emphasizing "regional crises" and slogans such as "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency," Japan's right-wing forces seek to shape public opinion in favor of larger defense budgets, legal changes, military expansion, and deeper integration into alliances.

Finally, recent passages of Japanese vessels through the Taiwan Strait indicate an attempt to play a more visible military role in regional affairs. While such symbolic moves may not alter the balance of power, they significantly increase the risk of miscalculation and deepen strategic distrust. As the "security dilemma" shows, actions taken by one country in the name of defense are often perceived by others as threats, triggering countermeasures. If Japan continues to use the Taiwan question to advance its military expansion, East Asia could be drawn into a spiraling arms race.

Debate over revising the Three Non-Nuclear Principles exposes a more dangerous turn

Against the broader backdrop of Japan's accelerating remilitarization, another deeply troubling development is the growing discussion within Japan about revising or reinterpreting the country's long-standing Three Non-Nuclear Principles. These principles – not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory – have for decades been presented as a moral and political symbol of Japan's postwar pacifism as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings.

However, in recent years, voices within Japan's conservative and right-wing political circles have increasingly called for a review of these principles. Some politicians have openly advocated discussions on "nuclear sharing" arrangements similar to those within NATO, under which US nuclear weapons could be deployed on Japanese soil. Others have argued that the worsening regional security environment requires Japan to reconsider what they describe as outdated self-restraints.

Such arguments are dangerous. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles have long served as an important political boundary separating postwar Japan from the militarist path of the past. Once that boundary is weakened – whether through formal revision, policy reinterpretation, or quiet erosion – it would signal a historic shift in Japan's national security identity and further accelerate the country's remilitarization process.

More importantly, any move by Japan toward nuclear sharing or loosening nuclear restraints would carry serious regional and global consequences. It would heighten strategic anxiety among neighboring countries, stimulate arms competition in Northeast Asia, and undermine the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Given Japan's advanced civilian nuclear technology and large stockpiles of plutonium, any discussion of weakening non-nuclear commitments inevitably raises broader concerns about Japan's long-term strategic intentions.

It is particularly alarming that some Japanese politicians are attempting to use regional tensions as justification for reopening the nuclear issue. By portraying nuclear constraints as a burden rather than a responsibility, they seek to normalize ideas that were once considered politically unacceptable. This reflects a dangerous pattern in which external security narratives are repeatedly used to dismantle postwar restraints in a step-by-step fashion.

The shadow of militarism has not disappeared

Japan's recent moves in the military and security spheres demonstrate that its remilitarization is no longer a matter of speculation or concern – it is a fact. This shift is not merely a policy adjustment but a deeper strategic turn aimed at breaking free from postwar peace constraints and reshaping Japan's identity as a military power.

History has repeatedly shown that when Japan embarked on military expansion, it not only brought suffering to its own people but also inflicted grave disasters on neighboring Asian countries. Today, some forces in Japan disregard historical lessons and use changing regional circumstances to push military expansion and institutional loosening. This will only intensify bloc confrontation, raise the risk of misjudgment, and undermine hard-won regional peace and stability. It cannot bring real security – only new insecurity.

The international community, especially Asian countries, must remain highly vigilant. Any attempt to whitewash, tolerate, or support Japan's remilitarization is a dilution of historical responsibility and a depletion of regional peace. Japan should earnestly learn from history, adhere to the path of peaceful development, stop its dangerous military moves, and win the trust of neighboring countries and the international community through concrete actions. Otherwise, the more Japan insists on crossing the peace line, the more trust it will lose, and the more isolated and dangerous its position will become.

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