China
2026.05.12 14:04 GMT+8

Experts on China-US ties: Critical challenges, cooperation prospects and tariff adjustments

Updated 2026.05.12 14:04 GMT+8
CGTN

Beijing will soon host one of the most anticipated diplomatic encounters of the year as the leaders of the world's two largest economies meet face-to-face.

Against the backdrop of a complex international landscape and shared global challenges, CGTN spoke to several experts to discuss the critical challenges facing China-US relations, promising areas for cooperation and potential tariff adjustments. 

The experts are Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University; Zhang Tengjun, associate research fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Christopher Newport University Associate Professor Sun Taiyi; and Cui Fan, professor of the School of International Trade and Economics at the University of International Business and Economics.

The conversations have been lightly edited for clarity and conciseness. 

CGTN: Amid structural competition, technological restrictions and trade frictions, what is the most critical challenge facing China-US relations in the context of President Donald Trump's visit to Beijing?

Wu Xinbo: The most critical challenge currently facing China-US relations is that the United States regards China as its primary strategic competitor, seeks to contain and suppress China, and undermines China's interests in various ways.

Zhang Tengjun: The core context of Trump's visit to China is that both sides have practical needs to manage differences and stabilize bilateral relations, yet it does not alter the underlying logic of strategic competition between the two countries. The most critical challenge in current China-US relations lies in the United States' long-standing fundamental and systemic strategic misperceptions of China, erroneously labeling China as its "primary competitor" and a "systemic challenge," and falling into a zero-sum, Cold War mindset.

This flawed strategic perception has driven the US policy of comprehensive containment and suppression of China, serving as the underlying cause of transgressions in core sensitive areas such as trade frictions and technological decoupling, while continuously eroding the political foundation for bilateral dialogue, consultation and risk management.

Sun Taiyi: The most fundamental challenge in China-US relations today is that both countries are trying simultaneously to stabilize the relationship while continuing long-term strategic competition. This creates a complicated situation in which competition persists across security, technology, trade and geopolitics, even as both governments seek to prevent direct confrontation.

One especially important factor is the evolving domestic political landscape in the United States. Compared with earlier periods, Trump's ability to fully restrain Congress and other parts of the Washington establishment appears more limited. Even if leader-level meetings produce positive atmospherics or practical agreements, those outcomes may still face resistance from institutional actors within the American system, particularly congressional China hawks and elements of the broader foreign policy establishment. This creates uncertainty regarding how durable summit understandings can ultimately become.

Therefore, the central challenge for both Beijing and Washington is not simply whether competition will continue – it almost certainly will – but whether both sides can build sufficient guardrails, communication mechanisms and political discipline to ensure that competition remains bounded and manageable rather than escalating into systemic confrontation.

CGTN: Given the complementarity between China and the US in critical minerals and the new energy sector, as well as the opportunities for openness outlined in China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), what do you see as the most promising areas for China-US cooperation?

Wu Xinbo: There are likely to be significant opportunities for China-US cooperation. First, in the trade sector, efforts could focus on avoiding protectionism, halting unilateral tariff increases and expanding two-way trade. Second, in the area of investment, the United States currently imposes many restrictions on Chinese investment in the US as well as US investment in China, often citing national security concerns. In reality, this two-way investment represents a very important and highly promising area in bilateral economic and trade relations. Third, there is scope for cooperation and exchanges in the technology sector. Fourth, on global issues such as climate change and public health, China and the US have a history of active collaboration, and under the new circumstances, both countries need to continue strengthening their joint efforts.

Zhang Tengjun: Both sides could work to establish a long-term, stable mechanism for energy trade and expand bilateral agricultural trade in products such as soybeans, corn and meat. On the basis of reciprocity, they could move toward removing unilateral sanctions, reducing investment barriers, and safeguarding the legitimate rights of foreign-invested enterprises, creating a more predictable and stable business environment for companies in both countries.

They could also seek common ground on stabilizing global energy prices, securing energy transport routes and mitigating the risk of supply disruptions. Additionally, there is potential for practical cooperation on global challenges such as macroeconomic stability, fentanyl control, food security, debt crisis management, nuclear non-proliferation and public health.

Sun Taiyi: There are still meaningful opportunities for cooperation in the economic sphere, even amid intensifying strategic competition. In the near term, the most realistic opportunity may not be a dramatic expansion of bilateral trade, but rather preventing further deterioration and gradually building mechanisms that make the relationship more stable and predictable.

Both economies remain deeply interconnected, particularly in supply chains related to manufacturing, consumer markets, critical minerals and emerging technologies. As a result, there is strong practical incentive on both sides to avoid uncontrolled decoupling.

In sectors such as critical minerals and new energy, there is also a degree of structural complementarity. China holds important advantages in processing capacity and supply-chain integration in areas related to rare earths, batteries and renewable energy technologies, while the United States retains strengths in innovation, finance and parts of the advanced energy sector. Although strategic competition will continue, selective cooperation or managed interdependence in some of these industries remains possible if both sides prioritize stability and economic pragmatism over complete separation.

By contrast, major breakthroughs in climate governance may be more difficult under the current political environment in Washington. President Trump's political base, as well as many within his broader political coalition, generally place less emphasis on international climate governance frameworks than previous administrations did. Practical cooperation on issues such as energy resilience, industrial transition or supply-chain stability could still emerge indirectly, even if it is not framed primarily in climate terms.

CGTN: What is the core logic behind the current China-US tariff adjustments? Could this "phase-based easing" provide a foundation for innovative collaboration in bilateral economic and trade relations? What potential uncertainties or risks remain?

Wu Xinbo: The reason the Trump administration made some adjustments to tariffs is twofold. On one hand, China mounted a resolute pushback during the trade war, which inflicted pressure on the US and forced adjustments. On the other hand, earlier this year, the US Supreme Court ruled that Trump's reciprocity-based tariffs were illegal, which also compelled changes. However, the administration did not abandon the "tariff card" entirely; it is still looking for other justifications and mechanisms, such as Sections 301 and 232, to continue using tariffs as leverage. Overall, though, the effectiveness of the US tariff approach has declined significantly.

China and the United States are the two largest economies in the world and also two major technological powers. If practical cooperation can be pursued, it would be a win-win for both sides and would greatly contribute to global economic development and technological progress.

The key, however, is that the US must adjust its approach toward China. If Washington can make pragmatic adjustments, bilateral relations would move away from zero-sum thinking and conflict toward genuine mutual benefit. In fact, the Trump slogan of "Make America Great Again" cannot be realized without China; in many respects, the US depends on China.

Cui Fan: Through multiple rounds of negotiations between China and the United States, current tariff levels have fallen significantly compared with their peak in April-May of last year. After the US Supreme Court declared the reciprocity-based tariffs and the fentanyl-related tariffs illegal, the United States is now attempting to reimpose high tariffs through other tools, particularly new Section 301 investigations. This introduces new uncertainties into China-US economic and trade relations.

At the same time, the recent and ongoing introduction or planned of non-tariff measures, export controls and economic sanctions by the United States is creating further disruptions to the stable development of bilateral economic and trade relations.

Sun Taiyi: The core logic behind the recent tariff adjustments is fundamentally rooted in mutual vulnerability and the recognition that both sides possess meaningful retaliatory capabilities against one another. As a result, neither side wants to bear the full consequences of an uncontrolled cycle of retaliation. In this sense, the current tariff adjustments and trade-war pause reflect a pragmatic recognition of reciprocal constraints rather than a fundamental resolution of strategic disagreements.

This temporary easing could still create limited opportunities for economic coordination and selective cooperation. If the relationship remains relatively stable in the short term, both sides may gain space to improve communication mechanisms, restore some business confidence and explore narrowly defined areas of collaboration in sectors where interests still overlap. In practical terms, even modest stabilization can help multinational firms, investors and supply-chain planners operate with greater predictability. That alone carries important economic value for both countries and for the broader global economy.

However, the limitations of this stabilization are equally important to recognize. Because the underlying strategic rivalry remains intact, both governments are simultaneously attempting to reduce their own vulnerabilities and weaken the leverage held by the other side. China continues accelerating efforts to achieve greater technological self-sufficiency, particularly in advanced semiconductors and related industries. Meanwhile, the United States is intensifying efforts to restructure supply chains, diversify sources of critical minerals and build alternative networks less dependent on China.

As a result, the present stabilization may prove durable in the short term but more fragile over the medium and long term. The relationship could remain relatively calm as long as both sides continue to believe that escalation would impose unacceptable costs.

Zhang Tengjun: The recent China-US tariff adjustments reflect a balance of strategic goals and domestic political-economic considerations on both sides. China's moves have been guided by mutual respect and reciprocity, using measured countermeasures to safeguard its legitimate development interests, push for the removal of all unilateral tariffs and align with its broader high-level opening-up strategy. By contrast, US adjustments are primarily tactical, serving the "America First" agenda to control inflation and reduce the trade deficit, without abandoning underlying trade protectionism or its broader containment strategy; tariffs remain a central lever in Washington's approach to China.

This phase-based easing offers a valuable window for innovation-driven cooperation, lowering trade costs, stabilizing market expectations and creating a more favorable environment for emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence. Yet, the US's core strategy of technological containment and decoupling remains unchanged, and ongoing non-tariff barriers continue to constrain the depth and scope of bilateral innovation collaboration.

Key uncertainties include the volatility inherent in transactional US diplomacy, domestic political constraints shaped by a bipartisan tough-on-China consensus, geopolitical spillovers and intensifying industrial competition – all of which could reverse the temporary easing.

Read more: 

Experts on China-US ties: Head-of-state diplomacy, global governance and more

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