The Philippines as a stepping stone for Japan's neo-militarism

Editor's note: Ding Duo, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

As Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visits Japan from May 26 to 29, the two countries are expected to begin formal talks on a General Security of Military Information Agreement, known as GSOMIA. If signed, the pact would allow Japan and the Philippines to share classified defense intelligence under tight safeguards to prevent leaks to outsiders. It would also mark Japan's first such deal with any Southeast Asian nation.

The discussions, led by Marcos and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, will also cover joint military exercises, logistics support and modernizing Philippine forces through radar systems and training. Security, especially in the South China Sea, tops the agenda. Marcos has already signaled that gray-zone tactics, such as water cannon incidents, vessel blocking and maritime militia swarming, will feature prominently in the talks. These issues have become routine flashpoints, and both leaders appear to see the GSOMIA as a practical tool to manage them more effectively.

At first glance, the move may seem like standard regional defense cooperation. Japan joined Philippine drills this year, and both sides talk of better interoperability. Yet beneath the surface lies a broader story of shifting alliances.

Although the United States has adjusted its policies toward allies and partners and overall US-China ties have grown more stable, the military-security cooperation promoted at US-Japan-Philippines summits a few years ago still carries strong policy momentum. What is striking now, however, is the rising initiative from Japan and the Philippines themselves.

Their eagerness reflects real anxieties. Both countries appear concerned about the reliability of American security promises and the possibility of future shifts in US foreign policy. They are hedging their bets by building tighter bonds that might survive Washington's changing priorities. This growing self-reliance suggests how partners once content to follow US leadership are now stepping forward on their own, driven by doubts that American commitments will remain rock-solid in every future crisis.

Should the Japan-Philippines GSOMIA be formalized, the regional security picture could change further. The United States already has intelligence-sharing pacts with both Manila and Tokyo. Adding this new agreement would create a closed-loop system among the three countries. Sensitive data would circulate only within the group, forming an exclusive security circle.

Such an arrangement runs counter to what most countries in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific want. They seek peaceful development, open trade and inclusive dialogue rather than secretive blocs that could deepen mistrust and complicate efforts at regional cooperation through multilateral forums like ASEAN.

Meanwhile, Japan clearly has its own agenda. On a tactical level, closer military ties with the Philippines allows Tokyo to pressure China across multiple theaters. By linking cooperation in the South China Sea with concerns in the East China Sea and around China's Taiwan region, Japan appears intent on creating a "three seas linkage" that stretches Chinese attention and complicates Beijing's moves.

Strategically, the partnership serves a larger purpose. It gives Japan so-called practical reasons to loosen postwar limits on its armed forces, expand defense spending and engage more freely overseas. In this way, the deal may also lead to reviving elements of militarism under a modern label, advancing Tokyo's goal of becoming what it describes as a "normal country with full military power."

These developments warrant close attention from the international community. A more assertive Japan, freed from past restraints and supported by selective alliances, risks becoming a new source of instability in East Asia rather than a contributor to lasting peace. History reminds us how quickly such ambitions can unsettle the region.

For the Philippines, this strategy carries painful irony. Marcos sees deeper ties with Japan as a way to gain confidence in confronting China over the South China Sea claims. External backing does give Manila more room to push back. Yet this choice overlooks history.

Only decades ago, the Philippines suffered greatly under Japanese wartime occupation and militarist aggression. The scars remain embedded in the country's national memory. Yet today, Philippine leaders appear increasingly willing to set that aside for short-term gain.

By strengthening military links with Tokyo, Manila is helping Japan move toward renewed military independence. In effect, the Philippines is offering itself as a stepping stone for what some call Japan's "new militarism." Such short-sightedness is striking. It shows how Philippine politicians are prioritizing immediate tactical advantage over long-term wisdom and regional stability, turning a blind eye to the very history that once defined their nation's struggle against foreign domination.

Whatever narratives are spun about the South China Sea, building increasingly exclusive intelligence clubs and trilateral military ties is a narrow answer. Instead, such efforts risk locking the region into deeper cycles of suspicion rather than opening paths to calm dialogue.

As Marcos and Takaichi meet, the world should closely examine whether these steps truly serve peace or simply redraw lines of confrontation. Japan's calculated moves and the Philippines' historical forgetfulness both deserve careful scrutiny. In an already tense Asia-Pacific, adding another layer of secretive security cooperation may ease today's worries but plant seeds for tomorrow's troubles. Real security comes from mutual understanding, not walls of classified information that keep neighbors apart.

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