Can China-Canada ties move beyond thaw to sustainable cooperation?

Editor's note: Jiang Wenran, a special commentator for CGTN, is the founding director of the China Institute and MacTaggart Research Chair emeritus at the University of Alberta. He is also an adviser at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Canada.The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to Canada this week can be taken as a pragmatic stress test of whether the recent thaw in bilateral relations can be translated into more stable and durable institutions.

The backdrop is a relationship that have experienced ups and downs in decades. Since 2018, Ottawa's China policy had, for some period, been shaped by confrontation, culminating in its 2022 "Indo‑Pacific Strategy" that labeled Beijing a "disruptive global power" and the 2024 imposition of a 100% tariff on all Chinese-made electric vehicles – a move widely criticized at home as a "performance of loyalty" to Washington.

Following Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's landmark January trip to Beijing, the two sides issued a joint statement announcing a new strategic partnership and signed a detailed economic and trade roadmap covering 28 specific measures across eight sectors, from agricultural market access to joint research on clean‑tech standards. That visit marked a deliberate break from the Trudeau era's subordination to US strategic priorities, with Carney framing this new chapter in China-Canada ties as essential to Canada's economic sovereignty.

The heavy lifting is done; now comes the operational grind. Energy and climate cooperation, already buoyed by China's role as the top buyer of Canadian crude via the expanded Trans Mountain pipeline, will proceed quietly but reliably. Beijing wants to demonstrate that it treats Canada as a rules‑based negotiating partner, not a pawn in great‑power rivalry.

Yet the trajectory will not be linear. Carney's government has embraced a "values‑based realism" that pairs principled positions with pragmatic economic engagement. The logic is compelling: diversify away from an erratic United States ahead of the looming US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) renegotiation, where Washington's leverage could once again be used to constrain Canadian autonomy. The pressure is acute: Over 75% of Canadian manufactured exports flow to the US annually on average, giving Washington extraordinary coercive power, while Trump's recent threats to impose more tariffs on Canadian goods and disinvite Ottawa from summits have underscored the fragility of that dependence.

Yet domestic constraints remain. Ontario's auto sector, along with a persistent "values vs. trade" narrative, will keep the electric vehicle (EV) issue under political pressure. The Chinese side, for its part, expects predictable implementation rather than quarterly performative scrutiny.

The sensible path is sequenced progress: agriculture and energy first, critical minerals and investment screening later, with political differences managed separately through restored dialogue mechanisms. This compartmentalized approach, neither decoupling nor embrace, aims to widen Canada's agency without creating new dependencies.

Ottawa watches the high-level exchanges between China and the US with acute anxiety. Any accommodation between the two sides risks carrying a hidden price tag for Canada at the USMCA table, echoing the "poison pill" provisions of the first Trump era that effectively gave Washington veto power over Canadian trade deals with Beijing.

Although the thaw in China-Canada ties may still face internal headwinds, particularly as the "2022 Indo‑Pacific Strategy" framed China as a systemic rival, Carney's doctrine demands replacing that document with a genuinely Canadian Asia‑Pacific strategy built on three pillars: a stabilized China relationship, resilient alliances and broad diversification, all while keeping defense focused on Arctic and cyber sovereignty.

This strategic reorientation reflects a broader realization in Ottawa: that Canada's over‑reliance on the US market has become a liability, and that meaningful trade diversification requires not just new partners but the political courage to resist external pressure.

Carney's bet is that Canada's middle‑power interests demand strategic autonomy: deepen practical cooperation where it lowers costs and opens markets, while maintaining NATO and defense commitments. The art of boosting China-Canada ties lies in moving fast enough on deliverables before US renegotiation leverage peaks.

Recent developments in China-US relations, such as the expected establishment of trade councils and the continuation of a trade truce, underscore a broader reality that even Washington recognizes the necessity of economic accommodation with China, bolstering Ottawa's case for diversification.

From Beijing's perspective, Canada is an important interlocutor within the Group of Seven, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, North America and the Arctic, and a test case for whether China can stabilize ties with a close US ally while Washington explores its own "constructive strategic stability" agenda. China will probe whether Ottawa's diversification rhetoric translates into genuine policy space.

For Canada, the challenge is to pursue engagement without illusion. Disciplined dialogue on three tracks – economic irritants, security concerns, and emerging‑issue governance (climate, artificial intelligence, crisis management) – can build trust. Wang Yi's visit can mark a crucial step toward a more predictable, interest‑driven partnership that serves Canada's long‑term resilience, with the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in November offering a natural milestone for tangible outcomes.

Ultimately, the success of this "third path" will be measured not by grand declarations, but by whether Ottawa can deliver on its promises while navigating the cross‑currents of great‑power competition.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X, formerly Twitter, to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)