Editor's note: Cao Cong, a special commentator for CGTN, is a doctoral candidate at the School of Global and Regional Studies, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore on May 31, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi promoted a revised version of the so-called free and open Indo-Pacific, declaring that Japan would seek to assume a "new role" in regional defense affairs and play a larger part in regional security.

However, when a Chinese representative raised questions regarding Japan's responsibility for its wartime aggression and asked when Japan would offer a genuine apology to the Asian countries that suffered under its rule, Koizumi sidestepped the issue and instead shifted the discussion to allegations about China's "lack of military transparency."

His response raises three questions that Japan must answer before asking its neighbors to accept a larger Japanese role in regional security affairs.

Has Japan settled its historical debt?

For many Asian countries, the most important issue is not what role Japan seeks to play in regional security, but whether it has genuinely confronted the legacy of its past aggression.

During World War II (WWII), Japanese militarism launched wars of aggression and imposed colonial rule across China, the Korean Peninsula and large parts of Southeast Asia, inflicting immense suffering on the peoples of Asia. Tens of millions lost their lives, while countless families endured wounds that have never fully healed.

This history continues to shape regional perceptions of Japan's security policy. It also explains why any attempt by Japan to move beyond the postwar framework inevitably attracts close scrutiny from neighboring countries.

More than 80 years after the end of WWII, Japan has yet to completely eradicate the legacy of militarism. Controversies surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine repeatedly resurface. Some politicians continue to make revisionist statements regarding wartime history, while certain groups seek to downplay Japan's responsibility for aggression.

Against this backdrop, Japan cannot expect its neighbors simply to forget the past while it pursues a larger security role.

Where is Japan's accountability to the victims of aggression?

Whether Japan sincerely acknowledges its historical responsibilities and deeply reflects upon its wartime crimes directly affects its ability to gain the trust of neighboring countries and preserve the foundations of regional peace and stability.

Yet when confronted with questions about Japan's wartime conduct at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Koizumi offered no clear answer. His response was not an isolated incident but rather a reflection of Japan's long-standing reluctance to fully address issues related to historical responsibility.

Instead of responding directly to concerns raised by countries that suffered under Japanese aggression, Koizumi attempted to redirect attention toward China's military development. Such avoidance does not resolve historical issues; it only reinforces doubts regarding Japan's willingness to face its past honestly.

If Japan genuinely wishes to be regarded as a responsible regional actor, it must demonstrate through concrete actions, not rhetorical deflection, that it is prepared to acknowledge the suffering caused by militarist aggression and respect the feelings of the victims and their descendants.

Is Japan still committed to its postwar promise of peace?

Koizumi argued that Japan is not experiencing a resurgence of militarism because it does not possess nuclear weapons or strategic bombers. Yet whether Japan is moving toward remilitarization has never depended on a specific category of weapons. The real question is whether Japan is breaking through the constraints established under the postwar peace framework.

In recent years, Japan has repeatedly cited changes in the regional security environment as justification for adjusting its security policies. Since revising three key security documents in 2022, Japan has moved to develop "counterstrike capabilities," effectively departing from its long-standing exclusively defense-oriented principle.

At the same time, defense spending has continued to rise. In fiscal year 2025, defense and related security expenditures reached 11 trillion yen ($498.2 billion), accounting for approximately 2 percent of GDP.

Japan has also accelerated efforts to expand and institutionalize its military capabilities. It has revised the "three principles on transfer of defense equipment and technology" and their implementation guidelines, relaxed restrictions on lethal weapons exports, expedited the deployment of long-range missiles, strengthened military capabilities in its southwestern regions and promoted the establishment of a national intelligence coordination mechanism.

Taken together, these developments – rising defense budgets, enhanced long-range strike capabilities, loosened arms-export controls and expanding military activities – suggest an increasingly visible effort to move beyond postwar constraints and acquire the attributes of a military power.

Even more concerning, some Japanese politicians continue to promote the so-called China threat theory as justification for military expansion and strategic adjustments. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Koizumi's repeated emphasis on China's military development while avoiding discussion of historical responsibility reflected precisely this troubling tendency.

The question that Koizumi failed to answer is precisely the question Japan most needs to answer today. The role Japan can play in regional affairs will not ultimately be determined by the size of its defense budget or the sophistication of its military capabilities. Rather, it will depend on whether Japan can genuinely confront its history of aggression, fulfill its responsibilities to the victims of that history, uphold its commitment to peace and earn the trust of its Asian neighbors through concrete actions.

This concerns not only Japan's future trajectory, but also the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

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