Editor's note: Ding Duo, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The Philippines has been unusually active on China-related issues lately, stirring tensions in ways that go beyond routine diplomatic friction. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore at the end of May, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro used his platform to revive the so-called 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling as a cudgel against Beijing.

Teodoro repeated familiar accusations of Chinese "expansionism," blamed delays in the Code of Conduct negotiations squarely on China as the "outlier," and questioned Beijing's credibility as a dialogue partner, insisting that China still had much "trust-building" to do.

In the same breath, the Philippine defense secretary alluded to Chinese-supplied fertilizers and fuel – materials extended to help the Philippines weather agricultural shortfalls and energy pressures triggered by global events – as little more than "packaging and deception." It was a telling moment: Even assistance extended to ordinary Filipinos became fodder for political theater, with Manila twisting practical goodwill into supposed evidence of ulterior motives.

This was not an isolated outburst. Days earlier, Japan and the Philippines announced the launch of formal negotiations to delimit their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the waters east of China's Taiwan island. The legal issues here are straightforward.

The waters in question lie east of Taiwan island. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, when coastlines are opposite or adjacent, maritime boundaries should be drawn by the states concerned through equitable means. Taiwan island is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. Any delimitation in those waters therefore demands China's direct involvement as a relevant party.

Yet Tokyo and Manila have chosen to move forward without Beijing. This is no mere procedural slip. It is a conscious decision to pretend that the Chinese mainland has no stake in the matter. Far from resolving a simple neighborly dispute, they are constructing a legal and operational corridor across the Philippine Sea, well within "the first island chain." By linking their exclusive economic zone claims, they create a foundation for joint resource exploration, synchronized patrols and a firmer footing to challenge Chinese presence in areas Beijing has long considered its own. Beijing responded with coast guard patrols, rightly pointing out that the move encroaches on Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction.

Philippine officials hailed the so-called 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling as a regional endorsement of their legal claims. To many observers, it carried the whiff of overconfidence – as if certain voices in Manila had swallowed some kind of anti-China stimulant and lost all sense of proportion, ignoring the careful balance most members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) prefer.

None of this sits easily with recent diplomatic efforts. Only weeks ago, Beijing and Manila had exchanged communications through official channels and reached modest understandings aimed at cooling tempers at sea and managing differences responsibly. Yet the pattern suggests that not everyone in the Philippines wants those understandings to hold.

Domestic politics appear to be the stronger driver. With internal rivalries sharpening ahead of future electoral cycles, anti-China posturing has become an easy way to score points. For a segment of the political class, it delivers quick popularity and private gain, even if it comes at the expense of national stability and the everyday welfare of Filipino citizens who rely on steady bilateral ties.

Compounding the problem is the rise of strident nationalism under Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. His administration has consciously recast China as an external threat, adjusting foreign and defense policies accordingly and fanning public sentiment through selective narratives. The result is a more confrontational tone that may win short-term applause at home but inflicts longer-term damage on bilateral ties.

Governance under Marcos has been marked by persistent challenges, including uneven economic delivery, domestic political turbulence, infrastructure bottlenecks and questions about administrative capacity, leaving many ordinary Filipinos feeling the pinch. On these fronts, the record speaks for itself.

It is worth recalling that China extended concrete help when it mattered – fertilizers to boost Philippine farming and fuel to ease energy pressures. These were not grand strategic bargains but straightforward contributions to people's livelihoods at a time of real need. Gratitude, it seems, has been in short supply. Instead, Manila has turned even these gestures into props for domestic theater.

From trade volumes to technology cooperation, investment flows and energy security, the numbers are clear: China can sustain its development without the Philippine market, but the reverse is far less certain. While nearly every other ASEAN member is deepening practical cooperation with Beijing – benefiting from shared growth and stability, the Marcos administration has chosen the path of provocation. The cost is measured in missed opportunities for Philippine growth, from unrealized infrastructure projects to potential partnerships in emerging sectors that could have lifted living standards.

Looking ahead, two risks stand out. First, as ASEAN chair in 2026, the Philippines may attempt to elevate its revival of the so-called 2016 arbitration ruling into a broader multilateral talking point. If that happens, it could complicate the atmosphere, pace, and substance of Code of Conduct consultations that all parties have pledged to advance, potentially fracturing the consensus-building spirit that has guided regional diplomacy for years. 

Second, external actors like the US and Japan are already signaling interest. Should such external interference translate into more tangible maritime security assistance or joint operations, it could add real pressure on China's efforts to safeguard its rights and maintain stability in the South China Sea.

Yet the deeper truth remains unchanged. Camp-style confrontation has no future in East Asia. Plus, Beijing and Washington are both working toward building a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability. As a treaty ally of the US and self-described junior partner, the Philippines would do well to read the room.

Chinese diplomacy has always followed a simple logic: friends are welcomed with good wine; jackals are met with a hunting rifle. That principle applies as firmly in the South China Sea issue and on the Taiwan question as it does anywhere else. Manila still has time to choose the wiser path. The question is whether it will do so before the self-inflicted wounds become too deep to heal.

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