Editor's note: Li Qiqian, a special commentator for CGTN, is an assistant research fellow at the National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The Iran issue is expected to be one of the most crucial geopolitical topics at the 2026 Group of Seven (G7) Summit in France, although it's been reported that the signing ceremony of a US-Iran peace deal is scheduled for June 19 in Switzerland.

While G7 members have basically coordinated their positions on several principles in their previous consultations, clear differences remain between the United States and its European allies. Against this backdrop, the summit is more likely to see limited cooperation with disagreements continuing rather than genuinely bridging the underlying strategic divide between the two sides.

The most obvious difference lies in their attitudes toward military action. The United States wants its allies to offer more explicit support, especially taking greater responsibility for security in the Strait of Hormuz and exerting pressure on Iran. US President Donald Trump once criticized NATO allies for their reluctance to get involved in military action, calling it a "very foolish mistake."

Major European countries, however, have responded with caution. For example, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy have all indicated that this war is not Europe's war and that they will not take part directly in military operations. This reflects a broader European concern about being dragged by the United States into a Middle East war with unclear objectives and high spillover risks.

As a result, European countries have generally responded with defensive measures or diplomatic action, while refusing to explicitly endorse or directly participate in US military operations. In other words, Europe accepts crisis management, but not war coordination.

Another difference concerns the priority objectives of the Iran crisis. The United States is inclined to use military pressure to force Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while incorporating the nuclear issue, sanction relief and regional security arrangements into subsequent negotiations. Reportedly, the abovementioned peace deal involves the reopening the Strait of Hormuz, releasing part of Iran's frozen assets, easing restrictions on oil exports and discussing Iran's nuclear program within the next 60 days.

European countries, by contrast, are more inclined to treat de-escalation, the restoration of navigation and the resumption of nuclear talks as mutually reinforcing objectives. They are seeking to avoid turning maritime security into an unauthorized and protracted military escort operation.

Based on these differences in attitude and objectives, the Iran crisis has exposed three layers of tension between the United States and Europe.

The first is the growing tension between rules-based legitimacy and unilateral action. When American foreign policy relies more heavily on military pressure, allies become less willing to accept its rules-based narrative. European countries are not refusing to uphold freedom of navigation. Rather, they refuse to equate freedom of navigation directly with support for US military action.

The second is the tension between the provision of public goods and the transfer of costs. From the perspective of Europe, if the provision of public goods comes at the cost of military escalation, and allies are expected to jointly shoulder that cost, then US leadership is no longer merely about maintaining order. It may also become a source of risk spillover. What Europe hopes to participate in is the stable provision of international public goods, not the sharing of war costs.

The third is the tension between alliance solidarity and strategic autonomy. The United States and Europe still share basic concerns over Iran's nuclear issue, regional security and energy routes. Brussels is willing to coordinate with Washington on diplomacy, humanitarian affairs and defense, but it has consistently retained the right to decide on the nature of military action and the degree of its own participation.

The G7 has already reached a basic consensus on related issues. The joint statement issued after the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting on March 27 called for an immediate end to attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure and reaffirmed the absolute necessity of permanently restoring freedom and security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. But the fundamental difference lies in whether Europe supports, or even participates in, US-led military actions.

The most realistic outcome of the G7 Summit is likely to be incremental progress in three areas where consensus still exists. G7 members may reiterate their common position on protecting civilians, safeguarding diplomatic facilities and ensuring humanitarian assistance. Second, they may emphasize freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to prevent further turbulence in energy markets. And finally, the summit may support certain phased diplomatic arrangements to facilitate the US-Iran talks. If those talks make headway, the summit may take the opportunity to help shape a political atmosphere conducive to de-escalation.

In conclusion, the G7 Summit may help ease contradictions between the United States and Europe over Iran, but it is unlikely to truly bridge their differences. It may push relevant parties toward phased coordination on a ceasefire, navigation and nuclear talks, but it will not bring about a fundamental shift in Europe's position. In this sense, what the summit can do is preserve a semblance of unity among the United States and its allies.

Ultimately, what the Iran crisis has exposed is not merely a policy dispute, but a deeper tension within the US-led alliance system over risk sharing and the definition of strategic responsibility.

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