Editor's note: Lyu Yaodong, a special commentator for CGTN, is a professor at the School of Global and Regional Studies under the University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Du Shaoshu, a special commentator for CGTN, is a student at the School of Global and Regional Studies under the University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the authors' opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

As Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently addressed at a memorial ceremony to commemorate the victims on the Ryukyu Islands, protesters chanted "No to War" and "Protect Article 9 of the Constitution." When questioned by reporters, Takaichi said that she was speaking at the time and had not clearly heard what was said.

A single protest, of course, cannot represent Japanese society as a whole. Yet it was a direct challenge to Takaichi's hardline course. Ryukyu still bears the scars of war and has long carried the burden of US military bases and expanding deployments in southwestern Japan. As Tokyo's rhetoric on China's Taiwan region intensifies and military deployments move further forward, one concern is increasingly being raised: Is Japan enforcing so-called security, or is it pushing itself toward the front line of a regional conflict?

Since taking office, Takaichi has sought to bind Taiwan-related issues, higher defense spending, constitutional revision, a stronger Japan-US alliance and a tougher policy toward China into a single political narrative. She invokes a "severe security environment" to rally domestic support, presents closer alliance coordination as proof of Japan's strategic standing and portrays military expansion as evidence of governing capacity. In reality, this approach turns alleged external tensions into material for political mobilization and uses security anxiety to bolster a strong-leader image.

This is the deeper source of her predicament. A securitized narrative may consolidate political resources, but it cannot simultaneously resolve diplomatic friction, economic uncertainty, alliance dependence and damage to political credibility. The more the administration amplifies crisis and confrontation, the more risks that might otherwise be managed separately feed into one another.

Takaichi's remarks on Taiwan question crystallize this approach. During Diet deliberations in November last year, she said that a potential contingency in Taiwan could constitute a "survival-threatening situation," allowing Japan to exercise collective self-defense. Though she later stressed case-by-case judgment, she refused to retract her remarks. That shows that Taiwan question has been drawn further into debates over Japan's security legislation, counterstrike capabilities and potential military involvement.

Japanese society, however, has not reached an overwhelming consensus. Polls show that support and opposition are nearly evenly divided over whether Japan should exercise collective self-defense in a "Taiwan conflict." Japanese society may offer some support for the government's increased defense spending; but that does not mean the public is willing to accept the costs of being drawn into war, economic volatility and rising living expenses. If the Takaichi administration can only manufacture a sense of crisis without easing such anxieties, it will struggle to secure lasting support for its security policies.

The backlash of Takaichi's diplomacy also reflects on economy. In response to Japan's remilitarization, supplies of critical mineral raw materials such as "dual-use items" to Japan have been restricted, forcing Japanese companies to accelerate their search for alternative sources and adjust their supply chain layouts.

For a country dependent on overseas markets, imported energy and transnational industrial networks, excessively securitizing relations with China will not reduce vulnerability. It will turn political friction into business pressure, supply-chain anxiety and market volatility.

Japan's relationship with the United States reveals the same contradiction. Takaichi seeks stronger alliance support through higher military spending, expanded base functions and regional deployments; but US decisions serve US interests first. The more Tokyo presents alignment with Washington as "strategic autonomy," the less room it retains in a crisis. Deeper embedding in a US-led confrontation framework does not strengthen autonomy; it increases the risk of being entangled in this situation.

Renewed controversies over political funding and online campaign practices are adding to the pressure. Complaints and allegations concerning funds handled by political organizations affiliated with Takaichi have again placed her and close aides under public scrutiny.

Shukan Bunshun, Japan's weekly magazine, has also reported allegations that people linked to Takaichi's camp produced "smear videos," and disclosed communications and online meeting materials between her aide and one of her closest confidants Takeshi Kinoshita and the video producers. Against the backdrop of the unresolved Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) slush-fund scandal, the renewed controversies surrounding financial transparency and campaign ethics have put the Japanese prime minister's image of strength and decisiveness under strain.

Continued increases in defense spending make this contradiction more pronounced. Japan is facing aging population, rising social-security burdens, pressure on local public services and higher household living costs. Further military spending will sharpen the trade-offs between national defense and investment in education, healthcare, social security and local services.

Amplifying a sense of crisis or projecting a hardline posture may generate short-term political momentum, but it cannot resolve Japan's deeper problems of sluggish growth, demographic decline and regional inequality.

If these controversies continue to accumulate, senior LDP figures may prioritize political damage control by, first, confining the issues of political funding and online communication to peripheral teams as much as possible to limit responsibility through investigations, disciplinary actions and apologies; second, by placing livelihood and social security issues back at the center of the policy agenda; and third, if necessary, through cabinet reshuffles or intra-party power rebalancing to prevent an individual crisis from becoming a greater burden on the ruling party.

But damage control does not mean fundamental reflection. The LDP is unlikely to abandon constitutional revision, military expansion, a stronger Japan-US alliance or a hardline China policy. More likely, it would shift from Takaichi's confrontational approach to a more cost-conscious, pragmatic hardline approach.

This could also drive strategic differentiation within Japan's conservative right-wing camp. Hardliners may argue that even modest adjustments to military expansion and China policy would undermine Japan's so-called deterrence and weaken its political mobilization capacity. More cost-conscious conservatives may fear that high-risk rhetoric, funding controversies and livelihood pressures are turning an ideological agenda into an electoral and governing liability. Their differences may lie less in ultimate direction than in pace, rhetorical boundaries and political cost.

Takaichi's political survival will depend largely on whether she can contain the political-funding controversy, moderate high-risk foreign-policy rhetoric and genuinely respond to livelihood anxieties in Japanese society. Even if she remains in office, she is likely to face stronger constraints within her party.

If the controversies deepen alongside falling public support, rising living costs or fresh diplomatic friction, senior LDP figures may conclude that limited damage control is insufficient and seek a broader cabinet reshuffle or party power realignment.

Ultimately, security should not become an excuse for creating confrontation; military buildup should not become a cover for evading livelihood concerns; and alliance should not become a reason for abandoning independent judgment. China and Japan are close neighbors separated only by a strip of water. The more complex and sensitive their relationship becomes, the more they need to honor political commitments, exercise strategic restraint and prevent differences from escalating into conflict.

Takaichi's course shows that replacing governance with confrontation, using military buildup to cover up livelihood concerns and presenting dependence as autonomy will ultimately backfire on Japan's own credibility, interests and future.

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