How Japanese militarism opened the door to war via intelligence first

Editor's note: Li Qiqian, a special commentator for CGTN, is an assistant research fellow at the National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

On July 31, the government of Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae officially established the national intelligence bureau and convened the inaugural meeting of the national intelligence council. Reorganized from the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the bureau is tasked with integrating intelligence from government agencies, coordinating "important intelligence activities," and providing administrative support for the prime minister-chaired council.

From promoting the legislation and creating the institutions to beginning work on Japan's first National Intelligence Strategy, Tokyo is building an intelligence system under the centralized direction of the Prime Minister's Office, designed to integrate information across agencies and directly serve national security decision-making. This is no routine administrative adjustment. It marks another dangerous step toward greater centralization and militarization of Japan's security apparatus.

The history of modern Japan shows that its wars of aggression began not with gunfire, but with military maps, terrain and strategic surveys, and secret intelligence reports. The pattern was clear: Surveys, research, commerce, or diplomacy were first used as cover to obtain information about a target country's geography, resources, transport, armed forces and political conditions.

Espionage, propaganda manipulation and political subversion were then employed to sow disorder and divide resistance, before military attacks were launched under such pretexts as "protecting Japanese nationals." Intelligence thus played a vanguard role in Japan's aggression.

The First Sino-Japanese War, which began on July 25, 1894, was an early example. Following the Meiji Restoration, the Imperial Japanese Army quickly made China and Korea priority targets for reconnaissance. Between 1879 and 1880, the general staff of the Imperial Japanese Army sent officers to various parts of China under the guise of travel and inspection. They investigated troop deployments, roads, ports and terrain, and later compiled military intelligence publications, including Rinpo Heibi Ryaku (Outline of Military Preparations of Neighboring Countries).

In 1888, the Japanese Imperial Land Survey was reorganized to institutionalize military mapping. At the same time, more organizations were established to build secret networks under cover of business, medical practice and cultural exchange. By the eve of the war, years of investigation had given the Japanese military a systematic picture of forces of the Qing Dynasty and Korean terrain, as well as the transportation conditions in northeast China.

After Fukushima Yasumasa, a former Japanese military attache in China, carried the findings of these investigations into the general staff, military officers of the Imperial Japanese Army submitted selectively filtered intelligence, some of it slanted toward war, to decision-makers, propelling Japan toward military action.

The September 18 Incident more starkly demonstrated this "intelligence first" approach. The South Manchuria Railway Co., founded in 1906, operated outwardly as a business but long performed investigative, infiltration and colonial functions.

By early 1931, the company and its affiliated bodies were extensively collecting information on the production and transport of weapons and ammunition, military grain purchases and fiscal conditions in northeast China. They were also engaged in political schemes, ideological agitation and the cultivation of pro-Japanese forces.

Having obtained information about the deployment of the Chinese Northeast Army and the terrain, communications and transport along the railway, the Japanese Kwantung Army brazenly invaded northeast China on September 18. The South Manchuria Railway Co. later helped produce so-called incident photo albums to whitewash Japan's aggression and turn truth on its head. Reconnaissance, deception, propaganda manipulation and armed invasion had become one integrated operation.

Before launching its full-scale war of aggression against China, Japan extended its intelligence apparatus deeper into Chinese society. The general staff repeatedly dispatched "land survey teams," whose members disguised themselves as merchants or travelers to map roads, bridges, water sources, military facilities and natural resources in secret.

By 1937, Japanese militarist intelligence activities had moved beyond observing China to directly interfering in its politics, exploiting internal divisions and cultivating puppet rule. Japan's outward expansion was therefore no momentary impulse; it rested on years of investigation, strategic planning and organized infiltration.

History must not be applied mechanically. What deserves vigilance today is the convergence of centralized intelligence power with Japan's accelerating military buildup, development of so-called counterstrike capabilities, relaxation of restrictions on arms exports, reinforcement of military alliances and persistent hyping up of "external threats."

Domestic concerns about the new agency's unclear limits, inadequate independent oversight and possible infringement of civil rights have yet to receive a convincing response. The profound suffering inflicted on the peoples of Asia by Japanese militarism often began with "intelligence first," before guns ever opened fire.

Japan's political leaders must learn the profound lessons of history and act prudently. They must never allow the intelligence apparatus to become the spearhead of military expansion and preparations for war.

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