Editor's note: Wang Yichen, a special commentator for CGTN, is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

August 6 marks the anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan bears a special responsibility to oppose nuclear weapons, reflect on the catastrophe of war and safeguard peace. The testimony of the hibakusha and decades of anti-nuclear activism have made the Japanese public particularly sensitive to attempts to loosen the country's post-war restraints.

Japanese media reported on August 2 that a public opinion poll showed 76% of respondents supported adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles – not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. The poll also found that 77% opposed Japan's participation in "nuclear sharing," under which US nuclear weapons would be deployed in Japan and jointly operated by the two countries.

The message is clear that the majority of the Japanese people do not want nuclear weapons on their soil or their country drawn into a military arrangement. Yet this public commitment to peace stands in increasingly sharp contrast to the security agenda pursued by the Sanae Takaichi administration.

On July 31, the Japanese government launched a National Intelligence Bureau by upgrading the former Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. A National Intelligence Council chaired by Takaichi also began operating. Under the new framework, intelligence gathered by different ministries and agencies will be compiled at the cabinet level and used to make integrated assessment reports for government decision-making.

From a broader perspective, this is far more than an administrative reshuffle. Many have warned that it represents a key institutional component of the Takaichi government's efforts to erode the constraints of Japan's pacifist Constitution and accelerate the rightward shift in Japanese politics. Together with the drive for constitutional revision, the earlier loosening of restrictions on collective self-defense, rising military expenditure and the development of offensive capabilities, intelligence centralization created a mutually reinforcing security architecture.

Such an architecture can provide integrated intelligence support across the entire policy chain from threat assessment and strategy formulation to interagency coordination and policy implementation, which therefore gives the Japanese government greater institutional capacity to move beyond the country's exclusively defense-oriented policy. Concerns raised during Japanese Diet deliberations about the fusion of intelligence and policy, privacy protection and the absence of sufficiently independent oversight should not be dismissed.

The timing of Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper is equally disturbing. Released by the Japanese government on August 4, just two days before the anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the document continues to portray China as an "unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge."

The white paper's emphasis on mobilizing Japan's "comprehensive national power" to deal with China is particularly revealing. It extends the logic of confrontation beyond the military sphere into economic, technological, industrial and diplomatic fields. Together with the new centralized intelligence structure, this approach risks turning relations with China into a form of society-wide strategic rivalry instead of managing differences through dialogue and cooperation.

Japan's military expansion is not the product of a single white paper. It is reflected in a succession of policy moves over recent years: rapidly increasing defense budgets, deploying longer-range strike missiles, easing restrictions on weapons exports, strengthening the defense-industrial base and repeatedly testing the boundaries of the exclusively defense-oriented policy. Especially, this year's white paper attempts to sell this broader course by portraying the defense industry as a source of economic growth and claiming that stronger military capabilities will benefit the economy and people's livelihoods. With Japan already facing fiscal and social pressures, however, further military spending will inevitably compete with healthcare, pensions, education and other public needs.

China's Ministry of National Defense has pointed out that Japan's attempt to hype up the "China threat" is a case of "the thief crying 'stop thief.'" The real danger to regional peace is the growing momentum of Japanese neo-militarism, which challenges the post-war international order and risks turning Japan into a source of instability in the Asia-Pacific.

History makes this trajectory especially alarming. Japanese militarism once inflicted enormous suffering on China and many other Asian countries while the atomic bombs retaliated against Japan's aggression also brought disaster to the local people. Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki must therefore not be reduced to remembering Japan's victimhood while ignoring its history of aggression.

If the Japanese government genuinely wants to commemorate the victims of the atomic bombings, it should respect its people's anti-war and anti-nuclear aspirations, uphold the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and return to peaceful development. Hyping the "China threat" may serve the interests of right-wing politicians and the military-industrial sector, but it will also bind the Japanese people and economy to the chariot of neo-militarism.

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