Editor's note: Xu Weijun is an associate research professor at the Institute of Public Policy, South China University of Technology. His research interests include East Asian international relations and China-US relations. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily those of CGTN.

On July 31, 2026, Japan's National Intelligence Council and its administrative body, the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), formally commenced operations. 

At first glance, this may appear to be a routine administrative reorganisation. However, viewed within the context of Japan's comprehensive strengthening of its national security system in recent years, it constitutes a critical step towards integrating foreign affairs, defence, economic security, cybersecurity, and counter-espionage into a unified national strategic framework. This move indicates that the Japanese government is restructuring the operational mechanisms of state power. It also signals that Japan's efforts to break free from the constraints of the post-war system have expanded beyond defence reforms and military development to the very foundations of national governance.

The establishment of the NIB will further accelerate the centralisation of executive power in the Prime Minister's Office. Japan's previous intelligence system was characterized by institutional fragmentation, which objectively limited the ability of any single political centre to exercise centralized control over classified information resources. Under the new system, the NIB is empowered to determine intelligence priorities, evaluate major intelligence matters, and request information from relevant departments. The NIB is responsible for the overall planning and comprehensive coordination of the entire intelligence community.

Moving toward a 'security state'

As intelligence requirements, collection priorities, analytical conclusions, and policy applications become increasingly subject to the influence of the Prime Minister's Office, Japan may face a growing risk of intelligence politicisation. Intelligence agencies may become less capable of independently assessing the policy environment and instead selectively collect and interpret information in accordance with the established preferences and assumptions of political leaders.

On this basis, Japan's system of governance will increasingly be securitized, driving the country into a "security state." This risk is particularly significant as Japan continues to advance legislation concerning counter-espionage and a foreign agent registration system. If concepts such as "foreign influence," "improper interference," and "harm to the national interest" lack clear legal definitions and boundaries of application, normal academic exchanges, media activities, business cooperation, and interactions among social organizations could become subject to stricter scrutiny.

At the present stage, the NIB still differs from the "Special Higher Police" that operated before 1945. The NIB primarily undertakes the functions of intelligence integration and analysis, and does not possess the powers of direct investigation, arrest, and ideological repression once exercised by the Special Higher Police. Nevertheless, there exists a political logic linking the two that warrants serious vigilance: the state may invoke external threats and regime security to justify the continuous expansion of secret information collection, thereby allowing the purported imperatives of national security to take precedence over individual rights and the autonomy of society.

Should the NIB establish a highly centralised information-sharing mechanism with the National Police Agency, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, and the Ministry of Defence, while future counter-espionage legislation further broadens the scope of conduct subject to investigation and punishment, Japan could develop a modern surveillance system characterised by technological sophistication and digital interconnectivity. Such surveillance may not take the form of the overt repression characteristic of the pre-1945 period. Rather, it may impose more extensive constraints on society through security-clearance procedures, personnel background screening, big data behavioural analysis, and various administrative restrictions.

From a defensive posture to a proactive security strategy

The establishment of the NIB also carries symbolic significance in facilitating Japan's deeper integration into Western intelligence networks. A relevant policy document issued by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) explicitly refers to the counter-espionage practices of "Five Eyes" members and emphasises the need to strengthen intelligence cooperation with "like-minded countries."

Although Japan is unlikely to become a formal member of the "Five Eyes" in the short term, it is actively restructuring its own institutions with reference to the secrecy protection, counter-espionage, personnel-vetting, and information-sharing standards of "Five Eyes" countries. Through institutional compatibility and functional participation, Japan seeks to gradually attain intelligence-sharing arrangements approaching those enjoyed by formal members.

Moreover, the establishment of the NIB represents only the first step in Japan's broader expansion of its intelligence system. According to the overall plans advanced by the LDP, subsequent measures will include the establishment of an external intelligence agency, the development of a training system for intelligence personnel, the enactment of counter-espionage legislation, and the formulation of a national intelligence strategy. Once an external intelligence agency is established, Japan's intelligence activities may shift from their traditional dependence on intelligence supplied by allies and a predominantly defensive posture toward the active overseas collection of human intelligence and signals intelligence, as well as influence operations in the cognitive domain.

Intelligence capabilities do not in themselves inevitably lead to war, but they can provide support for long-range precision strikes, overseas military deployments, covert operations, cognitive warfare, and economic sanctions. At a time when Japan is simultaneously developing more offensive military capabilities, expanding arms exports, deepening mechanisms for joint allied operations, and preparing to establish an independent external intelligence agency, the creation of the NIB cannot be viewed in isolation. 

It demonstrates that Japan's efforts to move beyond the post-war framework have progressed from revising defence policy and expanding the authority of the Self-Defence Forces to restructuring the underlying institutional architecture through which state power operates. Japan is gradually constructing a comprehensive security system capable of continuously identifying threats, mobilising resources, controlling information, and taking actions both domestically and abroad.

Therefore, the greatest symbolic significance of the NIB lies in the transformation of Japan's purported "state normalization" into a process of "security-state formation" with greater capacity for comprehensive mobilisation. The real risk lies not in Japan having already restored its pre-war system. Rather, it lies in the gradual erosion of the dispersion of power, military restraint, and vigilance towards the secretive state machinery that developed during the post-war period. 

As counter-espionage legislation, the establishment of an external intelligence agency, and the formulation of a national intelligence strategy proceed, the institutional constraints and societal vigilance that have historically limited the expansion of secret state power, overseas military operations, and military expansion in post-war Japan will be further weakened. This will not only narrow the space for democratic oversight and civil liberties within Japan, but also further reinforce its posture of strategic competition toward China, accelerate the expansion of Western intelligence networks into East Asia, thereby heightening the risks of strategic miscalculations, security mistrust and the escalation of crises within the region.