Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia join forces: Rethinking Mideast security amid a multipolar shift

Editor's note: Leonardo Russo is a Brazilian journalist and international relations specialist, focusing on geopolitics, BRICS and the Global South. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

A major geopolitical shift is taking shape in West Asia.

Türkiye is a military heavyweight: a NATO member, the alliance's second-largest army, and a country with an increasingly sophisticated defense industry.

Pakistan is another major military power, possessing nuclear weapons and one of the largest armed forces in the world.

Saudi Arabia brings a different kind of power. It is one of the world's leading crude oil exporters, a major financial power, and the custodian of Mecca and Medina, Islam's two holiest cities. This gives Riyadh considerable religious prestige and influence across the Muslim world.

Now these three countries are moving closer together militarily.

On August 7, 2026, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, establishing a principle of collective defense: an armed attack against one of the three would be considered an attack against all of them.

For decades, the United States served as the principal external security guarantor for much of the region. American forces were stationed across a network of bases, particularly in the Gulf, while Washington presented its military presence as an essential pillar of regional stability.

However, the recent confrontation with Iran has exposed some of the weaknesses of that model.

American attacks on Iran were followed by Iranian strikes against US military positions and interests across the region. The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz added another layer of instability, demonstrating how quickly a confrontation involving Washington could affect countries far beyond the immediate battlefield.

For many regional governments, the lesson was clear: relying heavily on the US for security can also mean becoming vulnerable to decisions made in Washington.

This comes at a time when American public opinion is increasingly skeptical of prolonged military involvement abroad. After decades of wars and interventions, many Americans want their government to focus more attention and resources on domestic problems. Support for Israel has also declined significantly among key segments of the American population.

This does not mean the United States is leaving the region. Its military presence remains enormous, and its alliances remain important. But regional powers are increasingly looking for alternatives and seeking greater strategic autonomy.

Against this background, the agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan becomes easier to understand. Rather than relying exclusively on Washington, the three countries are attempting to create an additional security structure of their own.

Things will not change overnight, but the agreement is another indication that American dominance in the region is becoming less absolute.

That also creates more space for other powers. India, for example, has expanded its defense cooperation with the United Arab Emirates while maintaining close military and strategic relations with Israel. In a more multipolar regional order, countries are increasingly able to build relationships with several major powers at the same time rather than depend almost entirely on Washington.

However, there is one major question surrounding the new agreement. The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani arrangement has no equivalent common enemy.

Saudi Arabia has historically regarded Iran as one of its principal regional rivals and has also faced years of confrontation with the Houthis in Yemen. Yet Türkiye and Pakistan both maintain important relations with Tehran.

If another confrontation were to erupt between Saudi Arabia and Iran, would Türkiye and Pakistan really be willing to fight on Riyadh's behalf?

Türkiye presents another potential dilemma. Relations between Ankara and Israel have become increasingly hostile, and some Israeli strategists now openly discuss Türkiye as a possible future rival. However, Saudi Arabia has its own interests and relations with Israel. Would Riyadh be prepared to confront Israel on behalf of Türkiye?

Pakistan has its own security concerns. Relations with Afghanistan have periodically deteriorated, particularly over militant groups operating along the border. Would Türkiye and Saudi Arabia be prepared to become involved in such a confrontation on Pakistan's behalf?

This is perhaps the biggest question mark surrounding the agreement.

The three countries share an interest in greater strategic independence and closer military cooperation, but they do not necessarily share the same enemies, priorities or perceived threats.

For now, the agreement may be more politically significant than militarily decisive. But even if its practical effects remain limited, it sends an important message.

The regional order is changing. Countries that once depended heavily on American security guarantees are increasingly looking for alternatives, building new partnerships and taking greater responsibility for their own defense.

The Mecca agreement is another clear sign that the era of unquestioned American hegemony is weakening, and that a more multipolar world is taking shape.