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The US Treasury Building in Washington, DC, the United States. August 24, 2026. /Xinhua
The US Treasury Building in Washington, DC, the United States. August 24, 2026. /Xinhua
Editor's note: Jessica Durdu, a special commentator for CGTN, is a foreign affairs specialist with a PhD in law. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.
The latest round of US sanctions against Iran, presented under the striking title "Operation Economic Outcast," represents more than another episode in the long and already difficult relationship between Washington and Tehran. It reflects a broader approach to international politics in which economic dominance is increasingly employed as an instrument of geopolitical coercion. The underlying assumption appears to be that sufficiently intense financial pressure can compel a sovereign state to alter its policies or ultimately submit to externally defined demands. Yet history offers considerable reason to question whether such a strategy can achieve lasting political results.
Economic sanctions are often presented as an alternative to military conflict. In principle, targeted economic measures can be used to signal disapproval, create leverage and encourage diplomatic engagement. The problem emerges when sanctions move beyond persuasion and become an attempt at what US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described in relation to Iran as "economic asphyxiation." At that point, economic policy becomes a form of coercive power politics.
This reflects a hegemonic mindset: The belief that economic strength, control over financial infrastructure and the ability to impose secondary consequences on third countries can substitute for dialogue between sovereign states. The difficulty is that the international system is no longer structured around a single uncontested center of economic power. Global trade networks are increasingly diversified, regional economic partnerships are expanding and states facing pressure are actively searching for alternative financial and commercial mechanisms.
Historical experience demonstrates the limitations of trying to force political surrender through prolonged economic pressure. Cuba provides perhaps the clearest example. The United States has maintained various forms of economic restrictions against Cuba for more than six decades. These measures have undoubtedly imposed substantial economic costs, but they have not produced the fundamental political transformation that successive US administrations sought. Instead, the sanctions became part of a long-term cycle of confrontation and distrust.
Iran presents an equally important lesson. Washington's maximum pressure campaign during the first Trump administration imposed significant costs on the Iranian economy. However, economic hardship did not automatically translate into political capitulation. On the contrary, pressure frequently strengthened Tehran's determination to develop alternative economic partnerships and mechanisms for adapting to external restrictions.
The paradox is clear: Economic coercion can weaken an economy without necessarily weakening the political will of a state. In some circumstances, it can produce precisely the opposite effect by deepening resistance and reinforcing perceptions that national sovereignty is under external attack.
The consequences, moreover, do not remain confined to the targeted country. The Middle East is already experiencing an extremely fragile security environment, and further escalation between the United States and Iran risks producing consequences far beyond their bilateral relationship. Iran's strategic location makes this particularly significant. The Strait of Hormuz has long been one of the world's most critical energy chokepoints, through which a substantial portion of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade passes.
Any prolonged disruption in this region can therefore affect consumers and industries from Asia to Europe. Higher energy prices increase transportation and production costs, intensify inflationary pressures and create new uncertainty for developing economies. Recent disruptions to shipping routes elsewhere, including in the Red Sea, have already demonstrated how regional insecurity can quickly translate into higher global freight costs and longer supply chains. A serious crisis around the Strait of Hormuz would have potentially even broader consequences.
Merchant vessels stranded in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz, near Khasab, a small town in northern Oman, May 29, 2026. /Xinhua
Merchant vessels stranded in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz, near Khasab, a small town in northern Oman, May 29, 2026. /Xinhua
There is also an important contradiction in the attempt to expand unilateral sanctions through pressure on Iran's trading partners. In an interconnected global economy, efforts to force third countries and private companies to conform to one state's foreign policy can generate significant diplomatic and economic friction.
Countries such as Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq maintain their own economic interests and foreign-policy calculations. Expecting the international community to simply align with unilateral decisions under the threat of secondary sanctions risks turning a bilateral dispute into a wider confrontation.
This does not mean that the serious differences between Washington and Tehran should be ignored. Questions concerning regional security, nuclear issues and military capabilities require sustained and responsible diplomacy. But these challenges cannot be permanently resolved through blockades, threats or escalating economic pressure.
The current moment therefore requires a change in strategic thinking. The objective of diplomacy should not be the economic exhaustion of one side but the creation of conditions in which all parties have an interest in avoiding escalation. This requires dialogue that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of all relevant actors, rather than a framework built exclusively around demands and punishment.
The international community should resist the normalization of unilateral economic coercion as a substitute for diplomacy. A more stable Middle East will not emerge from economic strangulation, nor will global energy and trade security benefit from the expansion of confrontation. The lesson of decades of sanctions is not that more pressure will inevitably produce better results. It is that pressure without a credible diplomatic pathway can become an end in itself.
In international politics, economic power can create leverage; but leverage is not the same as legitimacy, and coercion is not the same as diplomacy. If the objective is genuine and sustainable security, the path forward must lead away from economic warfare and toward equal dialogue, negotiated compromise and a political settlement that recognizes the legitimate interests and security concerns of all sides.
(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)
The US Treasury Building in Washington, DC, the United States. August 24, 2026. /Xinhua
Editor's note: Jessica Durdu, a special commentator for CGTN, is a foreign affairs specialist with a PhD in law. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.
The latest round of US sanctions against Iran, presented under the striking title "Operation Economic Outcast," represents more than another episode in the long and already difficult relationship between Washington and Tehran. It reflects a broader approach to international politics in which economic dominance is increasingly employed as an instrument of geopolitical coercion. The underlying assumption appears to be that sufficiently intense financial pressure can compel a sovereign state to alter its policies or ultimately submit to externally defined demands. Yet history offers considerable reason to question whether such a strategy can achieve lasting political results.
Economic sanctions are often presented as an alternative to military conflict. In principle, targeted economic measures can be used to signal disapproval, create leverage and encourage diplomatic engagement. The problem emerges when sanctions move beyond persuasion and become an attempt at what US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described in relation to Iran as "economic asphyxiation." At that point, economic policy becomes a form of coercive power politics.
This reflects a hegemonic mindset: The belief that economic strength, control over financial infrastructure and the ability to impose secondary consequences on third countries can substitute for dialogue between sovereign states. The difficulty is that the international system is no longer structured around a single uncontested center of economic power. Global trade networks are increasingly diversified, regional economic partnerships are expanding and states facing pressure are actively searching for alternative financial and commercial mechanisms.
Historical experience demonstrates the limitations of trying to force political surrender through prolonged economic pressure. Cuba provides perhaps the clearest example. The United States has maintained various forms of economic restrictions against Cuba for more than six decades. These measures have undoubtedly imposed substantial economic costs, but they have not produced the fundamental political transformation that successive US administrations sought. Instead, the sanctions became part of a long-term cycle of confrontation and distrust.
Iran presents an equally important lesson. Washington's maximum pressure campaign during the first Trump administration imposed significant costs on the Iranian economy. However, economic hardship did not automatically translate into political capitulation. On the contrary, pressure frequently strengthened Tehran's determination to develop alternative economic partnerships and mechanisms for adapting to external restrictions.
The paradox is clear: Economic coercion can weaken an economy without necessarily weakening the political will of a state. In some circumstances, it can produce precisely the opposite effect by deepening resistance and reinforcing perceptions that national sovereignty is under external attack.
The consequences, moreover, do not remain confined to the targeted country. The Middle East is already experiencing an extremely fragile security environment, and further escalation between the United States and Iran risks producing consequences far beyond their bilateral relationship. Iran's strategic location makes this particularly significant. The Strait of Hormuz has long been one of the world's most critical energy chokepoints, through which a substantial portion of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade passes.
Any prolonged disruption in this region can therefore affect consumers and industries from Asia to Europe. Higher energy prices increase transportation and production costs, intensify inflationary pressures and create new uncertainty for developing economies. Recent disruptions to shipping routes elsewhere, including in the Red Sea, have already demonstrated how regional insecurity can quickly translate into higher global freight costs and longer supply chains. A serious crisis around the Strait of Hormuz would have potentially even broader consequences.
Merchant vessels stranded in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz, near Khasab, a small town in northern Oman, May 29, 2026. /Xinhua
There is also an important contradiction in the attempt to expand unilateral sanctions through pressure on Iran's trading partners. In an interconnected global economy, efforts to force third countries and private companies to conform to one state's foreign policy can generate significant diplomatic and economic friction.
Countries such as Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq maintain their own economic interests and foreign-policy calculations. Expecting the international community to simply align with unilateral decisions under the threat of secondary sanctions risks turning a bilateral dispute into a wider confrontation.
This does not mean that the serious differences between Washington and Tehran should be ignored. Questions concerning regional security, nuclear issues and military capabilities require sustained and responsible diplomacy. But these challenges cannot be permanently resolved through blockades, threats or escalating economic pressure.
The current moment therefore requires a change in strategic thinking. The objective of diplomacy should not be the economic exhaustion of one side but the creation of conditions in which all parties have an interest in avoiding escalation. This requires dialogue that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of all relevant actors, rather than a framework built exclusively around demands and punishment.
The international community should resist the normalization of unilateral economic coercion as a substitute for diplomacy. A more stable Middle East will not emerge from economic strangulation, nor will global energy and trade security benefit from the expansion of confrontation. The lesson of decades of sanctions is not that more pressure will inevitably produce better results. It is that pressure without a credible diplomatic pathway can become an end in itself.
In international politics, economic power can create leverage; but leverage is not the same as legitimacy, and coercion is not the same as diplomacy. If the objective is genuine and sustainable security, the path forward must lead away from economic warfare and toward equal dialogue, negotiated compromise and a political settlement that recognizes the legitimate interests and security concerns of all sides.
(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)