Editor's note: Andrey Kortunov, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, was director general (2011-2023) and academic director (2024-2025) of the Moscow-based Russian International Affairs Council. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily those of CGTN.

Since the inception of the initial "Shanghai Five" in 1996, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has been in the focus of innumerable critics from all corners of the world. Many analysts were concerned about the body's slow organizational maturation, its overly general mandate, the broad political declarations at SCO top-level gatherings, and potential institutional competition with BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, and so on.

These concerns often reflected understandable intellectual impatience multiplied by inflated and unrealistic expectations. Why is SCO not turning into a full-scale multilateral security group or into a collective security system in Eurasia? Why is it not evolving into a multi-faceted economic integration project similar to the European Union or at least into a continent-wide free trade zone? Why is SCO so slow in building its financial arms like a Development Bank or an Investment Fund?

At the same time, despite all this criticism, SCO has always been, and still remains, very attractive to many nations in Eurasia and even outside it. The number of its member states has been steadily growing from the initial "Shanghai Five" to 10. Two countries have received observer status with the SCO, 15 more have become its dialogue partners, and many more have expressed their interest in joining select SCO projects. 

Many leading international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized bodies, did not miss their chance to engage in various partnerships with the SCO. Notably, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, despite his busy schedule, accepted the invitation to attend this year's summit in Kyrgyzstan's capital. 

So, why is SCO so popular? An evident explanation is that the attractiveness of SCO is a reaction to the present institutional deficit in Eurasia, where one cannot find a full-fledged analog to the Organization of American States or the African Union – multilateral bodies that unite dozens of nations on a continental scale. 

Of course, Eurasia is larger and more diverse than Africa or even than both Americas, and multilateral bodies in this part of the world historically covered Eurasian sub-regions. Skeptics would argue that Eurasia is so enormous and has so many various faces that it is simply impossible to unite it under a single umbrella. 

It is also clear that a number of powerful external actors are interested in keeping Eurasia divided or rather fragmented – they look at all attempts to consolidate the continent in any possible format as a potential challenge to their hegemony that has to be fought off at any cost.

It is worth mentioning that the United Nations General Assembly resolution on cooperation between the UN and the SCO, passed in September of last year, received support from 120 nations, and the 27 votes against the resolution came mostly from the West. But no matter what overseas actors might try to achieve in the Eurasian space, their aspirations do not mean that a continent-wide body with a broad mandate is not needed in Eurasia. 

SCO may well be in the best position to fill the continental institutional vacuum. It goes without saying that SCO will always be as functional and as efficient as its member states allow it to be. SCO member states are deeply committed to their sovereignty, national independence, and multi-vector foreign policy. Such commitment may at some points slow down the overall pace of SCO maturation – the caravan is moving at the speed of the slowest camel. 

SCO members' core security and development interests overlap, but never fully coincide, and sometimes even collide with each other. These collisions inevitably put constraints on what a multilateral body can accomplish. And yet, SCO has already become an indispensable part of the emerging Eurasian security and development systems.

The forthcoming summit in Bishkek should undoubtedly make SCO even stronger. It is expected to approve changes to the organisation's Charter, launch new mechanisms to fund joint infrastructure and investment projects, and make important decisions on cooperation in new security domains – such as cybercrime, transborder drug trafficking and illicit migration. 

The focus on security will not come at the expense of the development agenda. SCO members will consider new practical measures to promote trade and investment, further coordinate their respective national energy transition strategies, as well as align their overall approaches to climate change and environmental protection.

In the modern, highly volatile and often quite erratic world, SCO remains one of the key anchors of stability and resilience. This is exactly why SCO will never go out of style like many other less solid and more situational initiatives.

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