Editor's Note: Xin Ge, a special commentator for CGTN, is a professor at the School of Public Administration and Policy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

When President Xi Jinping described China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) as both a blueprint for China's own development and a list of opportunities for the world, the wording amounted to more than a diplomatic turn of phrase. It pointed to the outward-facing logic of China's next stage of modernization: progress at home should also bring opportunities abroad. At a time of weak global growth, strained supply chains, and widening development gaps, that distinction is worth taking seriously.

Speaking at the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 13, President Xi outlined five initiatives: open-source and inclusive artificial intelligence, trade and investment facilitation, digital industry cooperation, smart manufacturing, and science and technology talent development. The list is specific enough to be useful. Countries that have heard grand development language before will judge the plan by its delivery, but the range of proposals suggests an effort to turn broad commitments into workable areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

For much of the Global South, the appeal is clear. Too many countries remain suppliers of raw materials and consumers of finished goods, locked into a division of labor that limits their room for growth. The proposed initiatives speak directly to their need for broader market access, modern industrial standards, technological support and trained workers.

Some of the proposed measures are strikingly practical. Special economic zone partnerships, "smart gateways" and closer policy coordination would ease the bureaucratic friction that raises the cost of trade and investment. Support for smart manufacturing would go a step further, helping partners build advanced factories and work with common technical standards. The digital and AI initiatives have a similar purpose: emerging markets need access to new technologies, but they also need engineers who can use and improve them.

From building connections to building capability

The emphasis has shifted from building connections to building capability. A new road or port can bring a factory within commercial reach, but it cannot, by itself, teach people to design products, establish standards or operate advanced machinery. Those abilities must be developed locally if industrial progress is to last.

This is where the accusation that China is "squeezing out" other developing economies begins to unravel. Western industrialization was built in part through colonial extraction, unequal treaties and control over raw materials. Many Global South economies were drawn into the modern world system on terms they had little power to shape.

China's cooperation model takes a different approach. Infrastructure comes first because industrialization is impossible without dependable transport, electricity and communications. Technology transfer, local production and professional training then give that foundation an economic purpose. Engineering alliances and youth science exchanges reflect a basic insight: development cannot be imported wholesale. It has to be built, maintained and eventually led by local people. Commercial interests remain part of the equation, as they should be. But cooperation is more likely to last when developing partners acquire capabilities that remain useful long after individual projects are completed.

No economic partnership is free from friction. Industrial upgrading involves competition, adjustment and difficult choices. Yet competition itself is not exploitation. The key question is whether partner economies receive the tools to move up the value chain. A framework combining market access, technical standards, industrial support and training expands their options rather than narrowing them.

China's zero-tariff treatment for the 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations illustrates how market access can be widened without imposing political conditions. As the 15th Five-Year Plan has been formulated, China has also sought to connect its domestic priorities with global development needs.

This approach differs sharply from the zero-sum thinking visible in "small yard, high fence" policies, weaponized supply chains and calls for decoupling. Such measures treat one country's technological progress as another's security threat. They raise costs, disrupt production networks and place the heaviest burden on poorer economies least able to absorb shocks.

One country's industrial advancement need not come at another's expense. For the Global South, China's modernization offers scale, experience and usable tools. For China, cooperation with developing economies creates new markets and shared sources of growth.

The rise of the Global South is now a defining feature of international affairs, but greater influence does not automatically produce prosperity. Countries still need infrastructure, technology, industrial standards, financing and skilled workers. The plan's potential value comes from treating these needs together rather than as isolated projects.

A development blueprint becomes globally meaningful when other countries can see their own prospects within it. The opportunities are tangible: wider market access, shared technologies, modern industrial standards and a new generation of trained engineers. Delivering on them will require sustained commitment, not only from China but also from its partners. Yet if that commitment holds, the plan will amount to more than a national road map. It will help more countries move from waiting for opportunities to creating them.